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ABSTRACT
FACULTY OF PHYSICAL AND APPLIED SCIENCES
SCHOOL OF ELECTRONICS AND COMPUTER SCIENCE
Doctor of Philosophy
Hardware Level Countermeasures Against Dierential Power Analysis
by Karthik Baddam
Hardware implementations of mathematically secure algorithms unintentionally
leak side channel information, that can be used to attack the device. Such attacks,
known as side channel attacks, are becoming an increasingly important aspect of
designing security systems. In this thesis, power analysis attacks are discussed
along with existing countermeasures. In the rst part of the thesis, the theory and
practice of side-channel attacks is introduced. In particular, it is shown that plain
implementations of block ciphers are highly susceptible to power-analysis attacks.
Dual rail precharge (DRP) circuits have already been proposed as an eective
countermeasure against power analysis attacks. DRP circuits suer from an im-
plementation problem; balancing the routing capacitance of dierential signals. In
this thesis we propose a new countermeasure, path switching, to address the rout-
ing problem in DRP circuits which has very low overheads compared to existing
methods. The proposed countermeasure is tested with simulations and experimen-
tally on an FPGA board. Results from these tests show a minimum of 75 times
increase in the power traces required for a rst order DPA attack.
Some of the existing countermeasures to address the routing problem in DRP cir-
cuits do not consider coupling capacitance between dierential signals. In this
thesis we propose a new method, divided backend duplication that eectively ad-
dresses balanced the routing problem of DRP circuits. The proposed countermea-
sure is tested with simulations and results show a minimum of 300 times increase
in the power traces required for a rst order DPA attack.
Randomisation as a DPA countermeasure is also explored. It is found that ran-
domising the power consumption of the cryptographic device itself has little impact
on DPA. Randomising the occurrence of intermediate results, on which DPA relies
on, has better eect at mitigating DPA.Contents
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Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Digital communications have become a major part of modern day life. As more and
more information is being transmitted electronically, ways to keep the information
safe from eavesdropping are becoming more complex. The value of information is
always increasing, while it is subjected to an increasing number of threats. One of
the common electronic transactions in everyday life is electronic banking, which
ranges from internet banking to credit/debit cards. The modern credit/debit
cards employ electronic circuits to authenticate the card holder. Such cards are
also referred to as smart cards. Security is becoming an important metric along
with cost, performance and power consumption in embedded systems such as
smart cards [77]. To prevent eavesdropping, all the systems employ some form of
cryptographic algorithm.
Cryptography is the science of protecting information. A cryptographic algorithm
is a function that uses a secret key to encrypt information and without the knowl-
edge of the secret key decrypting this information would be impossible. An attack
on a cryptographic algorithm is the act of decrypting the encrypted information
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without the knowledge of the secret key 1. Sometimes this is also referred as
breaking an algorithm. During the past years, there has been lot of research on
cryptography and as a result there are several algorithms that provide data secu-
rity and authenticity, such as RSA [79], ECC [28, 52], AES [57], DES [58], TDES
[60] and DSA [59]. These cryptographic algorithms are well studied and breaking
them is considered to be computationally infeasible, provided they are used with
the suggested key size. Although the above cryptographic algorithms are com-
putationally infeasible to break, providing security in practice is still a challenge.
All cryptographic algorithms rely on the fact that the secret key is kept secret.
If the secret key is available to a third party then all the security provided by a
application using this secret key is lost.
Smart cards are credit card sized devices used for a variety of security applications
like ID cards, credit/debit cards, Cellular telephony, pay TV. Smart cards generally
contain a microprocessor, volatile memory, non-volatile memory and optionally
hardware accelerators for cryptographic functions. Smart cards also contain the
secret key used in the secure application. For example, a smart card can be used to
authenticate its holder. Consequently the ability to keep what is being processed
on the smart card and its memory are becoming important. For example, if an
attacker were to determine the secret key of a credit/debit card, the attacker could
then essentially print money. Thus the cryptographic scheme used in such devices
comes under more and more scrutiny.
Most attacks on cryptographic systems in the past have concentrated on the math-
ematics of the cryptographic algorithm. It has been assumed that if the cryp-
tographic algorithm is secure then its implementation will also be secure, until
1All cryptographic algorithms have a known attack called brute force attack. In this an
attacker tries every possible combination of the secret key. However, in practice, this is not
computationally feasible because the time required to try all possible keys, for example, of a 128
bit key (3:4  1038combinations) on a current generation computer takes few hundred of yearsChapter 1 Introduction 3
Kocher published timing attacks [30], and power analysis attacks [31]. Unfor-
tunately the device implementing the mathematically secure cryptographic algo-
rithm may leak certain information, called side channel information (it's called side
channel as the device and not the cryptographic algorithm is leaking information),
which can be used to nd the secret key of that device. Time taken and power
consumed are a common side channel information. Timing attacks depend on the
fact that a dierent amount of time is taken for dierent operations. Power anal-
ysis and electromagnetic analysis depends on the fact that the hardware running
the cryptographic algorithm consumes dierent amounts of power or emits dier-
ent electromagnetic signals depending on the data being processed or operations
performed. Attacks on cryptographic systems that use side channel information
are called side channel attacks.
Dierential power analysis (DPA) attack is a type of power side channel attack
that uses statistical analysis. DPA uses power side channel leakage from several
encryptions (called number of traces) of the cryptographic device on one hand and
the attackers hypothetical power consumption of the cryptographic device on the
other; and uses statistical correlation to report the most likely value of the secret
key. It is shown that one of the current state-of-the-art encryption algorithm,
AES, has been successfully attacked using DPA [62] and that DPA can be used to
attack implementations of otherwise mathematically secure encryption algorithms
[31]. Attacks that build on DPA have also been published, these are Second Order
DPA and Template attacks. Second order DPA [50] attacks use the attacker's
hypotheses about the side channel leakage of a device at two moments in time.
Template attacks [15] consist of a two phase strategy: rst a template of side
channel leakage is build based on an identical but dierent cryptographic device
as the one in the attack. Second, the side channel leakage from the attacked device
is matched against the pre-characterised templates. These attacks are normally
referred to as higher order dierential power analysis attacks (HODPA).4 Chapter 1 Introduction
To defend against DPA attacks, several countermeasures have been proposed, and
have various costs associated with them; either increase in area and/or diculty
in implementing them. These countermeasures include dual rail precharge logic
styles [91, 94], algorithmic masking [1, 66], gate level masking [69, 103], and ran-
domisation [8, 112].
1.2 Research Objectives
The main objective of this research is to investigate and nd hardware level coun-
termeasures to prevent DPA attacks on cryptographic systems. Dual rail precharge
countermeasures have been shown to remove data dependent power consumption,
however implementing them in a secure way is shown to be dicult. Our rst
objective is to investigate and extend dual rail precharge countermeasures that
can be easily implemented. Existing randomisation countermeasures at hardware
level are shown to have low area costs associated with them. Our second objective
is to investigate randomisation countermeasures at hardware level and compare
them against other existing countermeasures.
Summary of our objectives are:
 To investigate and extend dual rail precharge countermeasures that can be
easily implemented.
 To investigate randomisation countermeasures at hardware level.
1.3 Scope and Assumptions
We needed a way to measure the eectiveness of countermeasures against DPA
on cryptographic designs. To achieve this, we used these as our test designs:Chapter 1 Introduction 5
DES Sbox, AES Sbox and AES design. We used rst-order DPA attack in our
evaluations to measure DPA resistance and did not consider HODPA and template
attacks. We assume that any resistance gained by a countermeasure against DPA,
when compared to a DPA on an unprotected implementation, will also be gained
against HODPA and template attacks, when compared to HODPA and template
attack on an unimplemented design. In the remainder of the thesis, we refer to
rst order DPA as DPA.
1.4 Research Contributions
Our research objectives have led to the following contributions:
 We have developed a simulation based power analysis setup that aids in
power analysis attacks. This setup can be used to evaluate the counter-
measures that prevent power analysis attacks. We have also developed an
FPGA based power analysis setup for the same purpose. Both these setups
are congurable, such that any design can be evaluated for power analysis
attacks.
 Dual rail precharge logic styles have been already proposed as a countermea-
sure for power analysis attacks. We have shown that dual rail precharge cir-
cuits are vulnerable to DPA if the routing capacitance of dierential signals
is not properly balanced. To solve the dual rail dierential routing problem
we have proposed a new countermeasure, path switching, to improve DPA
resistance. We have published results from this work in [3, 4].
 Exiting solutions to solve the dual rail dierential routing problem do not
consider coupling capacitance. To address this we have proposed a new
method, called divided backend duplication. We have published results from
this work in [2].6 Chapter 1 Introduction
 A C++ program has been developed to aid in the transformation from a
normal circuit to a dual rail precharge circuit. Further enhancements have
been made to this program to incorporate path switching and divided back-
end duplication solutions. Scripts have also been written that automate the
divided backend duplication process. These programs can be easily adopted
to implement any design in dual rail precharge logic style.
 Randomisation countermeasures are also explored as a solution to prevent
power analysis attacks. It is shown that randomising the power consumption
itself does not prevent DPA.
1.5 Thesis Organisation
The organisation of the thesis is as follows:
 Chapter 2 introduces the basic concepts of cryptography and then discusses
side channel attacks, particularly dierential power analysis attacks.
 Chapter 3 classies exiting countermeasures against DPA and gives a brief
overview of some of the existing solutions to prevent DPA.
 Chapter 4 introduces DPA ow developed during the course of this research.
DPA results from simulation based DPA ow and measurements on a FPGA
are presented.
 In Chapter 5 DRP logic is introduced as a solution to prevent DPA. Later
it is shown that routing of dual rail nets poses a problem to the security of
dual rail precharge logic designs. Path switching is proposed as a solution to
overcome the balanced routing problem in dual rail designs. Based on sim-
ulation and real FPGA experiments, we show that path switching increases
DPA resistance of dual rail logic styles.Chapter 1 Introduction 7
 In Chapter 6 discusses the shortcomings of existing methods for routing
balanced dual rail nets. Another countermeasure, called divided backend
duplication is proposed as a solution to overcome balanced routing in dual
rail logic styles.
 Chapter 7 is about randomisation countermeasures to prevent DPA. Various
randomisation methods are discussed to counteract DPA.
 Finally Chapter 8 contains our conclusions about side channel attacks and
its countermeasures. Future research points are also discussed.
 Appendix A shows the research papers written as part of the work that led
to the production of this thesis.
 Appendix B contains tabular listing of DPA results based on our FPGA
setup.Chapter 2
Cryptography and Side Channel
Attacks
2.1 Introduction
Cryptography is the science of protecting information. Cryptography is used in
most secure applications such as including smart cards. In the rst part of this
chapter, basic techniques and theory of cryptography are reviewed. Cryptography
is a vast subject and as a result, only the most basic terms are reviewed. For
further information about cryptography, we refer the reader to a standard text
such as [82]. In the later part of this chapter, side channel attacks are reviewed.
2.2 Basic Review of Cryptography
A cryptographic algorithm is a function that uses a secret key to encrypt infor-
mation. The process, where the message is encrypted, is called encryption. The
input to encryption process is generally referred to as plaintext and the output
from the encryption process is referred to as ciphertext. It is important to note
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secret KEY secret KEY
encryption decryption
Alice encrypts her message Bob decrypts Alice’s message
Eve listening to open channel
Alice’s message encrypted message Alice’s message
open channel
Figure 2.1: Process showing usage of Cryptography to securely communicate
between Alice and Bob
that it is dicult, if not impossible, to obtain the plaintext from ciphertext with-
out knowledge of the secret key. Decryption is the inverse of encryption where,
the ciphertext and secret key is used to obtain the plaintext.
2.2.1 Why Use Cryptography?
Consider an example, where Alice has to send a secret message to Bob and does
not want anyone else to see this message. Eve is interested in knowing what the
message is, so she taps into the communication line that Alice and Bob use. If Alice
sends her message as is (i.e, without encrypting it), then Eve or anyone else who
can see the message can understand what that message is about. To prevent such
eavesdropping, Alice and Bob decide to use cryptography to communicate. Alice
and Bob meet beforehand and agree on a cryptographic algorithm and a secret
key to use. Later on when Alice needs to communicate with Bob, she encrypts her
message with the secret key and then sends it to Bob. Even though Eve can see
the encrypted message, it is useless without the knowledge of the secret key. Bob
on the other hand, can see Alice's message by decrypting the message he received,
as he already has the same secret key that Alice used for encrypting. This process
is depicted in Figure 2.1. Thus, by using cryptography Alice and Bob can securely
communicate without having to worry about eavesdropping.
Although the example discussed above is simple, it shows the need for cryptogra-
phy and how it can be used to securely communicate between two parties.Chapter 2 Cryptography and Side Channel Attacks 11
2.2.2 Symmetric Cryptography
In Symmetric Cryptography, the same secret key is used for encryption and de-
cryption, as shown in Figure 2.9. Thus secret key K will be used in both encryp-
tion, C = E(P, K) and decryption, P = D(C, K). Decryption is the inverse
operation of encryption, i.e, P = D(E(P, K), K).
There are two types of symmetric cryptographic algorithms, block ciphers and
stream ciphers. A block cipher operates on n-bit plaintext and produces n-bit
ciphertext as output, n being the block size. Current block ciphers usually operate
on 128 bit blocks.
A stream cipher on the other hand, operates on smaller units of plaintext, usually
bits. Stream ciphers encrypts data as it comes, i.e, it does not need xed length
data to operate on. Stream ciphers employ random number generators to encrypt
their data and they work on a continuous stream of data. With a block cipher,
encryption of any particular plaintext will result in the same ciphertext when the
same key is used. On the other hand, ciphertext from a stream cipher will vary
depending on when they are encountered during the encryption process. Block
ciphers can be adapted to act as stream ciphers, although bespoke stream ciphers
are generally faster and less complex than block ciphers.
2.2.2.1 Block Ciphers
Block ciphers are so called, because they operate on n-bit blocks. A block ci-
pher operates on n-bit plaintext and produces n-bit ciphertext as output and is
dependent on the secret key. Block ciphers often use diusion and confusion to
encrypt data. Diusion means the redundancy in the plaintext and secret key are
dissapated in the ciphertext. Even a change in single input bit will be diused
over several ciphertext bits and hence it will be dicult for the attacker to gain12 Chapter 2 Cryptography and Side Channel Attacks
knowledge about the plaintext from the ciphertext. Confusion refers to making
the relationship between inputs and the ciphertext as complex as possible. Even
if an attacker can gure out some ciphertext patters, he cannot use the cipher
method and patterns to gure out the secret key.
A cipher that combines two or more simple operations in a manner intending
that the resulting cipher is more secure than the individual components, is called
a product cipher. These simple operations usually increase either confusion or
diusion. A cipher involving the sequential repetition of an internal function is
called an iterated block cipher. This internal function is also referred to as a
round function. Although block ciphers represent a very complicated transforma-
tion most are composed of repeating iterations of simpler functions, also called
iterated product ciphers. Two popular schemes for designing block ciphers are
Substitution-Permutation (SP) networks and Feistel networks.
A SP network is a product cipher composed of a number of stages each involving
substitutions and permutations. During substitution the data is separated into
smaller blocks and the values in these blocks are substituted for others, typically
using a lookup table called s-box, this increases the confusion. Permutation works
across several blocks and mixes the data, swapping bits or combining values so
the inuence of data from one part of the plaintext is diused through the whole
ciphertext.
Feistel networks are a subset of SP networks, so are also made up of a number of
stages each involving substitutions and permutations. The dierence is that, the
plaintext is split into two equal halves and the round function is applied to the
right hand half. The result is then XOR-ed with the left hand side and becomes
the new right hand side. The original right hand side then becomes the new left
hand side. An advantage of Feistel networks is that encryption and decryption is
very similar.Chapter 2 Cryptography and Side Channel Attacks 13
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Figure 2.2: DES block diagram and round function
Some of the common symmetric block cryptographic algorithms are Data Encryp-
tion Standard (DES) [58], TDES [60] and Advanced Encryption Standard [57]. An
example of an algorithm based on SP network is AES. An example of an algorithm
based on a Feistel network is DES.
2.2.2.2 DES
The Data Encryption Standard (DES) was standardised in 1976 by National Bu-
reau of Standards and was developed by IBM. DES is a block cipher that works
on 64-bit blocks of data and uses 56-bit key and is based on Feistel networks [58].
Block diagram of DES is shown in Figure 2.2(a). As it can be seen, it has an Initial
Permutation stage, series of round functions and nally a Final Permulation stage.
The round function operates on the right half of the input block and round key.
There are a total of 16 rounds in DES.14 Chapter 2 Cryptography and Side Channel Attacks
The round function is shown in Figure 2.2(b). In the rst stage of round function,
32-bit input is expanded into 48-bit. The expanded data is then xor-ed with the
round key and split into eight 6-bit blocks. Each 6-bit block is then put through
a dierent s-box with 4-bit output and the resulting eight 4-bit blocks are re-
arranged by a xed permutation.
The 56-bit key is expanded into sixteen 48-bit round key. This is achieved by
splitting the initial 56-bit into two halves. Each 28-bit half is then rotated left by
either one or two bits depending on the round. From this 24 bits are then selected
from each half by a xed permutation. The process is repeated for each round.
Although the design details of DES are not published, the details of all the per-
mutations, expansion and s-boxes are published and are part of the standard.
Security of DES
DES only uses a 56-bit key, this gives 7:2  1016 possible key combinations. In
the 1970s this was adequate for brute force attacks to be infeasible. However
with the current generation computers, this is no longer true. To highlight this
fact RSA Security created a series of contests called the DES Challenges. The
rst challenge was in 1997 and was solved by the DESCHALL project in 96 days,
which was a distributed computing project designed to break DES. Less than a
year later in Feb 1998, a team from Distributed.net cracked DES in 41 days. In
2006 the universities of Bochum and Kiel developed COPACOBANA, which can
retrive the correct DES key in an average of of 7.2 days and all keys can be tested
in 14.4 days. COPACOBANA is built using o the self components and had 120
FPGAs. Cost to build COPACOBANA is less than $10;000 [37].
DES can no longer be considered secure against brute force attacks. In order
to increase the security against brute force attacks without having to change to
a dierent algorithm a variant of DES, called Triple DES, was developed and isChapter 2 Cryptography and Side Channel Attacks 15
discussed in Section 2.2.2.3. In 1997 NIST announced the development of a new
standard, to replace DES. It was published in 2002 and is called the Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) and is discussed in Section 2.2.2.4.
2.2.2.3 Double and Triple DES
To make DES secure without signicantly changing the underlying algorithm,
two variants of DES have been proposed, namely Double DES and Trible DES.
Double DES refers to the use of two DES blocks with two seperate keys, eectively
doubling the DES key length from 56-bit to 112-bit. In Triple DES (TDES), three
DES blocks with three dierent keys are used. A common structure of TDES is
linking the DES encryption blocks in series. This is commonly called as EEE as
all the steps are encryptions. To make TDES backward compatible with DES an
EDE structure is used, i.e, the second block is DES decryption block. If the three
keys to TDES EDE are same, then its operation is same as a DES encryption.
One would expect that by using Double DES the key space would increase to 2562.
Die and Hellman [18] have shown that this is not true by developing meet in the
middle attack [18]. It is a known plaintext attack where the attacker calculates
one encryption of the plaintext for all possible n keys and stores the results. Then
the attacker calculates one decryption of the ciphertext for each key in turn, if the
result is also in the previous list of results then it is likely that the correct keys
have been found. This can then be veried with another plaintext and ciphertext
pair. For this reason double DES would not increase the security from 22n, but
only to 2n+1. Although a three key TDES has a key size of 168-bit, but due to the
meet in the middle attack the eective security it provides is only 112-bit.16 Chapter 2 Cryptography and Side Channel Attacks
2.2.2.4 AES
In January 1997 the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) body
announced the initiation of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) develop-
ment eort, to replace the ageing DES. Its aim is to create a new standard for a
block cipher that would provide secure encryption.
SubByte
SubByte
Key Unit SubByte
Key Unit SubByte
Figure 2.3: AES round operation
In October 2001 the algorithm Rijndael, developed by Vincent Rijmen and Joan
Daemen, was selected to be AES [57]. AES is a symmetric block cipher that
is based on SP networks. The structure of AES is shown in Figure 2.3. AES
operates on a state that is initialized with a plaintext block, and after encryptionChapter 2 Cryptography and Side Channel Attacks 17
this contains the ciphertext. The state can be pictured as a rectangular array of
byte of four rows and four columns.
AES consists of a number of rounds, each round makes a number of transformations
on a state, and uses a round key derived from the encryption key. AES supports
three dierent key lengths and the number of rounds is dependent on the key
length. The number of rounds is 10 for 128, 12 for 196 and 14 for 256 bit key.
An encryption of an input block starts with AddRoundKey transformation. This
is followed by an odd number of regular rounds, and ends with a special nal
round. Each AES round function, except the nal round, consists of four trans-
formations: the SubByte, the ShiftRows, the MixColumns, and the AddRoundKey,
while the nal round does not have the MixColumns transformation. All AES
transformations are invertible which makes decryption possible. In this section
encryption transformations are breiy discussed.
SubByte Transformation
SubByte is generally called as S-box or substitution box, is a non linear byte
substitution, operating on each of the state bytes independent of the round and
the position of the byte.
S-box is constructed by composing two transofrmations: rst by taking the mul-
tiplicative inverse in the nite eld GF(28), then by applying the ane transfor-
mation over GF(2), given by Equation 2.1.
b
0
i = bi  b(i+4) mod 8  b(i+5) mod 8  b(i+6) mod 8  b(i+7) mod 8  ci (2.1)18 Chapter 2 Cryptography and Side Channel Attacks
S-box operates on individual bytes of the state, as shown in Figure 2.4. a0;0
represents the 8 MSB's of the plaintext and a3;3 represents the 8 LSB's of the
plaintext.
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Figure 2.4: S-box operation on states
S-box can be implemented as look-up tables, which take up lot of memory, or
in combinational logic using composite eld arithmetic. The advantage of im-
plementing S-box in combinational logic is that they take smaller area. In [115]
composite eld arithmetic has been briey introduced and details are given for
implementing S-box. In [57], s-box lookup table values are given.
dx￿
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Figure 2.5: Composite led implementation of S-box
ShiftRows Transformation
ShiftRow is a simple shifting transformation. The rows of the state are cyclically
shifted over dierent osets. Row 0 is not shifted, Row 1 is shifted over 1 byte,
Row 2 is shifted over 2 bytes and Row 3 is shifted over 3 bytes.
Figure Figure 2.6 illustrates the ShiftRow transformation. In actual hardware
ShiftRows does not take any area, only the output of S-box should be rotated
accordingly before passing it to MixColumn.Chapter 2 Cryptography and Side Channel Attacks 19
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Figure 2.6: Shift Rows transformation.
The MixColumn Transformation
The MixColumn transformation considers the four bytes in each column of the
state, as the coecient of a polynomial over GF(28) and multiplied by a(x) modulo
x4+1, where
a(x) = (03)16 x
3 + (01)16 x
2 + (01)16 x + (02)16 (2.2)
In matrix form MixColumn can be represented as
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2
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Ecient implementation of MixColumn presented in [115], shown in Figure 2.7, is
summarised here. XTime does the constant multiplication by (02)16. This can be
written as
(02)16S = xS
= s7x
8 + s6x
7 + s5x
6 + s4x
5 + s3x
4 + s2x
3 + s1x
2 + s0xmod p(x)
= s6x
7 + s5x
6 + s4x
5 + (s3 + s7)x
4 + (s2 + s7)x
3 + s1x
2 + (s0 + s7)x + s7 (2.3)
Thus XTime can be implemented only by 3 XOR gates, with 1 XOR gate in the
critical path.
AddRoundKey Transformation
In this operation a round key (generated by RoundKey generation block from the
secret key) is bitwise XOR-ed with state.
RoundKey Generation (Key Expansion)
The RoundKey process in AES generates an array of 4(Nr + 1) 4-byte words. The
Key expansion process can be described by the pseudo code listed below.Chapter 2 Cryptography and Side Channel Attacks 21
for i = 0 to Nk   1
wi = keyi
end
for i = Nk to 4(Nr + 1)   1
temp = wi 1
if (i mod Nk = 0)
temp = SubByte(RotWord(wi 1)) XOR Rcon( i
Nk)
else if (Nk > 6 and i mod Nk = 4)
temp = SubByte(wi 1)
end if
wi = wi Nk XOR temp
end
In RoundKey Generation process, SubByte applies S-box transformation. Rot-
Word cyclically shifts each byte in a word to the left. Rcon is a constant word
array with leftmost byte in each array as nonzero. [80] implemented Rcon in
combinational logic as shown in Figure 2.8.
  a￿
7￿   a￿
6￿   a￿
5￿   a￿
4￿   a￿
3￿   a￿
2￿   a￿
1￿   a￿
0￿
Initial value {00000001}￿ 2￿
Figure 2.8: Rcon in combinational logic.
2.2.3 Asymmetric Cryptography
A common problem with symmetric cryptography is key distribution. For example,
consider the case when Alice has to securely communicate with Bob. To use
symmetric cryptography to encrypt their messages, Alice and Bob should exchange
the secret key beforehand and ensure that it is not leaked to anyone else. Also
both Alice and Bob have to ensure the secrecy of the key after the exchange. Once22 Chapter 2 Cryptography and Side Channel Attacks
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decryption
plain text plain text cipher text
encryption
Figure 2.9: Symmetric Cryptography
the keys are exchanged, Alice and Bob can securely communicate and both have
to maintain one secret key.
Now consider a scenario where Alice has to communicate separately with 100 of
her friends. She has to exchange 100 secret keys beforehand and maintain them.
Thus key distribution becomes a problem with symmetric cryptography.
In asymmetric cryptography, a dierent key is used for encryption and decryp-
tion, as shown in Figure 2.10. RSA [79] and ECC [28, 52] are the most popular
asymmetric ciphers. In all asymmetric cryptographic algorithms, the keys come
as pairs and are commonly referred to as the public key and private key. The
public key, as the name suggests, is kept in the public domain so that anyone can
access it. The private key on the other hand is kept secret. Although these keys
are related, it would be dicult to deduce the private key given the public key,
as these algorithms rely on solving a computationally intractable problem. For
example, RSA relies on the diculty of solving eth root modulo n (where e and n
are the RSA public key) [79].
Now lets say both Alice and Bob publish their public keys, keyApub and keyBpub
respectively, while they keep their private keys keyApri and keyBpri in a secure
location. When Alice wants to communicate with Bob, she looks up his public
key, keyBpub, and uses it to encrypt her message. As Bob is the only one with
a private key to decrypt Alice's message, she can send it to Bob via an open
channel. Bob uses his private key, keyBpri, to decrypt Alice's message. Similarly,
if Bob wants to send a message to Alice, he will use Alice's public key to encrypt hisChapter 2 Cryptography and Side Channel Attacks 23
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Figure 2.10: Asymmetric Cryptography
message. When received, Alice will use her private key to decrypt Bob's message.
Thus using asymmetric cryptography eliminates the need to exchange the secret
key beforehand. It also removes the burden of sharing their secret key with anyone
else. Now even if Alice has to communicate with 100 of her friends, she only has
to manage her private key.
Although asymmetric cryptography solves the key distribution problem, its per-
formance is quite slow when compared to symmetric cryptography. As a result, a
combination of both types are used. For example, Alice uses Bob's public key to
encrypt the symmetric algorithm's secret key she will use later on. Bob acknowl-
edges this, by rst decrypting Alice's message and then encrypting the secret key
with Alice's public key. Now both Alice and Bob can use a faster symmetric
algorithm to communicate with a key they both agreed upon.
2.3 Attacks on Cryptographic Devices
Cryptanalysis is a process to attempt to circumvent the security of a crypto-
graphic algorithm. The cryptanalyst is usually referred to as the attacker. Tra-
ditional cryptanalysis is based on the observation of inputs and outputs of the
cryptographic device. The cryptanalyst would attempt to extract the secret key
based on these observations or choice and some knowledge of the implemented
algorithms. This has led to the development of mathematically more secure algo-
rithms, such as AES, where extracting the secret keys based on the input output24 Chapter 2 Cryptography and Side Channel Attacks
relation is extremely dicult. Even though the algorithm is secure from a math-
ematical point of view, its hardware implementation can often be used to extract
the secret key. On devices that implement cryptographic algorithms, the attacker
can mount many dierent types of attacks. Attacks can be classied into invasive
types or non-invasive types.
Invasive attacks are those which leave a physical evidence of tampering on the
device. K ommerling and Kuhn [33] have discussed many invasive approaches to
attack smart cards, such as de-packing smart card chips, memory reverse en-
gineering, and micro probing. A secure cryptosystem is usually equipped with
electromagnetic shielding, low-pass lters, and clock signal generators to protect
it from most invasive attacks.
Non-invasive attacks are those that do not physically tamper with the device,
instead they use information that is leaked from the device to attack. For either
type of attack, it is necessary to have physical access to the cryptographic device.
Non-invasive attacks are also commonly referred to as side channel attacks and
are discussed in the rest of this chapter.
2.4 Side Channel Attacks
A side channel attack is an attack on cryptographic device which exploits unin-
tentionally leaked information. Side channel attacks are a major threat to secure
devices, as these attacks can be carried out with relatively inexpensive compo-
nents. Without necessary countermeasures to protect secure devices, side channel
attacks can allow an attacker to reveal the secret key from these secure devices.
Side channel attacks on smart cards were rst discussed in 1996 by Kocher. Since
then many variation of side channel attacks have been published. Although Kocher
was the 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basic concept of side channels existed before. For example many safes that used
rotary combination locks were cracked by listening to sounds while trying to ma-
nipulate the combination locks . Here sound from the safe is treated as side channel
leakage, which is an unintentional leakage from the implementation of the safe.
Many movies often depict the process of safe-cracking by listening to noise.
2.5 Side Channel Attack Scenarios
Cryptographic algorithms are used in various applications. An electronic device
that implements or executes a cryptographic algorithm is usually called a cryp-
tographic device or cryptographic system or cryptosystem in short. One of the
applications of cryptography is in smart cards. Smart cards are like electronic
vaults that are used to protect the data they contain. Only after authenticating
a card reader, the smart card provides some information. Some of the common
applications of smart cards are bank credit/debit cards, GSM phone SIM cards,
physical access control cards, pay TV cards, etc. More recently passports are
also incorporating cryptographic devices. In all these applications security of the
cryptographic devices is of utmost importance. This means the secret key used in
these devices should not be accessible by unauthorised persons.
In many applications even the legitimate owner/user of a smart card is also not
allowed to access the secret key. An example of this is the pay TV user who is
not allowed to make extra money by duplicating and selling subscriptions on his
pay TV card. Another example is an electronic purse, where the owner cannot
increase the amount held in the electronic purse. Therefore an owner/user of a
cryptographic device also has motivation to attack it.
In applications such as e-passports and physical access control cards a third person
may have an interest to impersonate the owner/user of such cards. In such cases26 Chapter 2 Cryptography and Side Channel Attacks
the attacker may take the cryptographic device for a short period of time to mount
an attack and then return the device.
Whatever the motivation for attacking a cryptographic device, it is important to
note that access to the cryptographic device is necessary to implement side channel
attacks. Apart from the input/output to the cryptographic device, the attacker
would be able to measure the side channel information leaked during the device
operation.
2.6 Side Channel Leakage Types
As a cryptographic device processes input data, that is it either performs encryp-
tion or decryption, it emits information outside of the device that is dependent on
the data being processed. This information leakage is not a result of intentional
design of the device, but rather a by-product during the device operation. The
name 'side channel leakage' is used as this information can be considered as a side
eect of the cryptographic device operation.
As the secret key is a part of the data processed by the cryptographic device, any
side channel leaked from a cryptographic device will be related to the device's se-
cret key. Attacks on the cryptographic device, to nd the secret key, that use the
side channel leakage are called side channel attacks. The most common side chan-
nel leakages are execution time, power consumption and electro-magnetic(EM)
radiation. Some of the newly invented side channel attacks on PC/servers, called
as cache-timing attacks do not need physical access to the target device, instead
they need the access to run a program on the target device [63, 67] . These attacks
exploit the cache dependency of the executing algorithm to extract the secret key.Chapter 2 Cryptography and Side Channel Attacks 27
Execution Time
Some cryptographic algorithms perform operations based on a single bit of the se-
cret key. For example, in implementations of asymmetric ciphers such as ECC and
RSA, operations such as additions and multiplications are controlled by individual
key bits [28, 52, 79]. Often a single key bit decides whether addition is performed
instead of multiplication. This leads to dierent execution times, based on the
operation selected. Thus, in such algorithms, execution time will be dependent on
the secret key. Kocher [30] rst published attacks based on execution time. These
attacks are referred to as timing side channel attacks or timing attacks. One way
to counteract timing attacks is by making all operations consume the same amount
of time can prevent timing attacks. We do not consider attacks based on execution
time in this thesis.
Power Consumption and Electromagnetic Emanations
Power and Electromagnetic (EM) leakage are the mostly exploited side channel
leakage types against cryptographic devices. The majority of cryptographic de-
vices are implemented using CMOS logic. The power consumption of CMOS logic
is data dependent. Thus, power consumption as well as the EM eld that is caused
by the currents owing in a cryptographic circuit implemented in CMOS leak in-
formation about the secret key. Kocher et al. [31] rst published attacks based on
power consumption namely, simple power analysis (SPA) attacks and dierential
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2.7 Power Consumption of CMOS Logic
Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS) logic is the most widely
used logic style in designing digital semiconductor devices. CMOS gates consist
of two parts, a pull up network consisting of pmos transistors and a pull down
network consisting of nmos transistors. These two parts are complementary, i.e,
only one of these networks is conductive at a time. For a detailed description of
CMOS logic we refer the reader to these text books [75, 108].
Power consumption in CMOS consists of three components, namely 1)dynamic
power, 2)short circuit power and 3)static power. Dynamic power is the major
source of total power consumption and is the result of charging and discharging of
load capacitance. Dynamic power consumption is given by the following equation:
Pdyn =  CloadV
2
dd f (2.4)
In Equation 2.4,  is the switching activity factor of the circuit, Cload is the load
capacitance including the parasitic capacitance, Vdd is the supply voltage and f
is the circuit's operating frequency. The switching activity factor  is, in turn,
dependent on the circuit's input data and is a measure of the 0 ! 1 transitions on
the output of CMOS gates. For a given circuit, if the supply voltage and frequency
are constant so the resulting dynamic power consumption is directly dependent
on the processed data. More importantly a 0 ! 1 transition consumes a dierent
amount of power than 1 ! 0 transition, while 1 ! 1 and 0 ! 0 transitions (or
lack of transition) consume signicantly less power. This data dependent power
consumption of CMOS circuits makes power analysis attacks possible.
Short circuit power is caused when CMOS gates transition either 0 ! 1 or 1 ! 0.
When the CMOS gate's output changes state, both the pull up network and pull
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causes a direct path between the supply voltage and ground and hence power dis-
sipation. Short circuit power consumption is also referred to as direct path power
consumption. Like dynamic power consumption, short circuit power consumption
is dependent on switching activity factor, . In some literature, short circuit power
is considered as a part of the circuits total dynamic power.
The static power consumption of a circuit is given by the following equation:
Pstatic = Istatic Vdd (2.5)
where Istatic is the current that ows between the supply rails when the circuit
is stable, i.e, no operation (no switching activity). Static power consumption is
also referred to as leakage power. As CMOS technology scales down, static power
consumption tends to be the major portion of the total power consumption [38].
Static power consumption also depends on the inputs applied to a particular logic
gate. For example, in [38], it is shown that a 2 input NAND gate has dierent
static power consumption depending on the input pattern.
Electromagnetic signals are leaked by a cryptographic device in much the same
way as its power consumption. Currents owing though a conductor induces EM
emanations. As the power consumed by a cryptographic device varies while data
are being processed, so does its EM eld.
As power consumption and EM radiation are data dependent, side channel attacks
based on them are possible. An attack that exploits power consumption is called
a power side channel attack, while an attack that exploits EM leakage is called an
EM side channel attack. Power and EM side channel attacks are also referred to as
power analysis and EM analysis attacks respectively. Although the source of EM
and power consumption leakage is switching activity, EM side channel attacks can
be prevented by metal casing around the cryptographic device, while preventing
power attacks is more complicated. EM attacks have a di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attacks, however both these attacks can be carried out externally to the target
device.
Power and EM side channel attacks are similar in most ways. The source of the
side channel leakage for both power and EM is from the switching activity of a
device. As such the methods employed for power side channel attacks can also
be applied to EM side channel attacks. The only dierence is in the probe used
and the method employed to measure the side channel leakage. A resistor or a
current probe is used to measure the power consumption. Simple home-made coils
placed close to the cryptographic device have been successfully used to measure
EM side channel leakage in the near eld [20, 39, 74]. Mangard has discussed EM
side channel attacks in the far eld and mentioned that these are more dicult to
implement that the near eld EM attacks, as there is more noise in the far eld
EM signals.
2.8 Power Analysis Attacks
In [31], Kocher et al. coined the terms simple power analysis (SPA) and dieren-
tial power analysis (DPA), as a way to categorise power analysis attacks. Later
Quisquater and Samyde coined similar terms for EM based side channel attacks,
called simple EM analysis (SEMA) and dierential EM analysis (DEMA) [74].
Although the experimental setup required for power attacks and EM attacks is
dierent, they are both based on the fact that dierent transitions lead to dier-
ent energy consumption. Mangard in his thesis [39] used the terms simple side
channel analysis (SSCA) to refer to simple power analysis and simple EM anal-
ysis, and dierential side channel analysis (DSCA) to refer to dierential power
analysis and dierential EM analysis. In order to perform power analysis attack
on a cryptographic device, the attacker should be able to measure the power con-
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or indirectly by measuring the EM eld around the device. Another requirement
for the attacker is the ability to control and/or observe the inputs and/or outputs
to the cryptographic device with the same key.
In Section 2.8.1 hypothetical power model is discussed. Then in Section 2.8.2
simple power analysis is explained and in Section 2.8.3 dierential power analysis
is explained. Note that the principle described for power analysis attacks also
apply to EM analysis attacks.
2.8.1 Hypothetical Power Model
The key components of a DPA ow are the actual power consumption of physical
device and the attacker's predicted hypothetical power model of this device, as
shown in Figure 2.11. The actual power consumption is obtained by measuring
the cryptographic device's instantaneous power consumption while it is operat-
ing. Power consumption can be measured directly by measuring the current ow-
ing through supply/ground wires or by measuring the EM eld surrounding the
device. One of the important steps in DPA attack is the attacker's prediction
of the hypothetical power consumption, H1:::2K;1:::N from the intermediate result
I1:::2K;1:::N. The eectiveness of DPA depends on the attacker's hypothetical power
model of the target device [64, 100].
In [64], it has been suggested that attackers can have detailed information re-
garding the target device. Depending on the level of information the attacker
has about the target device, his/her ability to accurately predict the hypothetical
power consumption varies. In most cases, information about the algorithm used
and the architecture of the device can be sucient to accurately predict the hypo-
thetical power consumption. Such information can be readily available from the
device's data sheet, which is usually available in the public domain. In this section
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In [100], Tiri and Verbauwhede have summarised power models depending on the
level of abstraction used. At the instruction level, the number of instructions used
can be a measure of dynamic power consumption. In implementations of asymmet-
ric ciphers such as ECC and RSA, operations such as additions and multiplications
are controlled by individual key bits [28, 52, 79]. In such cases, based on the oper-
ation executed, the number of instructions executed varies, thus varying the power
consumption [100].
At the Register Transfer Level (RTL), the toggle count is a common measure for
estimating power consumption. The toggle count is a measure of the number
of 0 ! 1 transitions for a given circuit. As discussed in Section 2.7, the power
consumption of CMOS logic depends on 0 ! 1 and 1 ! 0 transitions. This model
is also called the transition count model or the Hamming distance model, since
the number of 0 ! 1 transitions depends on the previous state of the circuit.
The Hamming distance model has been successfully used to implement DPA in
[62]. Another commonly used model at this level is the Hamming weight model.
The Hamming weight is a count of the number of bits that are at logic 1. For
example, an 8 bit register which has 3 bits at logic 1 and 5 bits at logic 0 has
a Hamming weight of 3. In the rst DPA publication, Kocher et al. [31] used a
single bit Hamming weight model. They used a selection function to predict the
intermediate result of 1 bit. Depending on this intermediate value, they partitioned
the power traces to perform a dierence of mean correlation test. This model works
in practice, because the energy used to store a logic 1 is dierent to the energy
required to store logic 0. Although single bit attacks work, multiple bit attacks
(attacks where predictions of multiple bits are done) are more eective [43].
At the layout level, the power consumption model includes parasitic capacitance
along with toggling activity. At this level, parasitic capacitance can be used to
implement DPA against a circuit employing dual rail countermeasures [100]. Back-
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employing masking countermeasures [42]. Although information at the layout level
provides more insight into the target device, in practise we found that Register
Transfer Level information sucient to mount DPA on various circuits.
2.8.2 Simple Power Analysis
SPA attacks, as the name suggests, is a simple analysis of power consumption
of the cryptographic device. These attacks were rst published by Kocher et al.
[31]. To perform SPA, the attacker rst measures the cryptographic device's power
consumption (directly or by measuring the EM eld) while operating on a single
plain/ciphertext. This measured power consumption for a single plain/ciphertext
is usually referred to as a power trace. The attacker then visually analyses the
power trace to determine part of the secret key or an entire key itself.
Some cryptographic algorithms perform operations based on a single bit of the
secret key. For example, in implementations of asymmetric ciphers such as ECC
and RSA, operations such as additions and multiplications are controlled by in-
dividual key bits [28, 52, 79]. In such cases, based on the operation executed,
power consumption varies, allowing the attacker to determine the secret key. Sim-
ple power analysis has been successfully used to nd the secret key of an ECC
implementation in [65].
Hardware implementations of symmetric block ciphers are not as susceptible to
SPA as asymmetric ciphers. The reason is that hardware implementations of
symmetric block ciphers can operate in parallel on the data. Symmetric block
ciphers such as AES [57] do not have operations that are dependent on part of
the secret key, rather all the data is processed in parallel. However software
implementation of block ciphers have been reported vulnerable to SPA [47]. In this
thesis, attacks on software implementations of block ciphers are not considered.
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to SPA, dierential power analysis (DPA) attack is quite eective against them.
In this thesis we describe DPA attacks on hardware implementations of DES and
AES block ciphers.
2.8.3 Dierential Power Analysis
Dierential power analysis (DPA) attack is a more powerful method than SPA
and is a major threat to the security of cryptographic devices. DPA exploits the
correlation between the data and the instantaneous power consumption of the
cryptographic device [31] . As this correlation is very small, statistical methods
are employed to exploit its eciency. In a DPA, the attacker uses a hypothetical
model (discussed in Section 2.8.1) of the device under attack and then statistically
analyses the correlation of power consumption from the actual device to the hy-
pothetical model in order to nd the secret key. The eciency of the hypothetical
model depends on the capabilities of the attacker and how much knowledge of the
implementation he/she has of the cryptosystem.
The process of implementing DPA varies according to the target device and its
setup. For example, the attacker can only observe either inputs or outputs of the
target device. In another case, the attacker can measure the power consumption
of a cryptographic device only while performing decryption. In all DPA imple-
mentations, it is common to rst acquire the power consumption of a device and
later perform analysis.
DPA is used to extract/nd the secret key from a cryptographic device. This
secret key's bit length depends on the algorithm implemented in the device. It is
important to note that the entire secret key is not extracted at once, but rather
part of a secret key is extracted at a time until the entire secret key is known. In
DPA jargon, this part of the secret key is called a subkey. The choice of subkey
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device. If an attacker attempts to extract the entire secret key at once, then the
eort to implement the hypothetical power model would be same as a brute force
attack. For example, consider a device implementing AES [57] with a secret key of
length 128 bits. A DPA attack on the entire secret key, on this device would take
2128 = 340;282;366;920;938;463;463;374;607;431;768;211;456 key hypotheses,
which requires similar eort to that of brute force attack. Even if we could process
a billion billion keys (1018) per second, it would still require about 1013 years to
nish all possible key hypotheses [82] . However if a subkey of 8 bits is chosen,
then DPA on this 8 bit sub key would require 28 = 256 iterations and then entire
secret key would require (28)  16 = 256  16 = 4096 iterations, which is a
small number when compared to the brute force attack.
A DPA attack on a cryptographic module performing encryption is described
below. This process is also depicted in Figure 2.11. The cryptographic device's
secret key length is S bits, while the length of the subkey chosen for DPA attack
is K bits. The process described below assumes that the device is encrypting and
that the attacker can control the inputs to this device.
1. The power consumption of the cryptographic device is recorded while it
encrypts N dierent plaintext inputs with the same key and is denoted as
a matrix P1:::N;1:::T, where T is the number of points that are recorded per
encryption. The number N is usually referred to as the number of traces.
2. The attacker chooses an intermediate result of the executed algorithm that
is a function of the plaintext and the subkey. Based on the plaintexts and
all possible values for the sub-key, hypothetical values for the intermediate
results are calculated as a matrix I1:::2K;1:::N (called the hypothetical inter-
mediate results) where K is the number of subkey bits and 2K is the number
of possible values of the subkey. We also refer to this intermediate result as
the attack point.36 Chapter 2 Cryptography and Side Channel Attacks
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Figure 2.11: Principle of dierential side channel analysis
3. The attacker then determines a hypothetical power consumption value Hk;n
for every Ik;n. The absolute values of the H1:::2K;1:::N, are not important, only
the relative distances between the values are relevant.Chapter 2 Cryptography and Side Channel Attacks 37
4. The attacker reveals the correct subkey by correlating the hypothetical power
consumption H1:::2K;1:::N with the power traces P1:::N;1:::T.
There are two correlation methods that are commonly employed in a DPA attack.
They are the dierence of mean method [31] and the Pearson correlation method
[62].
Dierence of Mean Method
The Dierence of Mean (DM) is the original method proposed by Kocher et al.
[31]. The basic idea of this method is to split the power traces into two groups for
each key hypothesis based on a so-called selection function. In [31], Kocher et al.
rst partitioned the captured traces P1:::N;1:::T into two sets, based on a selection
function. The matrix H1:::2K;1:::N corresponds to the selection function for the DM
method. The means of the power traces in both sets are calculated and the means
of one set are subtracted from those of the other set. In the original paper, Kocher
et al. [31] used the possibility of a particular bit to partition the traces into two sets
(if the bit is 1, add current trace to set one else the other set). Rather than a value
of a bit, a threshold  can also be used to partition the traces based on H1:::2K;1:::N
[39]. For example, when the matrix H1:::2K;1:::N contains the Hamming weight or
the Hamming distance of an intermediate result of 8 bits, then  of 4 can be used
to partition the traces. Equation 2.6 shows how a set can be partitioned. Here
Nhigh is the number of samples for which the condition H2K;N >  is true. The
dierences of means, R1:::2K;1:::T, are calculated for every key hypothesis according
to Equation 2.7.
PSet1 =
1
Nhigh
X
8NjH2K;N>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R2K;T = P1(8NjH2K;N>);T   P1(8NjH2K;N);T (2.7)
The resulting DM matrix, R1:::2K;1:::T will have a dierence of mean trace for every
key hypothesis. The dierence of mean trace for correct key hypothesis will have
signicantly visible peaks when compared to the the other result traces [31].
Messerges et al. have shown that using a dierent  value for the selection function
results in dierent number of traces required for a successful DPA attack, and
called their attack, for  > 1, a multiple bit DPA attack. Based on an attack on a
smart card executing DES, they showed that a multiple bit DPA usually requires
fewer traces than a single bit DPA.
Pearson Correlation Method
The Pearson correlation is a common method to determine a linear relationship
between two variables. The formula for Pearson correlation takes on many forms.
A commonly used formula is shown in Equation 2.8.
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where, X and Y are two arrays with equal numbers of entries and N,
P
X and
P
Y are the sums of all the elements in X and Y respectively.
The calculation of Pearson correlation between matrices P1:::N;1:::T and H1:::2K;1:::N
for every xed T and K leads to R1:::2K;1:::T of correlation coecients. Since the
measured power consumption matrix, P1:::N;1:::T represents a sequence of numbers
for every plaintext, a representative value from this matrix, RP 1:::N, is used for
calculating the Pearson correlation. This representative matrix can either contain
an average value or a peak value from the original matrix.Chapter 2 Cryptography and Side Channel Attacks 39
For the correct subkey, 2Kc, the matrices RP1:::N and H2Kc;1:::N are highly cor-
related. Since the values RP1:::N and H2K!=2Kc;1:::N are largely uncorrelated, the
correlation coecients R2K!=2Kc are signicantly lower than R2Kc. If N is su-
ciently large in an attack the dierence between correlations can be detected in
matrix R1:::2K;1:::T. In this case, one correlation coecient of R1:::2K;1:::T is larger
than others and this position leads to the correct subkey.
 Ors et al. [62] implemented DPA on AES ASIC implementation using the Pearson
correlation method. The intermediate result chosen was the 8 MSB's of the initial
round of AES where key is XOR-ed with Plain text and loaded into registers. The
hypothetical power consumption was built by measuring the number of 0 ! 1
and 1 ! 0 transitions on the 8 MSB registers of the initial round of AES.  Ors
et al. [62] showed that almost 4000 encryption rounds (of power measurements)
are sucient to extract the secret key from an AES ASIC implementation.
Higher Order Dierential Power Analysis and Template At-
tacks
Higher order DPA attacks use hypotheses about the side-channel leakage of a
device at two or more moments in time. Higher order DPA has been shown to
be eective against masking countermeasures in [50, 105]. However, higher order
DPA attacks are signicantly more dicult to mount in practise than the normal
DPA attack [39].
In template attacks [15], an adversary needs to have access to an identical device
as the one on which the attack will be mounted. The adversary then builds a
template of side channel leakage, based on the identical device, for all possible
sub-keys under attack. This step is usually referred to as a proling step. After
side channel information is measured from the device under attack, it is matched
to the previously built template. The idea is to reduce the possibility to a few40 Chapter 2 Cryptography and Side Channel Attacks
keys or to even nd the correct key. Template attacks are dicult in practise,
as the availability of an identical device and the ability to program it is slim.
Nevertheless, designers of cryptographic devices need to be aware of higher order
and template attacks and they need to make sure that their devices are resistant
against them. In this thesis, we have not considered higher order attacks or tem-
plate attacks as we found that the basic rst order DPA attack to be sucient to
extract the secret key from a cryptographic device.
2.9 Summary
This chapter has introduced some basic background material on cryptography.
Power consumption of CMOS circuits is also reviewed. Security is an ever chang-
ing model. As the old cryptographic algorithms are broken, new algorithms are
designed. However the current standard algorithms, AES for example, have no
known mathematical attack. And as AES supports either 128, 192 or 256 bit
length keys, a brute force attack on it using current computational power would
be infeasible. However implementation of these mathematically secure algorithms
can leak side channel information and DPA is well known to exploit even the
faintest of the information available.
Next chapter, Chapter 3, introduces existing countermeasures to power analysis
attacks and Chapter 4 discusses power analysis attacks in practise.Chapter 3
Dierential Power Analysis
Countermeasures
3.1 Introduction
Power attacks pose a severe threat to the implementations of secure devices. Dur-
ing the last few years a lot of countermeasures have been proposed to prevent
power side channel attacks;. these countermeasures range from ad-hoc solutions
to elaborate, well understood solutions. As power attacks rely on the data depen-
dent power consumption nature of the cryptographic device, power analysis attack
countermeasures either try to eliminate this data dependency on power consump-
tion or try to minimise the data dependent power consumption beyond a point
where the attacks are not feasible.
Every countermeasure carries a certain cost, such as increase in silicon area, in-
crease in overall power consumption, or decrease in performance. Furthermore,
the eort that is needed to integrate the countermeasure into the design ow also
represents a cost. In order to understand how countermeasures are used, we rst
establish some understanding of the digital design ow. In Section 3.3 we classify
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countermeasures according to their approach to prevent DPA. Section 3.4 discusses
algorithmic countermeasures, Section 3.5 discusses various architectural counter-
measures, including constant power consumption, randomising and gate level. In
Section 3.6 we compare countermeasures and nally conclude the chapter.
3.2 Digital Design Flow
Digital circuits can be implemented in one of the following two ways: 1) as ap-
plication specic integrated circuits (ASIC), 2) as eld programmable gate arrays
(FPGA). ASICs, as the name suggests, are designed and manufactured for a spe-
cic application or group of applications. FPGAs are also integrated circuits, but
they are manufactured in advance, and have the ability to be eld programmable
to work as intended by the designer. FPGAs contains, among others, collection
of congurable logic block (CLB) and congurable interconnect fabric. CLBs are
usually formed of programmable look up table (LUT) and a register element. It
is the ability to programme these CLB to function as necessary and the ability to
programme the interconnect fabric to connect these CLBs in the required way, that
gives FPGAs their programmable nature. CLBs are also refered to as logic slice
(and sometimes just slice). ASICs, once manufactured, have xed functionality,
but FPGAs can be reprogrammed to dierent designs. Since ASICs are designed
for a specic functionality, they are usually out perform their FPGA counterparts.
As FPGAs are manufactured in advance, they have xed resources (usually mea-
sured in units of CLBs, embedded memory and optionally xed functional blocks
such as multipliers), so a designer has to choose an appropriately sized FPGA for
their designs. For more information on how FPGAs work, we refer the reader
to these books [44, 75, 109]. In this section, we briey discuss ASIC and FPGA
design 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3.2.1 ASIC Design Flow
There are two common ways of designing ASIC circuits: one is by using a full
custom design ow, the other by using a standard cell design ow. Full custom
refers to the design ow where layout of the design is done from grounds up. In
standard cell design ow commonly used logic gates are pre-designed for a specic
fabrication process. These pre-designed gates are called standard cells. All these
standard cells are compiled into a technology library that can be used by various
tools, called standard cell libraries or standard cell design kits. These standard
cell design kits are then shared across designs to reduce their development costs.
Full custom design ow is common for analog designs, while standard cell design
ow is common for digital design. Digital design is a vast, expanding and evolving
area. The most basic steps of the ow are shown in Figure 3.1.
The design starts from the target product's requirement: features and functionality
that need to be supported, area (cost) of the design, power consumption of the
design, and the performance of the design (the speed at which the design can work).
These requirements then form the specication of the design to be implemented.
Behavioural description is then created to analyse the design in terms of the func-
tionality required and to some extent the performance required. Behavioural de-
scription is usually done using high level languages such as c/c++, system c and
system verilog.
Using the design specication and behavioural description, Register Transfer Level
(RTL) design is created. RTL is described in hardware description languages such
as verilog and VHDL. This transformation, from behavioural to RTL, can be
done either manually by design engineers or automatically by using behavioural
synthesis tools. RTL design is then functionally verication. At this stage, power
estimation can also be done on the RTL description.44 Chapter 3 Di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Figure 3.1: Digital design ow overview
RTL is then converted into a netlist of logic gates using logic synthesis tools. Along
with the RTL design, logic synthesis tools require the target technology library and
design constraints. Design constraints to the logic synthesis tool is also derived
from the product spec and include clock frequency details, input and output pin
delays, power constraints.
Resulting netlist from logic synthesis is then veried to be functionally equivalent
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and by gate level simulations. Most importantly the resulting netlist is checked
against design constraints, namely area, speed and power. Area is reported directly
by the synthesis tool. Power estimation is done in two steps: rst the synthesised
gate level netlist is used to run gate level simulations and the switching activity
of this netlist is collected into a le during the simulation. In the second part,
the synthesised netlist, switching activity le and technology library as passed to
a power estimation tool and these tools then report average power, peak power
and instantaneous power consumption. Finally the synthesised netlist is checked
to see if it meets the timing constraints by using a static timing analysis tool.
The synthesised netlist is then passed to the place & route tool. The place &
route ow usually involves the following steps, shown in Figure 3.2. First a oor
plan is made (3.2(a)). This is where the aspect ratio (or the dimensions) of the
chip is xed. Next the standard cells are placed (3.2(b)) and nally the wires are
routed(3.2(c)). Place & route step as also referred to as the backend process.
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Placement row 3
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(regular orientation)
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ow:
create a oor plan
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VDD
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(b) Standard backend ow:
place the standard cells
VDD
GND
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GND
VDD
(c) Standard backend ow:
route the wires
Figure 3.2: Standard backend ow overview
The result of this step is a layout netlist le in design exchange format (DEF) [12].
From this placed & routed gate level netlist and the parasitic routing capacitance
can be extracted. This netlist is also checked against design constraints: area,
speed and power. Parasitic routing capacitance is also used in the constraints
analysis. Additionally, signal integrity (SI) and cross talk are also analysed at this
step. Placed & routed netlist is also veried to be functionally equivalent to the46 Chapter 3 Dierential Power Analysis Countermeasures
synthesised netlist. Once all the constraints are met, the placed & routed design is
sent to the fabrication facility in the form of a GDSII netlist. This nal constraint
checking step is called as sign-o step.
Engineering Change Order
During a design process, specication can change after synthesis or the place &
route step, this could be a result of a change in product requirement or a bug in
the RTL design implementation. Such late changes in specication are called as
Engineering Change Orders (ECOs). If an ECO is required, then designers change
the synthesised netlist, manually or with the help of commercially available ECO
tools, to reect to the new specication.
3.2.2 FPGA Design Flow
FPGA design ow shares some common steps with the ASIC design ow: product
requirement, specication, behavioural description, design entry and functional
verication are identical. Synthesis and place & route steps dier from the ASIC
ow.
For the FPGA synthesis, the target FPGA needs to be specied instead of a stan-
dard cell library. The result of the synthesis tool is then passed to the FPGAs
implementation tool. This implementation tool is normally provided by the FPGA
vendor. The implementation tool does the following steps: 1) translate, 2) map,
and 3) place & route. In the rst step, the synthesised netlist and design con-
straints are translated into an internal design format. This design representation
is then mapped into the target FPGA, i.e, the design is tted into the available
FPGA CLBs. The place & route then places all the CLBs and routes the connec-
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le, that can be used in functional verication and timing analysis. FPGA vendors
also provide tools which translate the placed & routed design into a bitstream, a
format that is necessary to program the FPGA.
3.2.3 Evaluating DPA Resistance
One way to know if a design is resistant to DPA attack is to run power estimation
simulations and analyse for DPA resistance on the simulation power consumption.
More details about simulation based DPA is presented in Section 4.3. Another
way to know if a design is resistant to DPA attack is to implement it on a FPGA
device and mount DPA on this device, more details about this are presented in
Section 4.4. In general, aim of a DPA countermeasure is to completely prevent a
DPA attack, and when not possible, to make DPA attack dicult by increasing
the number of traces required for an attack. So, a design ow intended to create
DPA resistant designs should include DPA analysis along with area, power and
timing in the sign o analysis.
3.3 Classication of Countermeasures
Countermeasures can be classied in many dierent ways; one of them being the
level at which they are applied such as gate level or algorithmic level. In this thesis
we classify them according to their approach to counteract the power analysis
attacks. In general there are ve approaches to counteract power analysis attacks.
The basic idea of the rst approach is to change the key of the cryptographic
module frequently, so that the attacker cannot capture enough traces to mount
a successful attack. Keys that are used for a few cryptographic operations are
called ephemeral keys. These ephemeral keys are based on a master key and are
generated when necessary. Power attacks can still be mounted at the time of48 Chapter 3 Di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generation of ephemeral keys, so care should be taken to protect against DPA.
These kinds of countermeasures are applied at the protocol level and are usually
referred to as protocol level countermeasures. For example, it is suggested to use
a hashing algorithm (SHA256) on the key to generate a new one, so that the
newly generated key can replace the existing one, and to use the new key in the
current transaction; this process repeats for every transactions. The idea is that
the same key should not be used again [29]. Kocher suggested that cryptographic
protocols should be designed to withstand certain amount of leakage and that the
cryptographic devices used with these protocols should be validated to make sure
that they do no leak more information than assumed in the protocol [29]. Number
of transactions required to successfully implement a DPA can be used to quantify
the about of leakage.
The second approach to counteract power attacks is to randomise the intermediate
results of the cryptographic module. The idea is to make the power consumption
of the randomised intermediate results uncorrelated to actual intermediate results.
This approach is generally referred to as masking. Masking can be applied at two
levels. One is at the algorithmic level and the other is at the gate level.
The third approach to counteract power attacks is to try to make the power
consumption of the cryptographic module independent of the data it processes, by
building a device that consumes the same amount of power for any combination
of inputs. This can be achieved by using dynamic and dierential logic or current
mode logic circuits.
The fourth approach to counteracting power attacks is to make the power con-
sumption of the cryptographic device constant, even when no data is processed.
These countermeasures employ analogue circuitry to achieve this. Note that this
approach is di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instantaneous power is always the same, whereas in the third approach, power
consumption for dierent inputs is the same.
The aim of the fth approach is to make the power consumption of the entire
device random enough that the power attack is dicult to implement. This can
be achieved by randomising the sequence of cryptographic operations, by randomly
varying the supply voltage and frequency, by randomly precharging the input gates
or by adding noise generators. Such countermeasures are generic in nature and
can be applied at dierent levels.
The countermeasures described in the above approaches to counteract power at-
tacks can be applied at dierent implementation levels in a design ow. These im-
plementation levels are algorithmic-level, gate-level, architecture-level and protocol-
level. Some of the countermeasures are suitable only at specic level, whereas the
others are more generic in nature and can be applied at more than one level. In
the next sections countermeasures at dierent implementation levels are discussed
in detail.
3.4 Algorithm Level Countermeasures
While designing a secure system, designers rst think of the algorithms to be
implemented. Then they decide whether to implement this algorithm as dedicated
hardware or software running on an embedded CPU or both, depending on the
constraints and available resources. Although countermeasures can be used at
dierent abstraction levels, such as gate level, there exist some algorithmic level
countermeasures to prevent power attacks. The basic idea of algorithmic level
countermeasures is to rewrite the cryptographic algorithm such that it does not
leak any side channel information. As the designer of algorithms has no in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on the implementation details, the only way to prevent side channel leakage is to
use masking techniques.
In recent years, algorithmic level masking has received a lot of attention. In this
section we cover the basic principles of masking and discuss their overheads. Basic
idea of masking is to replace every intermediate result i with a masked result r
and a mask m; the mask m is assumed to be randomly generated. This makes
correlating intermediate result i with power consumption dicult as it would re-
quire guessing the correct mask for each trace. The challenge of masking schemes
is to modify the intermediate functions that are used in a block cipher in such a
way that they work with masked inputs. While this is straightforward for linear
functions like additions and permutations, it is non-trivial for non-linear functions.
Additive masking is normally used for linear function, eg: r = i  m [39]. Special
care needs to be taken for non-linear functions and is normally dependent on the
algorithm. In AES, Sbox function is the non-linear function. Below articles are
some of the masking scheme for AES. The method presented in [1] involves adding
a mask to the plaintext, removing it before the Sbox operation, replacing it with
a multiplicative mask and after the non-linear Sbox operation, this multiplicative
mask is replaced with the original mask. The method presented in [102] is similar
to the above one, except that the same mask is used for both linear and non-
linear functions and a new mask is generated for every AES encryption round.
The method presented in [66, 72, 73] uses the same mask for linear and non-linear
(Sbox) functions of AES, and uses a correction term to the result of Sbox.
The modied algorithm (masked algorithm) can be implemented in software or
in hardware, which is an advantage to algorithmic level masking. However the
changes applied to one algorithm cannot be applied to another algorithm. Fur-
thermore algorithmic masking cannot be automated (to date no one has published
such claims), which is a drawback when compared to gate level masking.Chapter 3 Dierential Power Analysis Countermeasures 51
Mangard et al. [42] has successfully attacked two variants of masked (algorithm)
AES ASIC implementation: one based on [1] and the other based on [66]. In this
article Mangard et al. used toggle information of the Sbox combinational logic
to build the hypothetical power model. This was achieved by using a gate level
simulation of a back annotated Sbox netlist. Although it is highly improbable that
an attacker can get the detailed layout of the secure chip, never the less it is shown
that masked algorithms can be cracked, if such information is available. Mangard
and Schramm [40] have shown that the attack on masked AES was possible due
to the glitches in the Sbox region.
3.5 Architectural Level Countermeasures
Architectural level countermeasures cover a very broad spectrum. Any counter-
measure that cannot be classied into algorithmic level can be classied as archi-
tectural level. Generally, approaches three, four and ve (discussed in Section 3.3)
fall into this level. We rst discuss approach four (constant power consumption),
then discuss approach ve (randomisation) and nally discuss gate-level counter-
measures (masking and dynamic & dierential logic).
Researchers in the asynchronous community say that asynchronous designs provide
better security than synchronous designs, as there is no clock signal to reference
power traces. Moreover any changes in power supply or temperature do not aect
asynchronous designs (preventing power glitch, clock glitch and extreme operating
condition attacks). We do not cover asynchronous designs in this thesis for this
reason: lack of CAD tool support for fully automated design and the lack of
acceptability as an industry standard. For readers interested in asynchronous
DPA countermeasures we refer to the following papers [7, 17, 35].52 Chapter 3 Dierential Power Analysis Countermeasures
3.5.1 Constant Power Consumption using Analog Circuits
In this section we discuss countermeasures that use analogue circuits to compress
the power leakage.
3.5.1.1 On Chip Signal Compression Countermeasure
This countermeasure adds a suppression circuit to existing cryptographic hard-
ware, without modifying the actual cryptographic system [76]. Figure 3.3 shows
an architecture diagram. The instantaneous current drawn by the cryptographic
hardware is sensed and an appropriate current is shunted so that the total current
drawn from the supply shows less variation. This countermeasure comes at the
expense of area and more power consumption. Ideally the op-amp should have in-
nite bandwidth and zero response time. The average power for a circuit with this
countermeasure will be the peak power of the same circuit without countermeasure
[76].
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V dd
Figure 3.3: On chip signal compression, adapted from [76]
Similar techniques have been proposed in [49, 53]. In [53], it is shown from simu-
lations, that the cryptographic system current variation was reduced by between
87%-70% and the extra power consumed to mask the side-channel attacks rep-
resents between 21.6%-12% of the total system power respectively. The problem
with using such techniques is that they cannot completely secure the device againstChapter 3 Dierential Power Analysis Countermeasures 53
EM attacks. These techniques also have very high power consumption, and often
require o chip capacitance. The above articles did not report area overheads.
3.5.1.2 Real Time Current Flattening Countermeasure
Muresan and Gebotys [54] presented a real time current attening technique called
PAAR (power analysis resistant architecture), as shown in Figure 3.4. The idea of
this countermeasure is to always maintain the current consumption of the processor
within two programmable limits. Ideally these limits are close by, so that the
processor would always draw the same amount of current.
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Figure 3.4: Real time current fattening architecture (PAAR), adapted from
[54]
PAAR has two modules called Feedback Current Flattening Module (FCFM) and
Pipeline Current Flattening Module (PCFM). FCFM is responsible for measuring
the instantaneous current consumption at the processor's supply pin and gen-
erating two feedback signals to PCFM. PCFM is responsible for inserting non
functional instructions into the pipeline in order to bring the current consumption
of the processor to a value that is within two programmable limits.54 Chapter 3 Dierential Power Analysis Countermeasures
3.5.2 Randomising Countermeasures
Randomising countermeasures try to randomise the execution of algorithm along
with some random data. These countermeasures are quite generic in nature, and
can be applied at hardware level or software level. If random delays occur during
the execution of a block cipher, the power traces measured by an attacker are not
located at the same position in all of the measured power traces. This random
shift of traces decreases the correlation of the intermediate results and power con-
sumption. The most common randomising techniques are applied at the software
level, that is, to instructions that execute on a microprocessor.
3.5.2.1 Randomising at the Software Level
One of the randomising countermeasures is random process interrupts (RPI) [16].
The idea is to randomly interrupt the processor while it is executing the crypto-
graphic algorithm, thus randomising the execution sequence and power consump-
tion. Clavier et al. [16] have also discussed how an attacker can decrease the
eects of RPI. There has been some work on how many more traces are needed
if randomising techniques such as RPIs are used. In particular [16, 39, 64] have
theoretical formulae for the increase in number of traces when RPI is used. Work
in [26, 45, 46] discusses the possibility of embedding randomness into the processor
itself.
3.5.2.2 Randomising at Hardware Level
The basic idea of randomising countermeasures at the hardware level is to ran-
domly vary one or more variables that aect the overall power consumption. Dy-
namic power consumption is given by Equation 3.1. These variables are supplyChapter 3 Di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voltage (Vdd), frequency (f), switching activity () and load capacitance (C).
Switching activity, is data dependent.
Pdyn =  CloadV
2
dd f (3.1)
Yang et al. [112] have proposed randomly changing voltage and frequency to pre-
vent SCA. Yang et al. called their idea random dynamic voltage and frequency
scaling (RDVFS). Dynamic voltage and frequency scaling is a well known method
to reduce power consumption [68]. However the idea of RDVFS is to randomly
vary frequency and voltage to prevent SCA. The main strength of RDVFS comes
from the fact that the exact time of intermediate operations is not xed, due to
random frequency scaling. Voltage is scaled as a side eect of frequency scaling
[112].
Benini et al. [5] proposed an energy aware design technique for DPA resistance.
This countermeasure is around power managed units as shown in Figure 3.5
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Figure 3.5: Power managed units, adapted from [5]
Block B is similar to block A in functionality, but with lower power cost. Block
B might implement the typical behaviour of block A, but with a fewer number
of inputs and outputs. Sel selects which of the blocks A or B should be used for
computation. As a simple example, consider a 32 bit computation involving X +
Y. The inputs X and Y can range from 0to232   1. Block A can be a full 32 bit56 Chapter 3 Dierential Power Analysis Countermeasures
datapath, whereas block B can be a 16 bit datapath. Sel block can then see if the
upper 16 bits are zero to enable the B block.
In order to randomise the power consumption, a Linear Feedback Shift Regis-
ter(LFSR) can be used with the Sel signal, as shown above. This introduces
randomness to the power trace. If this randomness is not truly random or changes
less often, the attacker will still be able to determine the secret key. Also, attacks
presented in [62] target registers loading data. If the data loaded into registers
was plain text and the key, then this countermeasure would be useless in defending
against the DPA attack.
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Figure 3.6: Random delay countermeasure overview
Another kind of hardware randomisation was proposed by Bucci et al.. One of their
papers [9] discusses random delay insertion. The overview of this countermeasure
can be seen from Figure 3.6. The idea is to randomly change delays to scramble
the power consumption. However this technique has a drawback, as all the delay
elements are connected to the same ip-ops, total power consumption will always
be the same irrespective of the delay element chosen.
Bucci et al. [8] have proposed the use of random precharge logic to prevent SCA.
The overview of this countermeasure can be seen from Figure 3.7. The idea is to
randomly precharge all the combinational gates with a random value generated
from the random number generator(RNG). As register elements cannot loose their
state value, a redundant register is used to load the random value. Further, to
switch between normal operation and random pre-charging a MUX is used toChapter 3 Dierential Power Analysis Countermeasures 57
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Figure 3.7: Random precharging countermeasure overview
control the output of the compound register. Bucci et al. have reported that they
could reduce the DPA correlation but could not prevent an attack. However, they
did not report the average number of random cycles for a single cycle of normal
operation.
3.5.3 Gate-Level Countermeasures
In a standard cell design ow, RTL code is synthesised and mapped into technology
specic standard cells. These standard cells are also referred to as logic gates. In
CMOS technologies, power consumption of these logic gates is strongly dependent
on the data processed. This is the reason for power attacks to be successful.
However it is possible to design logic gates such that the power consumption of
the logic gates is independent of the processed data.
Gate-level countermeasures are integrated into existing design ows after the logic
synthesis phase, as shown in Figure 3.8. The dotted line shows the normal design58 Chapter 3 Dierential Power Analysis Countermeasures
ow. An extra step is added to translate the synthesised netlist into the appro-
priate gate level netlist, depending on the translation rules. These translation
rules vary for dierent gate level countermeasures. The translation step can be a
simple program to change the name of the normal logic cell into a DPA resistant
logic cell. Valentini et al. [104] have investigated various ways to translate a nor-
mal gate-level netlist into a DPA resistant gate level netlist and suggest using an
OpenAccess [83] based approach for more stable, modular and exible solutions.
Place & Route
Netlist translation
RTL code
to verification
Translation rules
Logic Synthesis
secure flow
normal flow
Figure 3.8: Integration of gate level countermeasures
In practice there are two ways to achieve data independent power consumption.
The rst is to use gate-level masking and the other is to use dynamic and dier-
ential logic design.
3.5.3.1 Dynamic and Dierential Logic
CMOS logic is the most widely used logic style in digital design. It is a well
understood fact that a CMOS circuit's power consumption is data dependent [75].
For example consider a CMOS inverter shown in Figure 3.9. It draws power from
the Source Vdd only when its output changes state from low to high. During
this transition stage some part of the current is stored in the load capacitor. The
inverter discharges the current in the load capacitor when its output changes from
high to low. For the remaining transitions, where the output does not change state
(high to high and low to low), there is no current dissipated. This data dependent
power consumption is the reason why power attacks are possible.Chapter 3 Dierential Power Analysis Countermeasures 59
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Figure 3.9: CMOS inverter output transitions
To overcome this limitation of CMOS gates, for security reasons, dynamic and
dierential logic can be used. In dynamic logic a precharge signal is used to
precharge the output of a gate which is then conditionally discharged, based on
the gates inputs. Usually this precharge signal is the Clock signal. Domino logic
is a type of dynamic logic [75]. In dierential logic a single bit is encoded as two
bits, called as the true part and false part. Bit 0 is encoded as 01 and 1 is encoded
as 10. The other combinations 00 and 11 are used for other purposes depending
on the implementation. In dynamic and dierential logic, a normal CMOS gate is
replaced by a compound gate that has twice as many inputs and outputs as the
CMOS equivalent. The addition inputs and outputs are because of the dierential
encoding. The aim is to achieve 100% switching activity independent of input
combinations. By 100% switching activity, we mean that for any combination of
inputs, the same number of 0 ! 1 and 1 ! 0 transitions occur on the output of a
gate. The combination of dynamic and dierential logic results in 100% switching
factor independent of input combinations.
Sense Amplier Based Logic Style
Dynamic and dierential logic is not a new concept, however its application to
prevent side channel attacks was rst proposed by Tiri et al. [91]; they have used
the principles of a sense-amplier based logic ip-op, proposed by Nikolic et al.
[61], and called their logic style sense amplier based logic style (SABL).60 Chapter 3 Dierential Power Analysis Countermeasures
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Figure 3.10: SABL example
A generic gate structure of the SABL style is shown in Figure 3.10(a) and an AND
gate in Figure 3.10(b). The main idea behind SABL is that the same amount of
load capacitance should be charged irrespective of the inputs. Assuming that
the routing capacitance of dierential nets is same, the same amount of intrinsic
capacitance is charged for any combinations of input data. This can be illustrated
by Figure 3.10(b). For any combination of inputs A,B = (0,0) or (1,1) or (1,0)
or (0,1) all the parasitic capacitance are charged. For more detailed explanation
about SABL see [91]. Tiri and Verbauwhede [92] have shown, using simulation,
that SABL indeed is eective against DPA (although in this example routing
capacitance were not considered). Tiri and Verbauwhede [93] have suggested a
way to reduce the power consumption of SABL by charge recycling.
Wave Dynamic Dierential Logic Style
A standard cell based design is the most common for large designs [75]. As SABL
cells need to be custom designed and are not available to a standard cell designer,
SABL has high integration cost. That is, to use SABL in a secure design ow, aChapter 3 Dierential Power Analysis Countermeasures 61
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Figure 3.11: Dynamic and dierential AND gate
custom library with new SABL cells has to be designed. Wave dynamic dierential
logic (WDDL) Tiri and Verbauwhede [94] addresses this issue by using the existing
CMOS standard cells to make dynamic and dierential logic.
Tiri and Verbauwhede [94] have shown that dynamic and dierential logic can be
built from normal CMOS gates. A dynamic and dierential AND gate (shown
in Figure 3.11) can be built from a normal AND gate and OR gate: the true
dierential signals are connected to the AND gate, while the false dierential
signals are connected to the OR gate. Finally, the outputs of AND gate and
OR gate are AND-ed with the precharge signal: the compound dynamic and
dierential AND gate will have exactly one 0 ! 1 transition for any combination
of inputs.
Tiri and Verbauwhede [94] have also shown that instead of generating the precharge
signals for every gate, they can be generated only at the inputs to the combina-
tional logic part, thus reducing the size of every gate. This means the precharge
signal is generated only at the inputs and propagated through the circuit like a
wave, hence the name wave dynamic dierential logic. However a restriction for
WDDL is that no inverting gates (such as NAND, NOR) can be used. Inversion
can be achieved by interchanging the dierential signals.
Figure 3.12 shows an overview of WDDL implementation. Tiri and Verbauwhede
suggested two dierent implementations of register cells for WDDL: the rst is
to use DDL registers, where the output of every register is precharged (shown in62 Chapter 3 Dierential Power Analysis Countermeasures
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Figure 3.12: WDDL implementation overview
Figure 3.12(a)), and second to use DDL registers in master slave mode (shown in
Figure 3.12(b)). Tiri and Verbauwhede suggest using the master slave registers
despite the double clock rate to achieve the same throughput, as the compound
register has 100% switching factor. Tiri and Verbauwhede [96, 97] have shown
how to use WDDL for FPGAs and how WDDL can be adopted for secure design
ows.Chapter 3 Dierential Power Analysis Countermeasures 63
Alternating Spacer Dual Rail Logic Style
Bystrov et al., suggested using an asynchronous circuit style to counter act SCA[11].
Their proposal was the dual spacer dual rail (DSDR) protocol. Their follow up pa-
pers [85, 86] also discuss some implementation details and a tool called Verimap to
aid the transformation of standard CMOS netlist into secure dual spacer dual rail
circuits. The easiest way to describe this countermeasure is by comparing with the
WDDL style. In WDDL only one precharge event is used. That is all the gates are
set to logic 0 in the precharge state and then evaluated. In asynchronous jargon,
this all zeros precharge state is called a spacer which separates the inputs (code
words) and the precharge signal. In DSDR another spacer, all ones is also used.
Hence the name dual spacer. Another dierence between WDDL and DSDR is
that, WDDL uses only positive logic (positive logic means non-inverting gates like
AND, OR). Whereas DSDR tries to optimise the circuit by using negative gates
(such as NAND, NOR). This optimisation comes from the fact that in CMOS,
positive gates are built from negative gates and an inverter. For example an AND
gate is actually a NAND plus an Inverter.
However using negative gates has a problem with precharge wave propagation.
In WDDL, all gates are positive, that is when all the inputs were false (bit 0)
all the outputs would also be false and then precharge wave would propagate.
The problem with DSDR can be understood from the example circuit shown in
Figure 3.13(a). The same logic can be implemented using only negative logic, as
shown in Figure 3.13(b). A dual rail implementation of the same example, shown
in Figure 3.13(c), cannot propagate the spacers properly. More specically, we
want both the rails of a particular signal (z in this case) to be either at logic 0 or
1. That means, inputs to any given gate should be at same logic (1 or 0). If this
condition is not satised then the precharge wave will not propagate. However,
when at the reset state (all zero spacer) the output of gate g1 is 1/1 (both rails).64 Chapter 3 Dierential Power Analysis Countermeasures
The inputs to gate g2 are not same, i.e inputs from c are at logic 0 and inputs
from gate g1 are at logic 1. This disrupts the wave propagation and aects the
security. To solve this issue, Bystrov et al. have suggested to use a spacer polarity
inverter to eliminate this problem [11] (shown in Figure 3.13(d)).
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Figure 3.13: DSDR combinational logic implementation overview
Sokolov et al. proposed to use these two spacers (all one and all zero) either in a
xed alternating way or a randomly alternating way [85]. Although DSDR was
proposed for use in asynchronous designs, it can be used in synchronous circuits
with small modications. Specically the register schemes used in the WDDL
style can also be used with DSDR. DSDR is also called alternating spacer as it
alternates between all ones & all zeros spacer.
Murphy and Yakovlev [55] have implemented an AES in 0.35 micron technology
using the dual spacer dual rail protocol. Murphy and Yakovlev have mounted
dierential power attacks on a DSDR AES and a normal standard CMOS AES
and reported that DSDR AES has increased the number of required traces by 40
times. Murphy and Yakovlev have also reported DSDR has an area overhead of
1.88 times, reduced throughput by 0.46 times, and increased power consumptionChapter 3 Dierential Power Analysis Countermeasures 65
by 2.2 times. Note that the increase in area is not twice, as expected for dual
rail implementations. The reduced area requirements are due to negative gate
optimisation that DSDR uses.
Problem with Dynamic and Dierential Logic implementations
At rst glance dynamic and dierential logic (simply called dual rail from now on)
provides a way to protect secure designs from SCA. However routing of dierential
signals poses a threat to the safety that dual rail circuits can provide. Standard
CAD tools used today are designed for single rail circuits, whose aim is not to
prevent SCA. Specially the place & route tools poses a big problem for adoption
of dual rail circuits. Simply put, if the dierential nets of a gate are not balanced,
then their parasitic capacitances are dierent. This means that power consumption
of dual rail circuits is still data dependent. Although it would take more traces
to attack a dual rail circuit than a single rail circuit, dual rail circuits that do not
consider routing capacitance cannot prevent SCA.
To address the routing problem in dual rail circuits, (so far) three proposals [23,
94, 95] were published. The next few paragraphs discusses them.
Divided Wave Dynamic Dierential Logic Style
Tiri and Verbauwhede [94] proposed to rst route the true part of the dual rail
and then copy the layout (with interconnects) and replace the AND gates with OR
gates and vice versa. This ensures that the dierential signals see the same routing
capacitance. The overview of this process can be shown in Figure 3.14. However
the problem with this approach is that the designer still needs to balance the
dierential inputs to the entire cryptosystem and also take care of single rail to dual
rail conversion. Another major problem is that if an inverter exists in the original
netlist, then this process gets complicated since the inversion should be achieved by66 Chapter 3 Dierential Power Analysis Countermeasures
Figure 3.14: DWDDL implementation from [94]
swapping the dierential wires. Although this approach is a theoretically sound
way to prevent power attacks, it may still not be able to prevent EM attacks
because the dierential netlists are physically separate.
Fat Wire Method
Tiri and Verbauwhede [95] proposed a \fat wire" method to solve the routing
problem in dual rail circuits. The idea is to change the minimum routing width
from W to Wf, Wf = (Pn + 2W)=2, where Pn is the pitch of normal wires. The
new fat wire should cover both of the dierential signals. Ideally its better to keep
the dierential signals of each cell close, so that the fat wire need not be extended
any more than necessary. After the place & route with fat wire, the resulting
design is transformed into nal dierential design. This process is illustrated in
Figure 3.15. After the transformation, as the dierential signals are always close
to each other, crosstalk eects may exists. To avoid this, one option is to include
a third wire in the fat wire, which can be a Vdd or GND line. Another option is
to simply increase the space between dierential wires. Note that either method
results in increased area.Chapter 3 Dierential Power Analysis Countermeasures 67
Figure 3.15: Fatwire transformation from [95]
Tiri and Verbauwhede [98] have given an overview of secure IC design using WDDL
for dual rail and \fat wire" for dual rail routing. In [99] a prototype IC for secure
implementations has been developed, by using WDDL and fat wire techniques.
It has been reported that this protected AES successfully prevented DPA for 5
key bytes (out of 16) for up to 1,500,000 encryption power traces. Although
other 11 key bytes were disclosed for a maximum 1,276,186 encryption power
traces. WDDL secure AES overheads are reported to be: Area overhead 3 times,
throughput overhead 3.8 times and power consumption overhead 3.7 times.
Backend Duplication Method
Another approach to solve the dual rail routing is proposed by Guilley et al. [23],
called the backend duplication method. In the backend duplication method, rst
a single rail netlist is taken as an input to the place & route tool. Then its oor
plan is altered to accommodate the dual rail gates and wires. This is done by
approximately doubling the length & width of the single rail chip dimensions.
Then obstructions are implemented: this step is necessary as it reserves the space
for dual rail counterparts. After this second step, the placement and routing is
run as in a normal design ow. Finally the duplication is done.68 Chapter 3 Dierential Power Analysis Countermeasures
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Figure 3.16: Secure backend ow: obstruction
Obstruction is needed for two reasons, cell placement and wire routing. For cell
placement, every other row is blocked for the dual rail counterparts. For wire
routing, every other vertical routing pitch is blocked. The row that is blocked for
placement is also blocked for horizontal routing. This obstruction forces the place
& route tool to leave enough room for the dual rail counterparts, in a way that
routing capacitances are matched.
Duplication is also done for cells and wire routing. For cells, this step is a simple
translation (AND to OR, NAND to NOR, etc...) and a horizontal ip. Note thatChapter 3 Dierential Power Analysis Countermeasures 69
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Figure 3.17: Secure backend ow: place & route single rail netlist
the wires within the rows also are copied. For vertical wires, this step is a simple
shift in position by the routing pitch. The concepts of obstruction and duplication
can be understood from the Figures 3.16 3.17 and 3.18. Note that the duplicated
cells are shifted by the distance of routing pitch to accommodate the duplicate
vertical wires.
However the problem with duplicate place & route is that it does not address
the coupling capacitance that exists between the complementary wires, that are70 Chapter 3 Dierential Power Analysis Countermeasures
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Figure 3.18: Secure backend ow: duplication
physically located next to each other. Moreover the coupling capacitance that
aects the overall capacitance is not properly distributed.
This of balancing coupling capacitance can be clearly seen from Figure 3.19 and
Figure 3.20. Wires W1 1, W2 1, W3 1 are the original wires where as W1 0,
W2 0, W3 0 are the duplicated wires. The coupling capacitance as seen by W2 1
is dierent than that seen by W2 0. Moreover if the capacitance between W2 1
and W2 0 is high, then crosstalk problems exists. One way to solve this problem
is to insert a power signal wire between the dierential wires or to increase theChapter 3 Dierential Power Analysis Countermeasures 71
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Figure 3.19: Secure backend ow: capacitance in single rail circuit
distance between the dierential wires (as advised in the fat wire method), but
both solutions increase the overall area.72 Chapter 3 Dierential Power Analysis Countermeasures
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Figure 3.20: Secure backend ow: capacitance in dual rail circuit
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Three Phase Dual Rail Logic Style
More recently, Bucci et al. [10] proposed to use three phases instead of two phases
(precharge/discharge and evaluate) in dual rail circuits to overcome the routing
problem. The idea is to precharge, evaluate and then discharge all the gates, so
that the power consumed by per clock cycle is always same. The phasing scheme
can be implemented as shown in Figure 3.21.
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Figure 3.22: Three phase dual rail Inverter
A three phase dual rail (TPDR)) inverter is shown in Figure 3.22 and its signal
timing shown in Figure 3.23. Although Bucci et al. [10] have proposed to use
SABL style cells, a WDDL style implementation is also possible. TPDR circuits
provide their security by charging and discharging all the gates (and their routing
capacitance), thus making the energy consumed per clock cycle constant. However
the energy dierence between the three phases stills leak information. Bucci et al.
[10] assume that it is dicult to extract information between phases as all the
gates change states at once. This assumption hold true if logic style as shown in74 Chapter 3 Dierential Power Analysis Countermeasures
Figure 3.22 is used where evaluation, precharge and discharge signals are same in
all the gates.
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Figure 3.23: Three phase dual rail timing diagram
3.5.3.2 Gate Level Masking
The basic idea behind gate level masking can be seen from Figure 3.24. Every
input of a normal gate is replaced by a masked input and a mask value and
every output is replaced by a masked output. This means outm = out  mout,
in1m = in1  m1 and in2m = in2  m2. Now the output of masked gate is a
function of in1m;m1;in2m;m2;mout. These mask values are randomly generated
when required. This means the power consumption of masked gates is not directly
dependent on the original inputs, hence it can prevent power attacks. The number
of mask bits used need not always be 1. It is shown that more than one mask can
be used for a bit [27], but is not practical as the overheads are signicantly higher.Chapter 3 Dierential Power Analysis Countermeasures 75
Articles [101, 103] present a solution to implement masking for AES non-linear
function at the gate level. [27] discusses gate level masking from a theoretical
point of view.
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Figure 3.24: Gate level masking
Gate Level Masking Overheads
In general, masking at logic level has high area, power and performance overheads.
An example masked AND gate from [103] is shown in Figure 3.25. In this case
the area overhead is roughly 8 times. This increase in the number of gates also
increases the power consumption and the critical path delay resulting in poor
performance.
To use gate Level masking countermeasures, rst the normal netlist is translated
into a masked gate level netlist (as shown in Figure 3.8). Depending on the
availability of resources, a library of masked gates is developed to support the
backend ows. Next the translated masked gate level netlist and the library of
masked gates are used to nish the design.
The cost of incorporating Masked logic cells into design ows can be very low, if
the masked gates are developed from standard logic gates. In this case no extra
backend libraries are required. For example this is true if a masking scheme such as76 Chapter 3 Dierential Power Analysis Countermeasures
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Figure 3.25: Masked AND gate from [103]
shown in Figure 3.25 is used. Designers only need to write a program to translate
the normal netlist into masked netlist.
Glitches problem in Gate Level Masking
Although gate level masking looks like an interesting option to counteract power
attacks, Mangard [39] has shown that masking techniques that do not consider
glitches are still susceptible to power attacks. Mangard et al. [41] have clearly
shown that glitches occur in masked logic gates and that they are susceptible to
power attacks. To overcome the glitch problem in gate level masking, Popp and
Mangard [69] introduced a new gate level countermeasure based on masking and
dual rail precharge, called masked dual rail pre-charge logic style (MDPL). The
basic idea of this solution is to avoid glitches in masked logic styles by using dual
rail precharge techniques [69]. MDPL gates were realised by using CMOS majority
gates.
However the MDPL style also has high overheads. Popp and Mangard [70, Table
1] have shown that MDPL has about 4.76 times area overhead, performs at about
0.6 times the equivalent CMOS designs speed and consumes about 17 times moreChapter 3 Dierential Power Analysis Countermeasures 77
power. Clearly this is an extremely high overhead and cannot be adopted where
constraints are more tight.
3.6 Comparison of DPA Countermeasures
Table 3.1: Comparison of some of the DPA countermeasures
countermeasure
and design
area
in-
crease
speed
re-
duc-
tion
increase
in
number
of traces
notes
Algorithmic masking
Masking [1], AES
Sbox
4.2 1.7 5.2 susceptible to glitches
([42]
Masking [66], AES
Sbox
2.5 2.1 1.2 susceptible to glitches
([42]
Gate-level masking
MDPL, AES [69] 4.76 0.59 182 key not found for
3,511,000 traces [71]
Constant Power Consumption using Analog Circuits
On Chip Signal
Compression, DES
[76]
- - - almost constant power
consumption from the
device, but needs o-chip
capacitance
Randomisation
DVFS, AES [112] - 1.2 - easy to detect
synchronisation points
from power trace and
attack
Random precharging,
AES [8]
- - - reduction in correlation
by 30%
Dual rail precharge logic
SABL, DES Sbox [91] 1.79 - - needs custom logic cellsto
manufacture
WDDL + fat wire,
AES [99]
3.1 0.25 119.7 5 subkey bytes not found
for 1,500,000 traces
WDDL + backend
duplication with
shielded dierential
wires, DES [24]
11.8 0.5 350 key not found for
6,400,000 traces [22]78 Chapter 3 Dierential Power Analysis Countermeasures
Since DPA was published, it has received signicant amount of attention from
researchers, as such, there are numerous proposals to protect a design from DPA
attack. Some of these countermeasures are tabulated in Table 3.1. The rst
column presents the countermeasure type and the design used in evaluating. The
second and third columns present area and speed overheads respectively. The
fourth column presents the increase in number of traces to nd the secret key,
when compared to an unprotected implementation of the same design. The nal
column has some comments related to the countermeasure.
These proposals vary in their approach to prevent DPA and comparing them is
not trivial. For applications in smart cards. the most important factor to consider
should be security, i.e, the number of traces required to nd the secret key. Indeed,
the protocol level countermeasures discussed in [29] need this number to design
the protocol. The next factor to consider should be area cost and implementa-
tion eort, followed by speed and power consumption. Our justication for these
statements is as follows; DPA attack is primarily aimed at smart cards. For smart
cards, security should be foremost otherwise these cards will be useless in their
function. The speed of operation or power consumption is not crucial because the
smart cards are only used for few seconds at a time and most smart card readers
have dedicated power sources.
Algorithmic masking countermeasures aim to randomise power consumption by
using a random mask with the intermediate results. These masking schemes need
to take special care of non-linear functions often found in block ciphers. It is
shown in [42] that algorithmic masking countermeasures suer from glitches and
that the design netlist with back annotated delays (from layout) can be used to
mount DPA.
Gate-level masking also suer from glitches [41], unless special care is taken to
avoid them [69]. MDPL [69] is currently the only known secure gate-level maskingChapter 3 Dierential Power Analysis Countermeasures 79
scheme, it is shown in [71] that a MDPL AES implementation did not reveal the
secret key for 3,511,000 traces. When compared to an unprotected AES imple-
mentation this is a 181 times increase in the number of traces. However MDPL
has an area overhead of almost 5 times when compared to an unprotected AES.
Randomisation countermeasures such as [8, 112] can only increase the number of
required traces by a margin.
Constant Power Consumption countermeasures such as [49, 53, 76] use current
sensing circuits to dissipate power such that the device (with countermeasure)
power consumption is constant. These solutions have been shown to work in
simulations, however one of the requirements of these circuits is an o-chip capac-
itance. To the best of our knowledge, such countermeasures have not been made in
silicon, but if an o-chip capacitance is indeed required, then an attacker can use
it to measure the dissipated power to nd the cryptographic device actual power
consumption.
Dual rail precharge logic style countermeasures such as SABL and WDDL have
been shown to be fully secure, however special care needs to be taken when routing
the dierential nets [95]. SABL is a custom design logic style, so is expensive to
manufacture. WDDL on the other hand, can be built from standard cell CMOS
library. As mentioned earlier, WDDL designs needs to have fully balanced dual
rail nets. In [99], a WDDL AES implementation with special care to routing,
using fat wire method, has been designed. When compared to an unprotected
implementation of AES on the same IC, WDDL needed 119 times increase in the
number of traces and 5 of the subkey bytes could not be found for 1,500,000 traces.
The WDDL implementation in [99] has 3.1 times area overhead when compared
to an unprotected implementation.
In [24] a WDDL DES with special care to routing, using backend duplication
method with shielding of dierential nets, has been implemented. In [22], this80 Chapter 3 Dierential Power Analysis Countermeasures
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Figure 3.26: Circuit to demonstrate the Early propagation eect
designs DPA analysis was not successful even after 6,400,000, an improvement of
350 times when compared to an unprotected DES implementation. However the
WDDL implementation in [24] is reported to have an area overhead of 11.8 times
when compared to an unprotected implementation.
3.7 Recent Research
Early Propagation Eect
The early propagation eect is an eect that commonly occurs during the operation
of a CMOS logic gate and is best described by an example. Consider the circuit
shown in Figure 3.26. When the input a is at logic 1 (i.e. true), the output z takes
the value of logic 1, whatever the value of input b. As the input a is connected to
the OR gate directly, any change in its value will reach the OR gate sooner than b.
Say, both the inputs a and b change at the same time. For cases where input a is
changed to logic 1, the output z will take the value of logic 1 irrespective of input
b. That is, the output z does not have to wait until b arrives. This phenomenon
is known as the early propagation eect.
Early propagation eect is a part of the normal behaviour of digital CMOS logic,
i.e, it normally goes un-noticed, as it does not alter the functional behaviour of
the design. But for secure designs under threat from DPA, it results in leakage of
information via power consumption which may be used by an adversary to gain
knowledge of secret information. Kulikowski et al. [36] have demonstrated that theChapter 3 Dierential Power Analysis Countermeasures 81
early propagation eect can be used to attack secure balanced dual rail pre-charge
logic styles.
Directional Latch Based Logic
Directional latch based logic (DLBL) is proposed by Kulikowski et al. [34] as a
dual rail logic style to counter act against dual rail routing imbalance, which also
prevents early propagation eect. Signalling between gates (i.e, sending a logic 1 or
logic 0) is done by discharging one of the logic rails (unlike other designs where the
logic rail is charged). Discharging one rail causes the other to discharge through
the directional latch. Directional latch can sense which rail is discharged rst and
hence the logic value can be determined at the receiving end. This discharging of
both the rails leads to a routing capacitance insensitive power consumption [34].
Kulikowski et al. [34] have implemented DLBL in schematics only for evaluation
and thus could not compare the actual area overheads. However they reported the
number of transistors required for a DLBL AND gate to be 29 (compared to 12
for WDDL and 18 for SABL).
Countering early evaluation: an approach towards robust
dual-rail precharge logic
Bhasin et al. [6] have proposed a dual rail precharge based logic style that is de-
signed to prevent early propagation eect and is specically targeted at FPGAs.
The basis of this logic style, is to use the dual rail spacers 1 to prevent early
propagation. Consider a two input AND gate (four inputs in dual rail implemen-
tation, composed of two input AND and two input OR); when this gate is being
precharged, both the inputs (0/0,0/0 in DRP) inputs are at 0,0 and its outputs
1spacers are briey discussed in Page 6382 Chapter 3 Di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(0,0 in DRP) is at 0. The idea of this logic style is to prevent the logic gate from
evaluating unless both the inputs are evaluated, i.e, both inputs to the dual rail
cell should not be 00 or 11. The aim of this proposal is to program a 4 input
LUT such that it outputs a spacer value (0,0) unless both its inputs are evaluated.
Bhasin et al. have implemented an AES in WDDL style and their proposal (called
DPL-noEE), without any dierential routing balancing techniques in either of the
implementations. Using an FPGA based DPA setup, they have demonstrated that
WDDL suers from early evaluation eect, while DPL-noEE does not.
Exploiting dual-output programmable blocks to balance se-
cure dual-rail logics
Sauvage et al. [81] have proposed to use Altera FPGA's dual output logic blocks
to aid in solving the dual rail routing problem. Some of Altera's Stratix II FPGAs
have an adaptive logic block. The feature of this block is, that it can be used a
one 6 input LUT or as two 4 input LUTs. Using the adaptive logic block in two 4
input LUT is attractive for dual rail precharge logic, so that the true part and the
false part of a gate can be placed closely. Sauvage et al. have experimented with
various alignments to securely place a WDDL DES design; namely Horizontal
place & route and Vertical place & route. Based on FPGA based DPA setup,
they found that WDDL implementation without specic eorts of place & route
constraints increases the robustness a little; the Horizontal place & route strategy
by 6.5; the Vertical place & route strategy by 5.
Balanced Cell-based Dual-rail Logic
Balanced cell-based dual-rail logic (BCDL) [56] is a dual rail precharge logic type
countermeasure that uses a global precharge signal to precharge the logic gates.Chapter 3 Dierential Power Analysis Countermeasures 83
On top of this global precharge signal, a special gate is used to ensure that all the
inputs are precharged; this ensures that early propagation eect eliminated. The
advantage of using a global precharge signal is that it reduces the precharge phase,
which in WDDL logic styles in once clock cycle. Nassar et al. have implemented
an AES using BCDL logic style on an Altera Stratix II FPGA, but without any
place and route constraints. DPA attacks have been carried out on a the BCDL
AES and on an unprotected AES. With the BCDL AES implementation they
were unable to nd the right key with 150,000 traces providing an increase in the
number of traces by 20 times when compared to the unprotected implementation.
Secure Triple Track Logic
Soares et al. [84] have presented a dual rail type logic style to counteract against
DPA. The basis of this logic style is to have three (instead of two in dual rail
precharge logic) rails to represent a bit. The third extra bit is used to synchronise,
so that the early propagation is avoided. When implemented on an FPGA this
logic style has an area overhead of 5.6 times. This implementation, when put
through DPA revealed the correct key in 4000 traces.
Novel Countermeasures and Techniques for Dierential Power
Analysis
Goodwin [21] has suggested ways modify block ciphers in such a way that DPA will
become dicult or impossible. Although Goodwin suggested these modications
for various block ciphers, we only review the ones for AES here. One of these
suggestions is to add an initial diusion function after the rst Add Key function,
in the form of Mix Columns operation, before starting the round function. The aim
of this countermeasure is to increase the number of possible subkeys from 28 (if the84 Chapter 3 Dierential Power Analysis Countermeasures
output of Sub Byte or Add Key is considered) to 232 (for Mix Column). This means
that the encryption and decryption implementations of AES has to be modied.
Using simulations based on the toggle count of the registers in the design as the
power consumption, Goodwin showed that the key could not be found for atleast
4096 number of traces, when compare to 742 for an unprotected one. Another
suggestion is to perpetually expand the secret key, i.e, the key scheduler of AES
should keep on generating new round key for every new plaintext, in addition to
AES's rounds. The idea is to not use the same key for every encryption and there
by eliminating any advantage an attacker would have in using the statistical nature
of DPA. Decryption implementations of this modied AES need to pre-calculate
and store the round keys, this is because the AES decryption requires the keys in
reverse order. Goodwin reported that the area overhead of perpetually expanding
key version of AES, for an encryption only implementation to be minimal compare
to an unprotected one. For an encryption/decryption implementation the area
overhead were between 2 to 3 times.
3.8 Summary
In this Chapter, we have discussed dierent types of DPA countermeasures. The
eectiveness of a countermeasure is measured by the increase in number of traces
required by DPA to nd the secret key, when compared to a normal implementa-
tion. Every countermeasure has an overhead associated with it (in terms of area,
performance or power consumption) and oers an increase in the number of traces
required by the DPA.
Dual rail countermeasures (discussed in Section 3.5.3.1) theoretically oer the
best DPA resistance, as they eliminate the data dependent side channel leakage.
Dual rail countermeasure has been reported to have at-least three times the area
overhead compared to a normal design while providing DPA security [24, 99].Chapter 3 Dierential Power Analysis Countermeasures 85
However implementing dual rail countermeasures is a challenging task, specically
the routing of dierential nets. Solutions to this problem is discussed in Chapter 5
and in Chapter 6.
Gate level masking countermeasures are discussed in Section 3.5.3.2. It is reported
that most of the gate level masking solutions suer from glitches (i.e, leak side
channel information when glitches occur) [41]. MDPL combines dual rail precharge
logic with gate level masking techniques, to overcome glitch issues in masked gates
[69]. MDPL has been reported to have a high area overhead of 4.5 times. In [71]
it is shown that MDPL circuits are secure against DPA.
Algorithmic level countermeasures are briey discussed in Section 3.4. In [40] it
is shown that, using back annotated simulations an attack on masked AES took
130,000 traces compared to 25,000 traces for normal AES.
Randomising countermeasures are presented in Section 3.5.2. The aim of these
countermeasures is to increase the noise in the side channel leakage. The amount of
noise induced can often be traded with area and/or performance. For example, the
percentage of random process interrupt can be increased or decreased depending
on the amount of noise required [16]. Overheads of randomisation countermeasures
depend on the type of randomisation used. In Chapter 7 we discuss hardware level
randomisation solutions.
The next chapter presents our DPA ow, based on simulations and on a FPGA
based experimental setup.Chapter 4
Power Side Channel Attacks in
Practise
4.1 Introduction
Power side channel attacks, particularly dierential power analysis (DPA) attacks,
are a serious threat to the safety of a secure devices. This chapter demonstrates
how to carry out DPA attacks. Two DPA setups are presented. One uses circuit
simulations while the other uses measurements from an FPGA device. The main
aim in developing such setups is to prove that DPA is a real and serious threat.
These setups can also be used to evaluate various DPA countermeasures. Simu-
lation based DPA setup is a valuable tool that can be employed by designers to
evaluate a countermeasures eectiveness before using it in a real device.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows, Section 4.2 discusses the test
circuits used for DPA. Section 4.3 discusses DPA using circuit simulation, while
Section 4.4 discusses DPA on a FPGA. In Section 4.5 we discuss the dierence
between simulation based DPA and a measured one.
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4.2 Test Circuits
In this section we discuss the test circuits used for DPA in this thesis. Most
of the literature on side channel attacks uses standard cryptographic algorithm
implementations or part of their implementation such as DES and AES [30, 62,
91, 92, 95, 100]. Using implementations of standard algorithms for DPA analysis
can aid in comparing results with other researchers. We have used AES, AES
Sbox and DES Sbox as test circuits in our research.
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Figure 4.1: AES architecture used in DPA attack
We developed an AES encryption circuit to perform power analysis attacks. The
algorithmic description of AES is presented in Section 2.2.2.4. Figure 4.1 shows
the architecture of AES used in the DPA attack. Verilog HDL models of AES
have been developed. These models were then used with automatic synthesis and
place & route tools to implement the circuit. A 0:35 AMS v370 design kit and
0:13 ST12 design kit were used for implementation. The same HDL model was
used for FPGA implementation as well. For FPGA implementation on a Xilinx
VertexE device, Xilinx's design tools were used.
The 8 MSBs (most signicant bits) of register R2 (as shown in Figure 4.1) are
used for DPA attack. This register contains the intermediate outputs from the
XOR and Sbox operations. The shift rows operation does not aect the 8 MSBs
of the intermediate result. In the rst round of AES, the original secret key is
used to generate this intermediate result. As we also know the plain text in theChapter 4 Power Side Channel Attacks in Practise 89
initial round, the only unknown variable will be the secret key. As a result, a
DPA attack on this intermediate result will reveal the correct key. Since the secret
sub-key used in calculating the attacked intermediate result is 8 bits wide, we have
256 possible sub-keys. The intermediate result is given by Equation 4.1.
Intermediate result; I = Sbox(key  plaintext) (4.1)
R1 R2
Q’
Q D
Q’
Q D 8 8 8
Sbox
output
plain text
key
Figure 4.2: AES Sbox circuit used in DPA attack
The AES test circuit shown in Figure 4.1 resulted in 20,000+ logic gates. Because
of the size of this circuit, power simulation times were quite high, often taking few
days. As DPA on this circuit is focused on the 8 bits intermediate result given
by Equation 4.1, other parts of the circuit can be seen as noise sources from the
DPA point of view. To reduce simulation time, we also developed part of the AES
shown in Figure 4.2. On this circuit, the registered output from the Sbox is used
for DPA attack and the hypothesis used for the AES circuit in Figure 4.1 applies
to this as well.
In addition to the AES Sbox circuit, we also used a DES Sbox, shown in Figure 4.3,
as a test circuit. Since the DES Sbox was smaller than AES Sbox, its simulation
time was shorter and as the DES Sbox's subkey length was 6 bits, its analysis time
is also reduced. For the DES Sbox circuit in Figure 4.3, cipher text is used for the
DPA attack. For DPA on this circuit, inputs L and R are assumed to be known
to the attacker. Parts of standard algorithms like AES and DES, similar to the
ones described above, have been used for DPA attacks in [91, 92, 95] as well.90 Chapter 4 Power Side Channel Attacks in Practise
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Figure 4.3: DES Sbox circuit used in DPA attack
4.3 DPA Setup based on Simulations
In a simulation-based DPA ow, the power consumption of the target design is
obtained from simulation instead of measurements from the actual silicon device.
Figure 4.4 shows our simulation-based DPA ow. The only part that is dier-
ent from a hardware based DPA ow is the actual power measurement. In a
simulation-based DPA ow, power consumption is obtained using power estima-
tion tools. In a hardware based DPA, power consumption is measured from the
target cryptographic device using a digital oscilloscope.
A major advantage of a simulation-based DPA ow over a DPA experiment on
hardware, for example an ASIC, is that DPA vulnerability can be estimated early
in the design cycle, before committing to actual silicon. For example, a new coun-
termeasure against DPA can be evaluated before fabricating the actual chip. A
DPA-based design ow is also presented in [8]. Other advantages of a simulation-
based DPA ow include ease of DPA implementation and noise free power mea-
surements from simulation tools. One major disadvantage with simulation basedChapter 4 Power Side Channel Attacks in Practise 91
DPA ow is the time taken by the simulation tools to calculate the power con-
sumption.
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Figure 4.4: Simulation based DPA ow
The simulation based DPA ow is as follows. The target designs representation
(either in transistor netlist or gate level netlist) is taken along with a set of plain
text inputs for power simulations. A secret key is used in these simulations and
it is kept constant for all plain text inputs. As simulation tools generally save
the power consumption result as continuous data, it has to be partitioned with
respect to its corresponding plain text input. The same set of plain text inputs
are used to generate hypothetical power consumption. Finally statistical analysis
is performed on the hypothetical power and simulated power and a decision about
the secret key is made.
For key hypothesis generation, we used RTL/gate level simulation using Mod-
elsim [48]. As test bench and RTL models for our target cryptographic device
were already developed as part of the design implementation, using them for key
hypothesis generation was easy. Partitioning of simulation data and statistical
analysis was done using a C++ program developed during this research work.92 Chapter 4 Power Side Channel Attacks in Practise
This program is capable of Pearson Correlation and Dierence of Mean statistical
analyses.
4.3.1 Power Estimation Tools
There are many dierent power estimation tools available in the market. Accuracy
and speed of these tools depend on the abstraction level they work at. A complete
survey of power estimation tools is beyond the scope of this thesis. For further
information regarding these tools, see [19]. Availability of a tools is an important
factor in deciding its usability. As DPA relies on statistical analysis, the number
of encryptions N (Section 2.8.3) and thus the simulation time is a determining
factor in the choice of power estimation tools. We had access to three dierent
types of power estimation tools: 1) spice level with best possible accuracy, eg:
HSPICE [88] and SPECTRE [13], 2) spice level with best possible performance,
eg: Nanosim [89] and Ultrasim [14], and nally 3) gate level, eg: Primepower.
HSPICE and SPECTRE are full spice level tools that provide best possible accu-
racy. These tools are mainly used in analog circuit design. The computation time
required by these tools increases with circuit size. As a result these tools are not
preferred.
Primepower is a fast gate level power estimation tool. Eciency of this tool
depends on the availability of properly characterised library. Since the standard
cell design kits we used (ST12 and AMS350) did not have a library characterised
for Primepower, we did not use it.
Nanosim and Ultrasim are known as fast spice simulators. They claim to trade o
accuracy for speed. Nanosim for example, claims to be within 90-95% of accuracy
of HSPICE [89]. As both the design kits we used supported Nanosim, it becameChapter 4 Power Side Channel Attacks in Practise 93
the simulator of our choice. Nanosim has also been used in [8, 69] to evaluate DPA
resistance.
4.3.2 Results from Simulation based DPA
Simulations have been done on a SPICE netlist without routing parasitics using the
fast spice simulator Nanosim. To limit the time spent on simulation, encryption
rounds (N) of 10,000 have been initially chosen. This simulation of the AES circuit
shown in Figure 4.1, which was run on a workstation running RHEL4 on an AMD
Opteron 246 with 1Gb memory, took about 25 hours of CPU time.
After obtaining the simulation results, the intermediate result matrix, discussed in
Page 35, I1:::2K;1:::N can be constructed by using Equation 4.1. We have used two
dierent hypothetical power models, namely Hamming weight (HW) model and
Hamming distance (HD) model (described in Section 2.8.1) to implement DPA.
The Hamming distance hypothesis model is used to predict the 0 ! 1 transition
on the selected intermediate result. This model is also referred to as the transition
count hypothesis. The second key hypothesis is to predict the Hamming weight of
the selected intermediate result (for example if 3 out of n bits of an intermediate
result were at logic 1 its Hamming weight is 3). These two hypothesis models dier
in that the Hamming distance hypothesis relies on exact bit transitions where as
the Hamming weight hypothesis is a more generic model, checking which bits are
at logic 1.
Results from the Pearson Correlation (Equation 2.8) statistical analysis are dis-
cussed here. The Dierence of Mean analysis also gave similar results. Statistical
analysis using Hamming weight did not reveal the correct key, however the Ham-
ming distance model revealed the correct 8 key bits, 167 in this case. The DPA
result plot for two dierent numbers of encryption rounds, 1000 and 10,000, is94 Chapter 4 Power Side Channel Attacks in Practise
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Figure 4.5: DPA result for 10,000 and 1000 encryption rounds on AES without
any countermeasure, based on simulations
shown in Figure 4.5. The X-axis represents all possible key values (0 to 255) and
the Y-axis represents the correlation of a particular key's hypothetical power con-
sumption to the actual power consumption. The key with the highest correlation
represents the correct key. It is also important to note that the absolute value of
correlation for the correct key is not important, it is the relative value from other
possible keys. As can be seen in Figure 4.5, the correct key value was detected for
10,000 encryption rounds but not for 1000 encryption rounds. For our AES test
circuit a minimum of 2500 rounds was needed to dierentiate the correct key, i.e.
for the correlation of correct key to be signicantly higher than the correlation of
other possible keys.
Because of the circuit complexity and time to simulate the entire AES circuit we
also implemented DPA on part of AES, the Sbox shown in Figure 4.2. Figure 4.6Chapter 4 Power Side Channel Attacks in Practise 95
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Figure 4.6: DPA result for 10000 rounds on AES Sbox without any counter-
measure, based on simulations.
shows the DPA result on this circuit. The hypothetical power consumption is
same as for the original AES circuit in Figure 4.1. For the Sbox circuit, the attack
point is at the register R2. Although this circuit is trivial when compared to the
complete AES system, it enables us to see the eectiveness of a countermeasure
in a shorter simulation time. Moreover as the there is no other logic operating in
parallel in the Sbox circuit, the power consumption observed would have less noise
than in the AES circuit (as there is more logic operating at a given time in AES),
thus any countermeasure proved against this circuit should work for the entire
AES as well. The eect of noise can be clearly seen in Figure 4.6, the correct key
detected for Sbox has much higher correlation value when compared to the DPA
result on the entire AES in Figure 4.5.96 Chapter 4 Power Side Channel Attacks in Practise
4.4 DPA Setup based on FPGA
As part of this research, we also developed an FPGA based DPA ow. Figure 4.7
shows the general block diagram of our DPA setup on an FPGA. The ow of
the experiment is as follows. The PC initiates the experiment, by rst setting up
the oscilloscope and then the FPGA (cryptographic device). Next the PC sends
data to the FPGA for encryption. While the FPGA is performing cryptographic
operation, it sends a trigger signal to the oscilloscope. The oscilloscope then
records the side channel leakage of the FPGA and sends it to the PC. After the
PC receives the side channel leakage data from the oscilloscope, it initiates a new
data transfer to the FPGA.
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Figure 4.7: Block diagram of DPA setupChapter 4 Power Side Channel Attacks in Practise 97
Oscilloscope
The Oscilloscope is used to measure the instantaneous power consumption of the
device under attack, digitise it and transfer it to the PC. At the time of this
research, we had access to a few dierent types of oscilloscopes including the
Agilent DSC80204B series oscilloscope. We preferred the Agilent DSC80204B for
two reasons. First the availability of an active dierential probe with this scope
and second the availability of an Ethernet port for data transfer. For all our
experiments we used this oscilloscope, which had 2 GHz bandwidth and 40 GSa/s
aquisition rate (shown in Figure 4.8) and an active dierential probe from Agilent.
Figure 4.8: Picture of the Oscilloscope while measuring power consumption98 Chapter 4 Power Side Channel Attacks in Practise
Data Transfer
Communication between the oscilloscope and PC was done via Ethernet. Commu-
nication between FPGA board and PC was done via RS232 for which we developed
an RS232 interface for the FPGA. To aid in these experiments, we developed a
C++ program that communicates with the FPGA via RS232 and with oscillo-
scope via Ethernet. This program also has a behavioural model of AES, AES
Sbox and DES Sbox so that any data sent back from the FPGA is veried against
the expected result.
Target Device
The FPGA board that we had access to is a Xilinx BG560 Prototype board [110].
This board has some peripheral equipment along with a socket for Xilinx Vertex
FPGA. The Xilinx Prototype board has three separate power supply terminals,
one to the internal core of the FPGA, the other to the IO of the FPGA and a third
to other peripherals on board. This enabled us to measure the power consumption
of just the FPGA's internal logic elements and not the IO circuitry.
Measuring Power Consumption
There are dierent ways to measure the power consumption of a device. The most
common way is to use a resistor across power supply terminals and to measure
the voltage across it. The measured voltage is proportional to the current owing
through the resistor and hence power consumed by the device. One other way
is to use a commercially available current probe. These so called current probes
have an inductor through which a wire is passed. The amount of current passing
through this wire is proportional to the voltage measured across the inductor.Chapter 4 Power Side Channel Attacks in Practise 99
Current probes are better to use at low voltages as they do not have the voltage
drop that is found in a resistor based setup.
Since we did not have access to a current probe, we used a resistor across the
voltage supply line to measure power consumption. Although our target board
had separate power supply lines for core and IO, they all had coupling capacitance
to ground and this resulted in noisier measurement. To overcome this, we also
experimented with simple coils to measure the device's power consumption via
the electro magnetic eld. Figure 4.9 shows a photograph of our test setup using
one such coil.
Probe for triggering
Oscilloscope
EM probe
for measuring
side channel
leakage
Diﬀerential Probe
FPGA
Power Supply
Figure 4.9: Picture of the Xilinx FPGA board used in the DPA experiment
In our experiments, both coil and resistor yielded similar results. Resistor based
measurements did not yield any results for big circuits, where more current is
consumed. The coil we used is sensitive to its position relative to the FPGA.100 Chapter 4 Power Side Channel Attacks in Practise
In all cases we had to try various positions, until we could see a clear current
consumption signal on the scope. The coil is also more sensitive to other EM
signals, especially from mobile phones. Results from experiments using resistor
and coil based measurements are discussed next.
4.4.1 Results from DPA on FPGA
Test circuits used in the FPGA based setup are same as the ones from the simu-
lation based DPA. The only dierence is that there is extra RS232 logic to com-
municate with the PC. In all cases we made sure that only the encryption logic
operates when the oscilloscope measures the side channel leakage.
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Figure 4.10: DPA result for 1000 rounds on FPGA implementation of DES
Sbox without any countermeasure.
We rst experimented on the AES Sbox circuit shown in Figure 4.2. On this
circuit, power side channel leakage measurements from both the resistor and coilChapter 4 Power Side Channel Attacks in Practise 101
did not reveal the correct key. We suspect this is because of noisier power supply
connections on our board due to coupling capacitance and because the AES Sbox
circuit's power consumption is too small to be detected. We then changed our
AES Sbox design on the FPGA in such a way that the outputs from register R2
were driven out to the FPGA IO ports. Our aim in doing this is to increase the
power consumption of AES Sbox by driving the extra capacitive load. With the
new design, measurements from both resistor and coil revealed the correct key.
Our DES Sbox experiments were similar as well, i.e, the outputs were driven out
to FPGA IO ports in order to nd the correct key. Both AES Sbox and DES
Sbox revealed their secret Key within 500 encryption rounds. Figure 4.10 and
Figure 4.11 shows the DPA results on DES Sbox and AES Sbox respectively.
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Figure 4.11: DPA result for 5000 rounds on FPGA implementation of AES
Sbox without any countermeasure.
For our AES circuit, in Figure 4.1, we rst measured power consumption via the
resistor for 5000 encryption rounds. This number however did not reveal the102 Chapter 4 Power Side Channel Attacks in Practise
correct key. Later we used the coil to measure EM signal around the FPGA.
Results from the coil based measurements revealed the correct key. We suspect
this because of noisier power measurement. Figure 4.12 shows DPA result on AES
circuit. Minimum number of traces required for a successful DPA attack on our
FPGA board is tabulated in Table 4.1.
0 50 100 150 200 250
all possible subkeys
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
m
a
x
i
m
u
m
 
c
o
r
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
f
o
r
 
e
a
c
h
 
s
u
b
k
e
y
key(55)
 detected
Correlation of different keys for 20000 traces
Figure 4.12: DPA result for 20000 rounds on FPGA implementation of AES
without any countermeasure.
Table 4.1: Minimum number of traces required for successful DPA attack of
unprotected designs implemented on our FPGA board
design minimum number of traces
DES Sbox 43
AES Sbox 31
AES 232Chapter 4 Power Side Channel Attacks in Practise 103
4.4.1.1 Discussion about comparing DPA setup
The FPGA based DPA setup discussed above was developed as a part of this
research and its main purpose was to evaluate the eectiveness of countermea-
sures. During the development of this board, we did not try to calibrate our setup
by comparing results from other DPA publications. To do that we will have to
have exactly same (or atleast similar) components, like oscilloscope, measurement
probes, power supply to the FPGA, FPGA device and the PCB board containing
FPGA device. Instead, we tried to tune our setup such that we would nd the
correct secret key in as fewer traces as possible. To measure the eectiveness of a
countermeasure, we compare the number of traces required for an implementation
with the countermeasure to the one without any countermeasures. This approach
of evaluating the countermeasures has also been used in various publications such
as these [22, 71, 99, 113].
However there is an eort to standardise an FPGA based DPA setup that various
researchers can use for eective comparison of DPA results and is available via [78]
(\Side-channel Attack Standard Evaluation Board"). For any one seeking to work
in DPA related topic, we strongly recommend using a standard board such as [78]
as it 1) reduces the DPA setup development time and 2) facilitates in comparing
DPA results with other research work.
4.4.1.2 How to know if the DPA Attack is Successful ?
After a DPA attack how can one know if the attack was successful in nding the
key? One option is to use the key found via DPA attack to decrypt a ciphertext
which is a result of encrypting a known plaintext using the device under attack.
For this to be possible, the attacker needs to be able to control the plaintext and
be able to see the ciphertext. Another option is to do a DPA analysis for dierent
number of traces, N (number of encryptions). As N is increased, the correlation104 Chapter 4 Power Side Channel Attacks in Practise
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Figure 4.13: DPA result for all encryption rounds on FPGA Implementation
of AES Sbox without any countermeasure.
of the correct key should higher than the rest. A gure depicting this is shown in
Figure 4.13; as the number of encryptions is increased the correct key correlation
gets separated from the rest of the other keys.
4.5 Comparison between Simulation based DPA
and a Practical one
Simulation based DPA ow, despite its long simulation time, is quite useful for
secure circuit designers and researchers, where DPA countermeasures can be eval-
uated. However there may be concerns about the similarities between simulation
based DPA and a DPA on an physical device. For example, simulations provides aChapter 4 Power Side Channel Attacks in Practise 105
noise free, accurate instantaneous power consumption. Whereas, power measure-
ments from physical devices using an oscilloscope will have measurement noise.
Moreover, the accuracy of measurement will depend on the sampling rate and
bandwidth of the oscilloscope used. Of course the accuracy of simulation depends
on power estimation tool and the simulation model used. Here we assume that
the simulation is done using a SPICE or Fast SPICE based tool to get reasonably
accurate results.
Simulation-based DPA can be considered as an ideal attack environment and hence
an ideal environment to evaluate countermeasures, as there is no measurement
noise and the simulated power consumption is accurate without any bandwidth
or sampling rate issues. If a countermeasure is successful in preventing DPA in
simulations then it can be assumed that it will be successful in preventing DPA
on the physical device, assuming that the simulation model used is an accurate
representation of the physical device. Of course the main drawback of simulation-
based DPA is the simulation time.
On the other hand, it may seem that simulation based DPA may be pessimistic
in evaluating DPA countermeasures. Since simulated power consumption is free
of measurement noise, an oscilloscope based measurement may have some noise
in its measurements and this noise in measurement may prevent a DPA attack.
However this scenario can be ignored, as DPA uses statistical methods and by
simply increasing the number of traces, the aect of noise can be minimised.
Simulated power consumption also provides the maximum available sampling rate
and is only limited by the simulation model and the simulation tool used. Although
oscilloscopes have limited sampling rate, the current state of the art oscilloscope
has about 40GSa/s (Giga Samples per second), while most of the smart cards
operate at clock frequencies of a few hundred mega hertz. Moreover for most
smart cards, clock frequency can also be controlled by the attacker. Since the106 Chapter 4 Power Side Channel Attacks in Practise
designer of a cryptographic device cannot predict which oscilloscope an attacker
might use, it is in the interest of the device's security that a worst case scenario
be assumed.
A huge dierence between a simulation model and a real device is that in the
simulation model we did not consider the eects of chip packaging. Chip packaging
introduces parasitics and aect the measurement of the power consumption signal
[87]. However, in [87], Steinkogler has done a comparative analysis of DPA from
simulation of a chip on one hand and measurements on the actual device on the
other. Steinkogler found that considering the chip packaging in the simulation did
not increase the correlation signicantly and that DPA results from transistor-level
simulations correlated well against DPA results from measurements on an actual
chip.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we presented our DPA ows, one based on circuit simulations
and other based on an FPGA board. Although our DPA ows are not real world
experiments, they are easily adaptable and provide a way to implement DPA and
evaluate countermeasures. These ows are used in countermeasures presented in
the following chapters.
The FPGA board used during this research has few drawback with regards to
DPA. Specically there were coupling capacitance that made it dicult to get a
noise free power consumption. To prevent this a board designed specically for
DPA can be used. For example, Research Centre For Information Security oer
an FPGA based evaluation board for DPA called SASEBO [78].
Using our simulation based DPA ow and FPGA based DPA ow on an AES
circuit we showed that dierential power analysis attacks are a real threat to theChapter 4 Power Side Channel Attacks in Practise 107
security of cryptographic devices. It is also important to note that DPA is simple
enough to implement.
Finally dierences between simulation and a measurement-based DPA are dis-
cussed. Simulation based DPA is a vital tool for evaluating eectiveness of DPA
countermeasures.Chapter 5
Path Switching: A Technique to
Tolerate Dual Rail Routing
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5.1 Introduction
Some of the countermeasures discussed in Chapter 3 rely on randomisation to
prevent DPA. The countermeasures presented in [5, 8] (discussed in Section 3.5.2)
randomise power consumption of the device thus reducing the data dependent
power consumption factor. However, the solution presented in [8] is only shown to
increase the number of traces needed for the DPA attack, but could not completely
prevent it.
Algorithmic masking [39, 64, 73] (discussed in Section 3.4) is specic to a given
implementation and cannot be exploited by automation. Gate level masking [103]
(discussed in Section 3.5.3.2) on the other hand can be automated very easily, but
proposals so far have high area overheads. It has been shown that both algorithmic
and Gate level masking suer from glitches, which can be exploited to nd the
109110
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secret key [41, 42]. To overcome the glitch problem in gate level masking, dual
rail dynamic logic has been used together with masking in [69], known as masked
dual rail precharge logic (MDPL). However MDPL has high area overhead, a 4.5
times increase [70].
Dynamic and dierential logic (also referred to as dual rail precharge - DRP)
[86, 92, 94] (discussed in Section 3.5.3.1) has been proposed to prevent DPA. The
idea is to consume the same amount of power for any combinations of inputs.
This is achieved by using dierential logic (two signals instead of one) and by
precharging both the dierential nets in every clock cycle. In DRP circuits, for
every logic gate, a complementary gate exists, usually referred to as false logic (or
false part). DRP circuits have been proved to prevent DPA provided the routing
of dierential nets is balanced [99].
Secure dual rail designs suer from one major problem: balancing the routing
capacitance of dierential nets[95]. To address the routing problem so far four
proposals have been put forward: DWDDL [94], fat wire [95], backend duplication
[23] and three phase dual rail [10]. Three of the four proposals [23, 94, 95] impose
some constraints on backend implementation ows and try to solve the problem by
eliminating the dierence of routing capacitance of dierential nets. Three phase
dual rail [10] tries to avoid the routing problem by introducing a third phase,
which is an additional overhead.
In this chapter we present a simple yet eective solution, called path switching, to
improve dual rail circuits tolerance to routing imbalances. Our solution assumes
that the dierence in capacitance of dierential nets exists. Instead of eliminating
this routing dierence, we use this dierence to randomly switch the path taken
by the dierential net, thereby improving DPA resistance.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. In Section 5.2 we summarise dualChapter 5 Path Switching: A Technique to Tolerate Dual Rail Routing
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rail precharge logic styles. Section 5.3 briey introduces our test circuit, hypoth-
esis models and simulation tools used. In Section 5.4 we show the results from
successful DPA attacks on dual rail circuits. In Section 5.5 we propose our coun-
termeasure to improve the security of dual rail circuits. In Section 5.6 we discuss
path switching implementation and extensions to logic gates. Finally in Section 5.9
we conclude this chapter and discuss some limitations of path switching.
5.2 Dual Rail Precharge Circuits
Dual rail precharge circuits were discussed in detail in Section 3.5.3.1. SABL [92]
is a dynamic and dierential logic style specially built to consume constant power
for any combination of inputs. As SABL cells are not available in the standard
library, users of SABL need to develop a SABL library which adds to the total
system costs. Wave dynamic and dierential logic (WDDL) [94] applies the same
dynamic and dierential logic style techniques to standard CMOS cells, avoiding
the expensive development of SABL library. WDDL has an area overhead of 2-fold
for combinational logic and 2-fold or 4-fold on ip-ops ([94]).
Dual spacer dual rail (DSDR) [86] is similar to WDDL except for the following. In
WDDL only one precharge1 event is used. That is all the gates are set to logic 0
in the precharge state and then evaluated. In asynchronous jargon, this 'all zeros'
precharge state is called a spacer which separates the inputs (code words) from
the precharge signal. In DSDR another spacer, 'all ones' is also used. Hence the
name dual spacer. Another dierence between WDDL and DSDR is that WDDL
uses only positive logic (positive logic means non-inverting gates like AND, OR).
Whereas DSDR tries to optimise the circuit by using inverting gates (such as
NAND, NOR). This optimisation comes from the fact that in CMOS, positive
gates are built from inverting gates and an inverter. For example an AND gate
1By precharge state we mean precharge or pre-discharge112
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is actually a NAND plus an INVERTER. However DSDR, with inverting gates,
might suer from glitches and may compromise the secret key (similar to the glitch
problem in masking [41, 42]), this has not yet been evaluated. DSDR has been
proposed in both Synchronous and Asynchronous systems.
The single rail to dual rail converters, ip-ops and precharge wave generators
used in DSDR [86] were presented from an asynchronous design point. To main-
tain compatibility with WDDL style designs, we used the single rail to dual rail
converter and precharge generation as shown in Figure 5.1, which are compatible
with both WDDL and DSDR. The precharge wave generation circuit can be build
with 2 D-type ip-ops and 1 T-type ip-op. An additional AND gate can be
used to control the precharge value changes (i.e. to randomly control the dual
spacer).
prch value
prch prch prch eval eval
preset reset
clk x2
in
prch prch value
out0
out1
prch
Figure 5.1: Precharge wave generation and single rail to dual rail converter
for dual spacer protocol
5.3 Test Circuit
Our DPA test setup was presented in detail in Section 4. We used a DES Sbox,
shown in Figure 5.2 as a test circuit for experiments related to this chapter. First
we implemented a DPA attack on a normal single rail circuit, to serve as a com-
parison for the eectiveness of dual rail countermeasures. We chose a dierence ofChapter 5 Path Switching: A Technique to Tolerate Dual Rail Routing
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mean DPA attack [31], which was discussed in Section 2.8.3. We developed two
key hypothesis models, namely Hamming weight model and Hamming distance
model, to attack the test circuit. These two hypothesis models dier in that the
Hamming distance hypothesis relies on exact bit transitions whereas the Hamming
weight hypothesis is a more generic model, checking which bits are at logic 1. If
the hypothesis value was more than 2, then the corresponding power trace is added
to set1 else to set0. To simplify our analysis, the only unknown term in our setup
was 'key'. As we show later the results of DPA attack for both these hypothesis
models dier.
4 6
key
cipher text
Sbox 4
4
6
L R
Figure 5.2: Test circuit: DES Sbox
Our test circuit used in this chapter was implemented in AMS :35 technology.
Since our AMS V370 design kit did not have positive cells such as AND and OR in
the standard library, which are necessary to implement WDDL circuits, we used a
NAND-INVERTER pair to implement an AND gate (similarly NOR-INVERTER
for OR gate) to realise a WDDL style DES Sbox. As the WDDL style only uses
positive gates, we call our WDDL style implementation positive logic DES sbox8.
We also realised a DSDR style DES Sbox, with the converters shown in Figure 5.1
and WDDL style master slave ip-ops. As DSDR with negative gates has a wave
propagation problem [86], we developed a program which inserts spacer inverters
(see [86] for more details) at appropriate places without changing the functionality
of the circuit. As the DSDR style proposes to only use negative gates, our DSDR
Sbox will be called negative logic DES sbox8. By which we imply a circuit with114
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DPA attack results on DES Sbox with Hamming Weight hypothesis
Figure 5.3: DPA result on single rail DES Sbox, based on simulations
negative gates only without using the dual spacer protocol. When a dual spacer
is used for a particular scenario we will specify it. For all our simulations we used
55 as the secret key.
DPA on the single rail circuit was successful with just under 100 traces for both our
hypothesis models. It took 60 traces with the transition count hypothesis model
and 90 traces with the Hamming weight hypothesis model. From this we can say
that the transition count hypothesis is more eective for this DPA attack. The
DPA result on normal single rail circuit for the Hamming weight hypothesis model
is shown in Figure 5.3. Figure 5.3 has four subplots which show the DPA result
trace, each belonging to a dierent key. Four dierent keys results are presented
for comparison. The top-left subplot belongs to the subkey with the highest peak
in the results trace, which according to the DPA is the estimated-correct key. The
top-right and bottom-left subplots belong to the subkeys with the second highest
and third highest peaks in the results trace, respectively. If the correct key usedChapter 5 Path Switching: A Technique to Tolerate Dual Rail Routing
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Figure 5.4: DPA result on negative logic DES Sbox without routing capaci-
tance for 10000 traces
for simulation (55) is not in these three subplots, it is then plotted in the bottom-
right subplot for comparison purposes. If the correct key (55) is in one of the three
subplots then the key with the fourth highest peak is plotted in the bottom-right
subplot. For the rest of this chapter, all the DPA results shown are of the same
format. We choose this way of presenting DPA results as the DPA result trace's
peak position can be easily visualised. As we see later, the result trace's peak
position changes, especially for dual rail circuits with two phases.
5.4 DPA on Dual Rail Circuits
To check the eectiveness of DRP logic styles we rst mounted DPA on a netlist
without routing capacitance, since a netlist without considering routing capaci-
tance can be considered as a DRP netlist with balanced routing capacitance for
the dierential nets. We used the same key hypothesis as used for the single116
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Figure 5.5: DPA result on negative logic DES Sbox for 2000 traces
rail circuit. DPA on positive logic DES sbox8 without routing capacitance was
successful after 2,000 traces with the transition count hypothesis and 600 traces
with the Hamming weight hypothesis. This is an unexpected result, since DRP
logic styles with balanced dierential nets are expected to provide a high level of
security. DPA on negative logic DES sbox8 without routing capacitance with the
transition count hypothesis was successful after 4000 traces and after 1000 traces
with the Hamming weight hypothesis. The DPA result on the negative logic DES
sbox8 with the Hamming weight hypothesis is shown in Figure 5.4.
It is reasonable to assume that dual rail precharge circuits without routing ca-
pacitance are the same as dual rail precharge circuits with properly balanced
dierential wires. Dual rail precharge circuits with properly balanced dierential
wires are expected not to yield the correct key to the DPA attack. As WDDL
and DSDR styles are built on basic CMOS gates rather than custom logic style
such as SABL, the dierence in power consumption between true logic and falseChapter 5 Path Switching: A Technique to Tolerate Dual Rail Routing
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logic leads to a successful DPA attack. Further the DPA peak was observed in the
precharge/discharge phase rather than the evaluate phase (see Figure 5.4). How-
ever, when both negative logic DES sbox8 and positive logic DES sbox8 were used
with the dual spacer protocol (i.e. alternate reset and preset in precharge phase),
neither of the hypothesis models revealed the correct key. For time reasons, we
limited this simulation to 30,000 traces.
Next we implemented DPA on the positive logic DES sbox8 with routing capac-
itance but without the dual spacer. As expected, the correct key was found for
both the hypothesis models. The results were similar with negative logic DES
sbox8, except that this DPA took fewer traces than the positive logic DES sbox8.
We believe this might have been the eect of glitches from using negative logic.
The DPA result on negative logic DES sbox8 with the transition count hypothesis
is shown in Figure 5.5.
When the dual spacer protocol was used in both negative logic DES sbox8 and
positive logic DES sbox8 circuits the transition count hypothesis was unsuccessful
in nding the secret key, but the Hamming weight hypothesis successfully found
the secret key. The only dierence in the result is that positive logic DES sbox8
took far more traces than the negative logic DES sbox8 to nd the secret key, again
we suspect glitches in the negative logic circuit. From this we can conrm that
by using the dual spacer protocol, the number of traces needed to perform DPA
increased by 50 times for positive logic and 85 times for negative logic compared to
a normal dual rail circuit. It is also interesting to note that the Hamming weight
hypothesis yields results quicker than the transition count hypothesis for dual rail
circuits.118
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5.5 Path Switching
Dual rail precharge circuits (WDDL, DSDR) have 100% switching activity, i.e,
the (compound dual rail) logic gates switch the same number of times for any
combination of inputs. However DPA is successful on dual rail precharge circuits
because the power consumed by the true part and the false part is dierent. This
dierence is mainly caused by dierences in the routing capacitance. In other
words, the path taken by a true signal is xed and dierent from that of a false
signal. The greater the imbalance between paths, the greater its eect on DPA.
Cfalse
Ctrue
source
source destination
destination
true signal
false signal
Figure 5.6: Normal dual rail
The output signals of registers and other signals (bus) with high load capacitance
are usually used for the DPA hypothesis model (focus of attack) [62, 92]. In this
section we propose a countermeasure to withstand DPA on high load capacitance
signals, without having to change any routing.
0
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1
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1
Cfalse
Ctrue
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destination
true signal
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temp signal A
temp signalB
false signal in
switch path
switch path
switch path
switch path
true signal in
source switcher destination switcher
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To solve the imbalance between a true signal and a false signal we propose a
method called path switching. The idea is to randomly swap the true signal path
and the false signal path. By path we mean a signal path which includes wires
and any gates. Consider the dual rail signal path in Figure 5.6. If the true signal
and false signal see the same load capacitance Ctrue = Cfalse, then the power
consumed by the true part and the false part is the same and hence DPA on
this signal would be unsuccessful. However if there is a dierence in the load
capacitance, then DPA can be successful (shown in Section 5.4). We propose to
use the modication in Figure 5.7 to randomly switch the paths. When 'switch
path' changes its value the true path and false path are swapped. However the
functionality remains the same, as the destination switcher will switch according
to the source switcher. The signal 'switch path' can be tied to a randomly seeded
LFSR for randomness. If the path capacitance between sources/destinations and
the switcher is signicantly less than the capacitance seen by the original signals,
this method will introduce randomness in power consumption. This method will
especially introduce randomness in the dierence in power consumption between
the true path and the false path. This is easy to achieve, as the source switcher
can be placed near the source cell and the destination switcher can be placed with
the destination cell. In Figure 5.7 multiplexers are used to construct the switcher.
As the 'switch path' signal switches between two complementary signals, an XOR
gate can also be used as shown in Figure 5.8, which results in reduced area and
wiring.
To see the eectiveness of path switching we modied our test circuit from Fig-
ure 5.2 into the circuit shown in Figure 5.9 (complementary logic is not shown
for clarity reasons). Note that we have inserted the path switching XOR gates
at the original L input and cipher text output to implement path switching. We
implemented DPA with both hypothesis models. For DPA on negative logic DES
sbox8 (with path switching) we could not nd the secret key, for 30,000 traces.120
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Figure 5.8: Path switching dual rail with XOR gate
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Figure 5.9: Test circuit with path switching (complementary logic not shown)
However for DPA on positive logic DES sbox8 (with path switching) it took about
20,000 traces to nd the secret key. The DPA result on positive logic DES sbox8
with path switching is shown in Figure 5.10.
Next we implemented DPA on a circuit with both dual spacer and path switching
and could not nd the correct secret key for both the hypothesis models. For
time reasons, simulations were limited to 30,000 traces. However 30,000 is not a
large number to make sure this countermeasure works. So we simulated negative
logic DES sbox8 with dual spacer and path switching for 300,000 traces. Even
then the correct key was not successfully found. Although this does not guarantee
that path switching with dual spacer prevents DPA completely, it shows that this
solution can increase the number of traces required for DPA signicantly. DPA
results for this simulation are shown in Figure 5.11.
Finally all the DPA results are summarised in Table 5.2. DRP with path switchingChapter 5 Path Switching: A Technique to Tolerate Dual Rail Routing
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Figure 5.10: DPA result on positive logic DRP DES Sbox with path switching,
for 30,000 traces
and dual spacer improved the number of traces required by at least 3000 times
when compared to single rail circuits and by at least 75 times when compared to
normal dual rail precharge circuits.
Table 5.1: Area for various implementations of DES Sbox in AMS 0:35
technology
design area in
mm2
times
increase
DES Sbox single rail 20202.4 1.0
DES Sbox negative logic dual rail 53974.8 2.67
DES Sbox positive logic dual rail 64530.6 3.19
DES Sbox negative logic dual rail + path
switching
61108.8 3.02
DES Sbox positive logic dual rail + path
switching
71664.4 3.54122
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Figure 5.11: DPA result on negative logic DRP DES Sbox with dual spacer
and path switching, for 300,000 traces
5.6 Path Switching Implementation
Path switching adds two XOR gates to a ip-op instance or to a high capacitance
wire. These XOR gates are redundant in terms of logic functionality, as they do
not change the functionality of the design. Implementing path switching before
the logic synthesis phase can optimise away these XOR gates. Hence it is desirable
to implement path switching after the synthesis phase. It is also necessary to im-
plement dual rail after synthesis as the currently available CAD tools are designed
for single rail designs and would optimise any or all of the complementary parts of
a dual rail design. Moreover extending (duplicating) a single rail design into a dual
rail is not a complex problem and has been discussed in [94]. Since path switching
is an extension to dual rail circuits, it also can to be applied after synthesising a
single rail design. Path switching implementation, within the context of design
ow is shown in Figure 5.12 (standard design ow is shown in Figure 3.1).Chapter 5 Path Switching: A Technique to Tolerate Dual Rail Routing
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Table 5.2: Number of traces required for successful DPA attack on dual rail
circuits based on simulations. X means key not found for upto 300,000 traces
Transition count Hamming weight
Hypothesis Hypothesis
DES Sbox single rail 60 90
DES Sbox positive logic
2000 600
without routing cap
DES Sbox negative logic
4000 1000
without routing cap
DES Sbox positive logic
1100 400
no dual spacer
DES Sbox positive logic
X 20,000
+ dual spacer
DES Sbox positive logic
X 20,000
+ path switching
DES Sbox positive logic
X X
+ dual spacer + path switching
DES Sbox negative logic
90 70
no dual spacer
DES Sbox negative logic
X 6,000
+ dual spacer
DES Sbox negative logic
X X
+ path switching
DES Sbox negative logic
X X
+ dual spacer + path switching
Path switching can be implemented in two steps. In the rst step, path switching
is applied before place & route, as shown in Figure 5.13 (solid lines). A list of
ip-op instances and high capacitance wires are selected by the designer to be
processed. Such a list of high capacitance nets can be known from the oor plan
of the design. A program has been developed, based on OpenAccess [25], to insert
the path switching XOR gates. The resulting netlist from path switching insertion
can be placed & routed. In the second step, as shown in Figure 5.13 (dashed lines),
parasitic data can be extracted from place & route tools to nd if any dual rail net
pairs have a high ratio of parasitic capacitance. The designer can then generate
a new list to apply path switching, based on the dual rail net pairs that have a
high ratio of parasitic capacitance. Then path switching can be applied to the new
list to re-implement the design. The second step can often be avoided by proper124
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Figure 5.12: Path switching implementation within the context of digital
design ow
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Figure 5.13: Implementing path switching. Dashed lines show optional steps
oor planning and by inserting path switching XOR gates to all the nets that are
expected to have high capacitance. Finally the resulting path switching netlist
should be put through DPA analysis requirements, if they are not met, the wholeChapter 5 Path Switching: A Technique to Tolerate Dual Rail Routing
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path switching process should be repeated until the DPA analysis requirements
are met.
5.6.1 Path Switching Implementation on FPGAs
Path switching on FPGAs is more promising than on ASICs as path switching is
the rst solution than can be applied to solve the dual rail routing problem on FP-
GAs, where routing resources are limited. Note that path switching does not fully
solve the routing problem, it just increases the tolerance to routing imbalances.
The path switching ow presented in Figure 5.13 can be applied to FPGAs and
ASICs in general. However FPGAs have a dierent architecture which enables
better implementation of path switching.
The basic idea of path switching is to randomly change (swap) the path taken
by the true signal and the false signal. In order to achieve this we can insert
XOR gates at the source and destination of a signal (Figure 5.8). However in
most FPGAs the basic building block is a four input Look Up Table (LUT).
Implementing a 2 input XOR in a 4 input LUT would waste resources. Instead
if the source/destination gate uses less than 4 inputs, the source/destination gate
and the XOR gate can be merged into a single LUT. For example consider the
example in Figure 5.14(a). As the source gate is using less than the available
inputs, the XOR gate can be merged with the source gate. The new LUT will have
a dierent programming value based on the previous LUT's value. For example
if a 3 input LUT implementing an AND function will have programming value of
80HFE, the new 4 input LUT, with XOR merged can have a programming value
of 160H5556 (note that LUT programming value also depends on the order inputs
are connected).126
Chapter 5 Path Switching: A Technique to Tolerate Dual Rail Routing
Imbalances
. . .
(n − 1)th
input
inputs
n input
LUT
source switcher
temp signal A
switch path
true signal in
(a) Source gate and XOR gate
. . .
input
inputs
n input
LUT
nth
temp signal A
source switcher
switch path
(b) Source gate and XOR gate
merged
Figure 5.14: Merging XOR gate and Source gate
5.6.2 DPA Results on FPGA Implementation
In this section we present DPA results for the FPGA implementation of path
switching. The DPA setup on FPGA was already discussed in Section 4.4 and is
unchanged except for the design that is loaded onto the FPGA. We implemented
the same DES Sbox circuits, that are used in simulation, on the FPGA. We also
used the same key hypotheses that are used in the simulated DPA. Our aim is to
test path switching for a large number of traces and to show that path switching
can be applied to FPGA circuits. As such, we did not implement the optimisation
discussed in Section 5.6.1.
First, we applied DPA to a normal single rail DES Sbox. DPA on single rail
circuit with the transition count hypothesis was successful after 91 traces and
with the Hamming weight hypothesis was successful after 43 traces. Next we
implemented a positive logic dual rail DES Sbox, for which DPA with the transition
count hypothesis was successful after 446 traces and with the Hamming weight
hypothesis was successful after 262 traces. Next we implemented a positive logic
dual rail DES Sbox with dual spacer protocol, for which DPA with the transition
count hypothesis was successful after 1,100 traces and with the Hamming weight
hypothesis was successful after 832 traces.
Finally, we implemented DPA on a dual rail DES Sbox with path switching. Nei-
ther our transition count hypothesis nor Hamming weight hypothesis revealed theChapter 5 Path Switching: A Technique to Tolerate Dual Rail Routing
Imbalances 127
0 200 400 600 800 1000
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
x 10
−3
d
m
−
d
p
a
 
t
r
a
c
e
key : 59
0 200 400 600 800 1000
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
x 10
−3 key : 45
0 200 400 600 800 1000
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
x 10
−3
d
m
−
d
p
a
 
t
r
a
c
e
time/trace numbers
key : 40
0 200 400 600 800 1000
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
x 10
−3
time/trace numbers
key : 55
Correct key (55) not found
with the highest peak
Wrong key (59) found
with the second highest peak
key (45) found
with the third highest peak
key (40) found
DPA attack results on DES Sbox with Hamming Weight hypothesis
Figure 5.15: DPA result on FPGA implementation of positive logic DRP DES
Sbox with path switching, for 300,000 traces for hypothesis partition value of 2
correct secret key. The DPA result for dual rail DES Sbox with path switching is
shown in Figure 5.15. We found similar results for DPA on dual rail DES Sbox
with path switching and dual spacer. The DPA result for dual rail DES Sbox with
path switching and dual spacer is shown in Figure 5.16. For the DES Sbox with
path switching, we collected a total of 300,000 traces and for DES Sbox with path
switching and dual spacer, we collected a total of 3,000,000 traces.
Note that both our hypotheses partition traces into dierent sets based on the
hypothesis value. If the hypothesis value is more than 2, then it is added to set 1
else to set 0 (Page 112). When we used a dierent number to partition the traces,
we found dierent results. For the dual rail DES Sbox with path switching, a
partition cuto number of 3 revealed the correct key in 155,000 traces. Whereas
for the dual rail DES Sbox with path switching and dual spacer, a partition cuto
number of 1 revealed the correct key in 1,330,000 traces. DPA results for dierent
hypothesis partition values are shown in Figure 5.17 and Figure 5.18 for a DES128
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Figure 5.16: DPA result on FPGA implementation of positive logic DRP DES
Sbox with path switching and dual spacer, for 3000,000 traces for hypothesis
partition value of 2
Sbox with path switching and a DES Sbox with path switching and dual spacer
respectively.
In addition to the DES Sbox test circuit, we also mounted DPA on AES Sbox,
shown in Figure 4.2. We were able to nd the correct key from DPA on AES Sbox
in 97 traces using transition count hypothesis and 31 traces using Hamming weight
hypothesis. For the dual rail AES Sbox it took 200 and 900 traces for transition
count and hamming weight hypothesis respectively. Next we implemented DPA on
dual rail AES Sbox with path switching and dual spacer; and it required 332,900
traces to nd the correct key, using Hamming weight hypothesis and a partition
function of 6.
The dual rail DES Sbox with dual spacer protocol on FPGA was easily attacked
when compared to the simulation. However both dual rail with path switching
and dual rail with path switching and dual spacer have similar DPA results inChapter 5 Path Switching: A Technique to Tolerate Dual Rail Routing
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Figure 5.17: DPA result on FPGA implementation of positive logic DRP DES
Sbox with path switching, for 300,000 traces for hypothesis partition value of 3
Table 5.3: Number of traces required for successful DPA attack on dual rail
circuits based on FPGA setup
Transition count
hypothesis
Hamming weight
hypothesis
DES Sbox single rail 91 43
DES Sbox positive logic no dual
spacer
446 262
DES Sbox positive logic + dual
spacer
1,100 832
DES Sbox positive logic + path
switching
X 155,000
DES Sbox positive logic + dual
spacer + path switching
X 1,330,000
AES Sbox single rail 97 31
AES Sbox positive logic + no dual
spacer
200 900
AES Sbox positive logic + dual
spacer + path switching
X 332,900
simulation and on the FPGA. DRP with path switching and dual spacer for DES
Sbox increased the number traces required for successful DPA by 30930 when130
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Figure 5.18: DPA result on FPGA implementation of positive logic DRP DES
Sbox with path switching and dual spacer, for 3000,000 traces for hypothesis
partition value of 1
compared with normal single rail design and by 5076 when compared with normal
dual rail on our FPGA test setup. DRP with path switching and dual spacer for
AES Sbox increased the number traces required for successful DPA by 10738 when
compared with normal single rail design and by 1664 when compared with normal
dual rail on our FPGA test setup. All the results are summarised in Table 5.3.
Detailed results of DPA based on FPGA are presented in Appendix B.
5.7 Area for Implementing Path Switching
Path switching is an addition to dual rail precharge circuits, so its area increase
when compared to single rail circuit is atleast two times. Path switching adds
4 multiplexers (or 4 XOR gates) per bit. The area overhead of the dual spacer
protocol on top of the existing dual rail circuit is also much less. Only 2 D-typeChapter 5 Path Switching: A Technique to Tolerate Dual Rail Routing
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Table 5.4: Area for various implementations on our Xilinx FPGA board
design area in number of
slices
times
increase
DES Sbox single rail 16 1.0
DES Sbox single rail implemented from
ASIC netlist
54 3.37
DES Sbox positive logic dual rail 123 7.68
DES Sbox positive logic dual rail +
path switching
178 11.125
AES Sbox single rail 45 1.0
AES Sbox single rail implemented from
ASIC netlist
74 1.64
AES Sbox positive logic dual rail 158 3.5
AES Sbox positive logic dual rail +
path switching
231 5.13
ip-ops and 1 T-type ip-op is required to make a normal dual rail circuit dual
spacer ready. Overall using the dual spacer with path switching has low area
overhead on top of existing dual rail precharge logic overheads, while providing
a high level of security. Area gures for DES Sbox are tabulated in Table 5.1.
Positive logic DES sbox8 is bigger than its negative logic equivalent because of
the fact that our AMS 0:35 technology library did not contain them and we had
to mimic the AND-OR braviour using NAND-NOR and INVERTER gates. Path
Switching adds approximately 3 times the area overhead for DES Sbox circuit
when compared to an unprotected implementation.
Area gures for path switching implementation on FPGA are tabulated in Ta-
ble 5.4. The DES Sbox path switching implementation has an area overhead of 11
times, while the AES Sbox has an area overhead of 5 times. These numbers are
quite dierent to the ASIC design area gure in Table 5.1, for the following rea-
son; we used an ASIC netlist to implement dual rail circuits on FPGA. This is to
ensure the wave propagation feature of WDDL is not disrupted by inverting logic.
Unlike ASIC synthesis, we did not nd a way to constraint the FPGA synthesis
tool to only use certain type of logic. Tiri and Verbauwhede [96] presented a way132
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to optimise FPGA synthesis for WDDL style, so in theory the area gure of path
switching on FPGA could be better.
5.8 Extending Path Switching
Path switching's inherent limitation is that it cannot be applied to logic gates.
There might be a case where the logic gates need protection against imbalanced
dual rail routing. In such cases path switching can be applied to logic gates as
well, but at the expense of increased area, as described below. Every n input gate
is replaced by an n + 1 input gate. The additional input is connected to switch
path signal. The new gate will have the following function: if switch path is 0, the
new gate will have the same function as the previous gate (AND), if switch path is
1, the new gate will have the complementary function of the previous gate (OR).
An example gate is shown in Figure 5.19.
in1
in2
out
f = and(in1, in2)
(a) Original gate
in1
out
in2
switch
path
switch path
1
0
f
and(in1, in2)
or(in1, in2)
(b) New gate with path switching
Figure 5.19: Extending path switching to logic gates
With logic gates that can change functionality from AND to OR and vice verse,
path switching, which was previously only applicable to ip-ops and buses, can
now be applied to the entire design. Now path switching XOR gates only need to
be inserted at the primary inputs and outputs of the design. The area overhead of
extended path switching is quite high, as every gate has to provide dual function-
ality. Also the switch path signal has to be connected to every cell in the design.
Extended path switching, although it has high overheads, can be an attractive
solution for FPGAs.Chapter 5 Path Switching: A Technique to Tolerate Dual Rail Routing
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5.9 Summary
In this chapter we evaluated dual rail precharge logic styles (WDDL and DSDR)
and found that DRP circuits are vulnerable to DPA if the routing capacitance of
dierential signals is not properly balanced. We then showed that a dual spacer can
increase the number of traces required to attack dual rail circuits signicantly, but
cannot completely prevent it. To solve the dual rail dierential routing problem
we propose a new countermeasure, path switching, to improve DPA resistance.
Using circuit simulations and implementations on FPGA, we showed that dual
rail circuits with the dual spacer and path switching signicantly increase the
number of traces required by DPA. DPA tests on our experiments have shown an
increase of 1664 in the number of traces required to nd the secret key.
Path switching can be applied to high capacitance buses and registers at an area
over head of four XOR gates per bit. An ASIC implementation of path switching
on DES Sbox has an area overhead of 3 times. The FPGA implementation of
DES Sbox has 11 times the area overhead, while the AES Sbox one has 5 times.
The path switching combined with dual spacer area overhead is insignicant when
compared to an existing dual rail precharge logic style's overhead. Path switching
has an inherent limitation. It cannot be applied to logic gates. It also does not
address attacks on combinational logic. However extended path switching can be
applied to an entire design, with an increase in area overhead.Chapter 6
Divided Backend Duplication for
Balanced Dual Rail Routing
6.1 Introduction
Of all the DPA countermeasures discussed in Chapter 3, the logic level coun-
termeasures that fall under the dynamic and dierential logic style discussed in
Section 3.5.3.1 (also referred to as dual rail precharge - DRP) theoretically oer
the best resistance to DPA. The basic principle behind DRP logic is to eliminate
any information leakage by consuming the same amount of power in every clock
cycle. DRP circuits have been proved to prevent DPA, provided the routing of
dierential nets is balanced [99].
Balancing dierential nets (balanced dual rail routing) is not, however, a trivial
task. To address the routing problem, to date the following proposals have been
put forward: DWDDL [94], fat wire [95], backend duplication [23], three phase
dual rail [10], path switching [4], Double WDDL [113] and an iterative correction
ow [7]. Of these, three proposals [23, 94, 95] impose some constraints on backend
implementation ows and try to solve the problem by eliminating the dierence of
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routing capacitance of dierential nets and in the process, these solutions introduce
coupling capacitance between the dierential nets. Three phase dual rail [10] tries
to avoid the routing problem by introducing a third phase, which is an additional
overhead. Path Switching [4] (discussed in Chapter 5) oers an improvement to
dual rail circuits and can only protect registers and buses with high capacitance.
Double WDDL, as the name implies, has two separate WDDL implementations
thereby increasing the area overheads by four times. Double WDDL was developed
mainly for use in FPGAs [113]. The rst WDDL part is implemented using normal
place & route ow. The second WDDL part is obtained by copying the rst WDDL
part, including the routing details, and reversing the original and complementary
logic [113]. Backend correction ow, described in [7], is iterative and can consume
a signicant amount of time to implement a design. In this method the design
is successively routed and analysed until every dual rail routing pair is balanced.
The analysis consists of collecting routing parasitics for every dierential pair nets.
This method also requires a complex strategy to constrain the router and a non
trivial algorithm to guide the iterative process towards convergences
In this Chapter, we concentrate on the implementation of balanced dual rail
precharge logic styles rather than the alternatives. We present a simple yet ef-
fective solution to improve dual rail circuit routing capacitance while eliminating
coupling capacitance between the dierential nets. In Section 6.2 we discuss dual
rail precharge logic styles, give a brief introduction to backend design ow, and
discuss existing methods and their shortcomings. In Section 6.3 we present the
inversion problem and discuss its solutions. In Section 6.4 we present our pro-
posed methodology. In Section 6.4.1 & Section 6.4.2 we present ASIC & FPGA
implementations respectively and then conclude the chapter.Chapter 6 Divided Backend Duplication for Balanced Dual Rail Routing 137
6.2 Background
6.2.1 Dual Rail Precharge Logic Styles
Dynamic and dierential logic (also referred to as dual rail precharge - DRP)
[86, 92, 94] has been proposed to prevent DPA. Dual rail precharge circuits were
discussed in detail in Section 3.5.3.1. The idea is to consume the same amount of
power for any combination of inputs. This is achieved by using dierential logic
(two signals instead of one) and by precharging both the dierential nets in every
clock cycle. In DRP circuits for every logic gate, a complementary gate exists,
usually referred to as false logic (or false part).
Dual rail precharge logic styles can be classied into two types based on the way
precharge is applied. Sense amplier based logic (SABL) is a DRP logic based on
the principles of domino logic, where a special precharge signal is applied to every
gate to force the gate to precharge. Wave dynamic dual rail (WDDL) and dual
spacer dual rail (DSDR) on the other hand propagate the precharge signal from
a designs primary inputs and state-elements (ip-ops). WDDL and DSDR have
the following dierences over SABL: 1) WDDL and DSDR can be constructed
using existing CMOS standard cells and 2) that the true logic and false logic are
two dierent cells. The second point is not true in all cases. WDDL and DSDR
both need special inverters, where the true and false wires are cross connected. As
dierential logic has both true and false outputs, an inverter is implemented by
exchanging the outputs. Moreover an inverter is an inverting gate, it will stop the
precharge wave propagation. Figure 6.1 shows the basic building blocks of WDDL
with master slave WDDL ip-ops. Although double the clock frequency is re-
quired to get same data rate using master slave ops, these are recommended [94].
All primary inputs are driven by a `precharge wave generation' block, so that indi-
vidual gates will propagate the precharge. Note that the inverter is implemented138 Chapter 6 Divided Backend Duplication for Balanced Dual Rail Routing
by exchanging the dual rail pairs.
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Figure 6.1: Building blocks of WDDL,with Master Slave WDDL 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6.2.2 Backend Design Flow
Most of the digital designs implemented today are based on a standard cell ow. A
set of commonly used standard cells are designed and characterised such that CAD
tools can be used to automate most of the design ow. Design entry is typically
in behavioural HDL which is synthesised and mapped to the target technology's
standard cells. After the synthesis, the resulting netlist is placed and routed to
get the nal design. Backend design usually refers to the implementation of the
design after the synthesis phase and mainly involves oor planning, placement
and routing. A placer partitions the available core area into rows, where the
standard cells are placed. In a similar fashion, a router partitions the core area
into horizontal and vertical routing grids. Each grid has a minimum size dened
by the target technology's wire pitch size.
The place and route ow usually involves the following steps, shown in Figure 6.2.
First a oor plan is made (Figure 6.2(a)). This is where the aspect ratio (or
the dimensions) of the chip are determined. Next the standard cells are placed
(Figure 6.2(b)) and nally the wires are routed (Figure 6.2(c)).Chapter 6 Divided Backend Duplication for Balanced Dual Rail Routing 139
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Figure 6.2: Normal backend ow overview
6.2.3 Existing Methods
Divided wave dynamic dierential logic (DWDDL) was proposed by Tiri and Ver-
bauwhede [94] to address routing imbalances in DRP logic styles. DWDDL's idea
is to place and route a single rail design (the true part), copy it and replace the
complementary cells (for example `and' with `or' and vice verse) to get the false
part. However, this method assumes that there is no inversion in the single rail
design, as an inverting cell would stop the precharge wave propagation. However,
in practice it is dicult to have logic without inversion. This is the only known
limitation for DWDDL and no further work has been reported on it.
Fat wire was proposed by Tiri and Verbauwhede [95] to address routing imbal-
ances in DRP logic styles. In this methodology a fat wire is constructed from
two adjacent normal wires. For the fat wire method to work, rst the dual rail
netlist, instantiating dual rail cells, has to be placed. Then instead of routing two
dierential wires (for the true and false signals) a single fat wire is routed and
later decomposed into two normal single wires which will have same wire length.
Backend duplication was proposed by Guilley et al. [23] [23] to address routing
imbalances in DRP logic styles. The basic idea of backend duplication is based
on placement and routing obstructions (constraints to the CAD tool). The rst
step of backend duplication is to constrain the CAD tool (1) to only use alternate140 Chapter 6 Divided Backend Duplication for Balanced Dual Rail Routing
rows for placing cells and routing horizontal routes (2) and to use the alternate
routing pitches for routing vertical routes. Thus, when the placer has nished
placing the single rail design, a dual rail design can be obtained from copying (and
transforming) the single rail into the previously obstructed rows. Note that this
operation is a simple shift in coordinates of the placed cells. Duplicating the routes
is done in two steps. Once the design is routed, horizontal routes are duplicated
in the same way as cells. Vertical routes are duplicated by a simple shift in the
x-axis of the routing pitch.
6.2.4 Shortcomings of the Existing Methods
Coupling capacitance has become one of the most critical issues in deep sub micron
physical designs because of 1) interconnect dominated circuit delay and 2) strong
coupling eects between interconnect wires [108]. As technology scales the wire
widths, their relative height is increased and coupling capacitance between wires
increases [108] (Figure 6.3(a)).
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Figure 6.3: Coupling capacitance eects
In the fat wire and backend duplication methods (vertical routes) dual rail wires
end up next to each other, as shown in Figure 6.3(b). With coupling capacitance
increasing, the eective capacitance seen by a true and false signal will vary. For
example consider dual rail pairs b t & b f. The coupling capacitance seen by b tChapter 6 Divided Backend Duplication for Balanced Dual Rail Routing 141
is C2 & C3 whereas the coupling capacitance seen by b f is C3 & C4. Now if
the capacitance C2 & C4 vary by a huge dierence, the resulting design can have
unbalanced wire capacitance and this can lead to information leakage. Note that
this eect becomes more and more dominant as technology scales down. The eect
of coupling between dierential wires is more signicant in the fat wire method
than in backend duplication since the horizontal wires are also next to each other.
Of course spacing between dual rail wires can always be increased to reduce the
coupling capacitance, however such an increase comes at the expense of increased
area and reduced routing resources. Of the three methods to address routing
problems, DWDDL is the simplest and most eective. However practical designs
will always have inversion and hence will not be able to use the DWDDL method.
6.3 Inversion Problem in DRP Logic
Inversion in dual rail precharge logic styles is considered as a free operation, since
dual rail signal pairs are complementary; inversion is simply obtained by exchang-
ing the dual rail pairs. On the other hand, an inverter cannot exist in a WDDL or
DSDR style design since it would stop the precharge wave propagation. In other
words, inversion is only possible by exchanging the dual rail pair. This property
of WDDL and DSDR logic styles prevents designs from using a DWDDL style of
implementation. Of course dual rail pairs can be exchanged after DWDDL im-
plementation, but there is no systematic way of doing this. Moreover, the extra
wire capacitance from this exchange can add to the critical path delay of a design
and can introduce unbalanced wires. This issue of exchanging wires can be worst
when the number of unused inverters in a design increases. As an example a 8ns
clock period, 128 bit AES had 5,762 inverters from a total gate count of 22,704,
excluding buers used for the clock tree. For this example, we increased the area142 Chapter 6 Divided Backend Duplication for Balanced Dual Rail Routing
and delay cost of the original inverter by 10 times so that synthesis tool will use
it only when inversion is needed and not for buering.
6.3.1 Mitigating the Inversion Problem in DRP Logic
Inverters cannot exists in WDDL and DSDR style designs as they would stop the
precharge wave propagation. On the other hand, designing logic without inversion
is dicult. It is possible to have a cell that behaves as an inverter and still not
prevent the precharge wave propagation: this is possible by using a two input XOR
gate instead of an inverter and connecting the second input of XOR to the negated
precharge signal that is used in generating the precharge wave (Figure 6.1).
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Figure 6.4: Using XOR instead of an Inverter (Inputs a t & a f are driven by
precharge wave generation block shown in Figure 6.1)
Consider the example circuit on the left side of Figure 6.4, with the truth table
shown. When the prch signal is high all primary inputs are set to logic 1 (inputs at
& af are driven by precharge wave generation block shown in Figure 6.1). However
intermediate signal i t (output of the inverter) will not propagate the precharge
wave and the output signal z t will not be precharged. Now consider the circuit
on the right of Figure 6.4. A two input XOR gate is used instead of an inverter.
The original input and output of the inverter are connected as before to the XOR.
The second input of the XOR is connected to the prch signal, which is used inChapter 6 Divided Backend Duplication for Balanced Dual Rail Routing 143
precharge wave propagation. When prch is high the XOR will act as a buer
allowing the precharge wave to propagate and when prch is low XOR will act as
an inverter as intended in the original circuit.
It is also possible to use a Domino-style inverter (similar to the one presented in
[10]) instead of an XOR gate. As in the case of the XOR, prch is used to precharge
the domino-inverter. In the case of a domino style inverter, the timing of prch
is important for the circuit to work. Because of this, we prefer to use an XOR
gate and in the rest of this chapter we use XOR gates to replace inverters. Note
that inverters that are used in clock tree synthesis need not be replaced, as the
clock signal is not precharged like normal inputs. Based on this, we now present
a method to implement a fully balanced dual rail design.
6.4 Proposed Method: Divided Backend Dupli-
cation
With XOR gates replacing inverters, a dual rail circuit can be implemented as a
physically separate (without any connections) true part (original single rail part)
and false part (complementary part). The primary inputs and outputs will still
remain common for both the true and false parts. With this advantage the divided
WDDL implementation, [94], can now be implemented provided that 1) the pins
of complementary standard cells should be same, i.e, at same location and same
metal layer and 2) the size of the complementary standard cells are the same.
Divided backend duplication implementation, within the context of design ow is
shown in Figure 6.5 (a standard design ow is shown in Figure 3.1).
Figure 6.6 shows the overview of our proposed method for balanced dual rail
routing. This method is similar to the backend duplication method, [23]. A single
rail design is used for the initial place and route process and then duplicated to144 Chapter 6 Divided Backend Duplication for Balanced Dual Rail Routing
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divided backend duplication process
Figure 6.5: Divided backend duplication implementation within the context
of digital design ow
get the nal dual rail design. The process can be divided into the following steps
(shown in Figure 6.7).
1. A WDDL-compliant single rail design is processed to replace the inverter
cells with XOR cells (Figure 6.4). A program has been written for this
conversion, based on OpenAccess [83]. At this stage the design is still single
rail.Chapter 6 Divided Backend Duplication for Balanced Dual Rail Routing 145
(a) Initial Floor Plan (b) Reserve space for duplicating
complimentary logic
(c) Flip every object (cells & routes)
to right
Figure 6.6: Proposed method overview
2. A oor plan is made for the processed single rail design, with utilisation of
half the required nal utilisation. This ensures that there is enough space
for duplicating the complementary part (Figure 6.6(a)).
3. Half of the oor plan area is reserved (obstructed) for the complementary
part (Figure 6.6(b)).
4. The single rail design is implemented in the usual way, i.e, place and route,
timing analysis, SI analysis, ECO xes, etc.
5. After the single rail design is nalised, the complementary part can be ob-
tained by ipping every object in the single rail design to the right and by
replacing the complementary cells, AND with OR and vice verse, as shown
in Figure 6.6(c). This step can be done by processing the DEF le and is
similar to the process used in fat wire [95] and backend duplication [23].
As our proposed method is derived from DWDDL and backend duplication, we
call it divided backend duplication (DBD). A small variation to the duplication
process can be made: 1) Instead of ipping the design objects to right, they can146 Chapter 6 Divided Backend Duplication for Balanced Dual Rail Routing
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Figure 6.7: Divided backend duplication implementation
be shifted by half of the core width. 2) Instead of ipping the design objects along
the x-axis, this can be done on the y-axis too (ipping to top or bottom).
6.4.1 ASIC Implementation
To show the eectiveness of divided backend duplication, we implemented an AES
test circuit with 100k+ gates in a 130nm process. Three dierent designs are im-
plemented. All designs have the same constraints and netlist. The dierence is in
implementation. The rst implementation, which we call \regular place & route
design", is implemented without any special techniques. The second implementa-
tion, which we call \backend duplicated design", is implemented as suggested in
[23] and is based on the WDDL logic style [94]. The third design, which we call \di-
vided backend duplicated design", is implemented as suggested in Section 6.4 and
is also based on WDDL logic style [94]. All the designs aspect ratios are set to 1.
The row utilisation of \regular place & route design" is set to 0.70 while for \back-
end duplicated design" and \divided backend duplicated design" it is set to 0.35
(half the required utilisation, so that enough room is available for duplication). We
used Cadence Encounter tools [90] to perform the backend implementation. For
parasitic extractions we used Encounter's native extractor and set the \detailed"Chapter 6 Divided Backend Duplication for Balanced Dual Rail Routing 147
and \coupling" switches to true. After the parasitic extraction, all the parasitic
information was exported into a Standard Parasitic Exchange Format (SPEF) le
containing the ground capacitance, coupling capacitance and resistance of every
wire.
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Figure 6.8: Ratio of capacitance of dierential pair nets
Figure 6.8 shows histograms in which the internal interconnect capacitance of the
regular place and route design, the backend duplicated design and divided backend
duplicated (DBD) design are compared. We have not implemented fat wire [95] as
the eect of coupling on dual rail signal pairs from fat wire should be similar to that
of the backend duplication method [23]. The capacitance per net was extracted
from the SPEF le, which in turn was reported from Encounter. Figure 6.8(a)
shows the distribution of the ratio between the capacitance at the true signal net
and the capacitance at the corresponding false signal net (Ctrue=Cfalse). The ratio
Ctrue=Cfalse for regular place & route method is between 0.01 & 10 and for the148 Chapter 6 Divided Backend Duplication for Balanced Dual Rail Routing
backend duplication method it is between 0.70 & 1.5. On the other hand, for the
divided backend duplication method this ratio is only between 0.90 & 1.1. The
percentage of nets that have a ratio of 1 for divided backend duplication is 93.25%
when compared to 28.34% for backend duplication.
Figure 6.8(b) is similar as Figure 6.8(a) except that coupling capacitance is only
considered instead of total capacitance. The cumulative coupling capacitance
per net was extracted from SPEF le, which in turn was reported from En-
counter. Coupling capacitance ratio, Coupling Ctrue=Cfalse for regular place &
route method are not shown as the ratio for some nets was as high as 70. For the
backend duplication method, the ratio Coupling Ctrue=Cfalse is between 0.22 &
3.52 while for divided backend duplication is 0.60 & 1.9. The percentage of nets
that have a ratio of 1 for divided backend duplication is 85.15% when compared to
24.86% for backend duplication. As discussed in Section 6.2.4, this increase in ca-
pacitance ratio for backend duplication method is due to unevenly distributed cou-
pling capacitance, whereas the divided backend duplication method shows much
less variation.
6.4.2 FPGA Implementation
Dierential routing on FPGAs is more dicult than on ASICs as the routing
resources are limited. Tiri and Verbauwhede [96] have discussed a WDDL imple-
mentation on FPGAs and proposed a synthesis ow. However, the dierential
routing problem in FPGAs has not been addressed to the best of our knowledge.
In this section we discuss how the divided backend duplication method can be
applied to get balanced dierential routing in FPGAs.
Before implementing a design in FPGA, it has to be synthesised to the target
FPGA. Synthesising for a secure dual rail implementation has been discussed
in detail in [96]. We adopt the ow presented in [96] to synthesise for dividedChapter 6 Divided Backend Duplication for Balanced Dual Rail Routing 149
backend duplication implementation with the modications shown in Figure 6.9.
After replacing the inverters with XORs, FPGA synthesis can be done with a
commercial CAD tool or \Clustering" technique described in [96]. Care needs to
be taken if Commercial CAD tools are used, to preserve the wave dynamic nature
of the design. Note that the structural true and false part are identical for FPGAs,
the only dierence being the LUT programming value.
design sr.v
(WDDL)
design sr.v
(DBD) with XOR
inverters
replace
design dr.v
(DBD)
synthesis
logic
(FPGA) script
duplicate
to place & route
Figure 6.9: Divided backend duplication synthesis for FPGAs
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Figure 6.10: Floorplanning to implement divided backend duplication dual
rail design on FPGAs
FPGAs have highly regular structure as shown in Figure 6.10(a). Each box in
Figure 6.10(a) corresponds to a congurable logic Block (CLB) and its associ-
ated routing resources. Unlike ASICs, the place & route process of FPGAs is
not standardised. This makes it dicult to duplicate the placement and routing
information for complementary parts of a dual rail design. Although each FPGA
vendor has a specic implementation tool, most of the tools oer procedures to
1) oor plan and 2) constrain a designs instance to a specic location. However,
constraining a net to a specic routing resource is not supported. Based on this,
the process to implement a balanced dual rail design in FPGAs can be divided
into the following steps.150 Chapter 6 Divided Backend Duplication for Balanced Dual Rail Routing
1. The WDDL-compliant single rail design is processed to replace the inverter
cells with XOR cells and to transform the netlist into a FPGA-specic netlist
(Figure 6.9).
2. The oorplan area is divided into two equal parts (for the true and false
parts), comprising equal number of CLBs, local routing resources and global
routing resources (Figure 6.10(b)).
3. The top-level dual-rail design is implemented in the usual way, without vio-
lating the boundary constraints set above. The implementation steps usually
are place & route, timing analysis, ECO xes, etc.
4. After the top-level dual-rail design is successfully implemented, locations of
all the instances of true part are saved to a le. Based on the location of
a true part's instance, the corresponding false part's instance is calculated
and written to a constraint le.
5. Based on the new constraints, the false part is re-implemented.
(a) Floorplan view of duplicated design on a Xilinx
FPGA
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Figure 6.11: Divided backend duplication implementation results on a Xilinx
FPGA
To see the eectiveness of backend duplication, we implemented a DES sbox on a
Xilinx FPGA [111]. Xilinx's XST tool was used for synthesis and ISE was used
for implementation. The Xilinx Floorplan editor was used to constrain the oorChapter 6 Divided Backend Duplication for Balanced Dual Rail Routing 151
plan. After the initial place & route Xilinx's Floorplan editor was used to save all
the instance locations. The nal place & route process was constrained by using
Xilinx's UCF le. Figure 6.11(a) shows a oor plan view of such a duplicated
design. Although FPGA implementation tools do not report detailed parasitic
information, they report delays associated with an instance and interconnect in a
Standard Delay File (SDF). This SDF le was analysed and the resulting distri-
bution of the ratio between the delay at the true signal net and the delay at the
corresponding false signal net (Delaytrue=Delayfalse) is shown in Figure 6.11(b).
The delay ratio Delaytrue=Delayfalse for the regular place & route method is be-
tween 0.40 & 2.7 and for the divided backend duplication method it is between 0.8
& 1.2. The percentage of nets that have a ratio of 1 for divided backend duplica-
tion is 64.25% compared to 46.34% for regular place & route. Although we have
constrained an instance to be at a specic location, the implementation tool is free
to connect the wires and may be the reason for only 64.25% of nets to have a ratio
of 1. Note that we are not constraining the FPGA tool to duplicate the routes,
as we could not nd a way to achieve this. Yu and Schaumont have implemented
a duplication method for Double WDDL style on Xilinx FPGAs [113] that can
be used to completely balance the routing of dierential nets on FPGAs. a way
to constrain the routing, there are tool specic ways to achieve this, Xilinx for
example has Guided PAR & SmartGuide.
6.4.3 Backend Duplication by using Mux
The XOR gate, discussed above, can introduce glitches, especially when both its
input change at the same time. As the same prch signal is used to drive the the
primary inputs to precharge and the XOR gate, both the inputs to XOR gate can
change at the same time resulting in glitches. Mangard et al. [41] demonstrated
on how glitches at gate level can be used in DPA. Hence it is desirable to avoid
glitches.152 Chapter 6 Divided Backend Duplication for Balanced Dual Rail Routing
logic cloud
a t
0 0
1
0
1 1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0 0
0 1
0 1
1 1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
b t i t z t prch prch value
0
1
X
X
X
X
i t
z t
a t
b t prch
inputs
prch prch value
dr inputs f
dr inputs t
prch mux
prch value
Figure 6.12: Using MUX instead of an Inverter
clock_sr
clock_dr
PRCH
PRCH_MUX
PRCH_VALUE
Figure 6.13: Timing of PRCH and PRCH MUX signals to avoid glitches in
divided backend duplication using MUX
To avoid any possible glitches at the XOR gate, a MUX can be used as shown
in Figure 6.12. First input of MUX is the original signal, second input is the
PRCH VALUE signal used in precharge circuits at primary inputs, and the select
signal of MUX is PRCH MUX. Figure 6.13 shows the timing relationship of PRCH,
PRCH MUX and PRCH VALUE signals. Aim is to avoid unnecessary signal
transitions. PRCH MUX and PRCH go high at the same time, but PRCH MUX
goes low after PRCH. This delay in PRCH MUX ensures that rst input to MUX
is settled before selecting it. Similarly, PRCH VALUE should not change its value
at the same time as PRCH and PRCH VALUE signals. The control circuit to
generate the PRCH, PRCH MUX and PRCH VALUE signals is, obviously, more
complicated to implement than a normal precharge wave generation circuit.Chapter 6 Divided Backend Duplication for Balanced Dual Rail Routing 153
6.4.4 Area for Implementing Divided Backend Duplication
Table 6.1: area for for various implementations in ST 0:12 technology
design area in mm2 times increase
DES Sbox single rail 3282.2 1.0
DES Sbox normal dual rail 7936 2.4
DES Sbox DBD dual rail 9226.7 2.8
AES Sbox single rail 6001.2 1.0
AES Sbox normal dual rail 13099.6 2.2
AES Sbox DBD dual rail 21289.7 3.54
AES single rail 209945.4 1.0
AES normal dual rail 464742.6 2.2
AES DBD dual rail 697204.8 3.3
As DBD is based on dual rail logic, its area overhead is twice as much of the
single rail design. In Table 6.1 area for various designs in ST 0:12 technology
are tabulated. The DES Sbox DBD implementation has 2.8 times area overhead
compared to the unprotected single rail, while the AES SBox has 3.5 times and
the AES has 3.3 times.
6.4.5 Advantages of Divided Backend Duplication
The main advantage of divided backend duplication is that both the true and false
parts see the same environment. The coupling capacitance problem discussed
in Section 6.2.4 is now eliminated. As divided backend duplication is based on
standard cells implementation styles such as WDDL and DSDR, it can be adapted
to both ASICs and FPGAs.
Divided backend duplication will not have a problem with diagonal routing, an
upcoming interconnect technology (already available in Xilinx FPGAs and sup-
ported by the Cadence X architecture router), whereas backend duplication cur-
rently cannot handle it. Implementing divided backend duplication process is
a straightforward process. Neither specic design rules need to be changed nor154 Chapter 6 Divided Backend Duplication for Balanced Dual Rail Routing
specic routing blocks have to be imposed on the design. In our example imple-
mentation for ASIC, the run time was 3 times less when compared to backend
duplication. As the true and false parts are not interleaved, implementing any
engineering change orders (ECOs) is also simple and straightforward.
The only requirements to implement divided backend duplication are that 1) the
pins of complementary standard cells should be same, i.e, at same location and
same metal layer and 2) the size of complementary standard cells are the same.
This is an advantage when compared to the requirements imposed by fat wire [95]
and backend duplication [23].
As divided backend duplication separates the true and false part, a by-product
is that two separate data sets can be processed at the same time, instead of one.
Divided backend duplication designs can have a random mode where one part can
process the required data and the other can process random data. Further the
entire design can be congured such that the design can randomly switch from
dual rail mode to random mode and back. Divided backend duplication designs
can even be congured to operate either the true or false part at a given time to
reduce power consumption, when DPA countermeasure is not required. The only
requirement to achieve this is to change the input/output interface to the dual rail
design.
6.4.6 Disadvantages of Divided Backend Duplication
The main disadvantage of the divided duplication method is the additional area
and delay overhead introduced by replacing inverters with XOR gates. The number
of XOR cells used depends on the design and cannot be generalised. For our AES
test circuit about 25% of cells were XORs. This increased the critical path delay
by 1.2 times. The delay and area overhead introduced by XOR can be minimisedChapter 6 Divided Backend Duplication for Balanced Dual Rail Routing 155
by using a domino style inverter instead of XOR. Also the prch signal needs to be
buered as it drives all the extra XOR cells.
sub1
sub2 sub4
sub3
top
sub6
sub5
Figure 6.14: Hierarchical divided backend duplication
As the true and false part of the design are physically separated, there may be
a concern that EM analysis attacks [20] may be successful, by only observing the
true or false part. Although this may seem unlikely, one may minimise the extent
of this concern by taking a hierarchical approach to implementing divided back-
end duplication compared with that shown in Figure 6.7. An example oor plan
for a hierarchical divided backend duplication is shown in Figure 6.14. Another
approach would be to use the backend duplication method [23], but with the fol-
lowing dierence for duplication: instead of shifting to the right, every object can
be ipped to the right.
6.5 DPA Results
In this section we present results from simulation based DPA on a divided backend
duplication circuit. In previous chapters AMS 0:35 technology design kit was
used to simulate our circuit for experimenting with DPA. AMS 0:35 technology
design kit, however, did not have all the necessary les to allow us to duplicate156 Chapter 6 Divided Backend Duplication for Balanced Dual Rail Routing
the design as described above. Hence ST 0:12 technology was used. We used
same DES sbox circuit as in Chapter 5. The major dierence between simulating
a ST design kit and AMS is that, in AMS we could get a spice netlist including
all parasitics, where as in ST the paracitics were used from a SPEF le. In both
the cases Nanosim fast SPICE simulator was used.
Table 6.2: Number of traces required for successful DPA attack on dierent
implementations of DES sbox, based on simulations. X means key not found in
300,000 traces
Hamming weight
Hypothesis
single rail 1,000
dual rail 3,500
dual rail + dual spacer 50,000
dual rail without RC X
dual rail without RC + dual spacer X
dual rail + XOR based DBD 700
dual rail + XOR based DBD + dual spacer 6,000
dual rail + MUX based DBD X
dual rail + MUX based DBD + dual spacer X
We rst implemented DPA on normal single rail circuit. For this circuit the
correct key was revealed in 1000 traces. Dual rail circuit revealed correct key in
3,500 traces and dual rail circuit with dual spacer revealed correct key in 50,000
traces. Although these actual numbers are not exactly the same in comparison to
results on AMS 0:35 technology the percentage of increase in comparison to a
normal single rail circuit in both the design kits is similar.
XOR based DBD circuit revealed the correct key in 700 hundred traces where as
XOR based DBD circuit with dual spacer revealed 3,500 traces. As we suspected,
glitches caused by the XOR gate lead to data dependent power consumption and
eventually led the XOR based DBD circuit to reveal the correct key. The DPA
result on XOR based DBD circuit is shown in Figure 6.15.
As discussed in Section 6.4.3, a MUX based DBD minimises the glitches introduced
by the DBD methodology. And as expected, MUX based DBD circuit did notChapter 6 Divided Backend Duplication for Balanced Dual Rail Routing 157
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Figure 6.15: DPA result on XOR based DBD circuit
reveal the correct key in 300,000 traces. This is at least 300 times improvement
on single rail circuit. The DPA result on MUX based DBD circuit is shown in
Figure 6.16.
FPGA based DPA Results
As previously discussed, our FPGA ow had a few limitations. In particular, we
had to drive IO ports to see any dierence in power consumption. To achieve a
fully balanced design, these IO routes has to be duplicated as well. Evaluating
backend duplication on FPGAs including balanced IO routes can be an extension
of this work. Yu and Schaumont [113] reported a successful implementation of
backend duplication on FPGA. Although the design they duplicated is dierent,
they none the less duplicated a design in much the same way as our proposal. As158 Chapter 6 Divided Backend Duplication for Balanced Dual Rail Routing
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Figure 6.16: DPA result on MUX based DBD circuit
our method is similar, once a design is properly routed, its DPA resistance will
increase.
6.6 Summary
We have shown that coupling capacitance between dual rail nets can cause routing
imbalances. To address this, we have proposed a new method, called divided
backend duplication. We have shown that the divided backend duplication method
can be applied to get a balanced dual rail design in both ASICs and FPGAs and
that it oers a signicant improvement in balancing routing capacitance compared
to previous methods. Divided backend duplication has an area overhead of around
3.3 times compared to an unprotected single rail design. XOR based divided
backend duplication method is show to have issues with glitches and can lead to
a successful DPA attack. MUX based divided backend duplication is introducedChapter 6 Divided Backend Duplication for Balanced Dual Rail Routing 159
as a solution and it is shown that the MUX based divided backend duplication
will oer at least a 300 times improvement in the number of traces required for a
successful DPA attack.Chapter 7
Randomisation Countermeasures
7.1 Introduction
Randomisation countermeasures in the context of power analysis attacks mean
randomly varying one or more factors that aects the power consumption of the
cryptographic device under attack, there-by preventing the power analysis attack.
In randomisation countermeasures, the side channel information is still leaked.
But as a result of randomisation, this information is embedded in unwanted power
consumption (noise). Suppose randomisation occurs during the execution of a
block cipher, then all the power traces measured by the attacker are not correlated
to the intermediate results and this decreases the correlation of the intermediate
results and the power consumption. As a result randomisation countermeasures
increases the noise in the measured power consumption of the cryptographic device.
However, adding noise in the power consumption to a point where DPA will be
unsuccessful is not trivial. For example, adding extra logic to run in parallel
will not prevent DPA. Consider the attack in Chapter 4 on AES circuit shown in
Figure 4.1. The DPA attack was on the output of Sbox, where there were 7 other
identical Sboxes running in parallel to the one chosen in the attack. Even then the
161162 Chapter 7 Randomisation Countermeasures
attack was successful. This indicates that adding similar logic to run in parallel,
although increases noise in the power consumption, doesn't prevent DPA.
Pdyn =  CloadV
2
dd f (7.1)
Dynamic power consumption is given by the Equation 3.1. These variables are
supply voltage (Vdd), frequency (f), switching activity () and load capacitance
(C). Switching activity,  is data dependent. In this chapter we explore solutions
to DPA that vary one or more of these variables. In Section 7.2 we discuss random
dynamic voltage and frequency scaling as a DPA countermeasure. This counter-
measure varies f and Vdd to achieve randomisation. In Section 7.2.1 we evaluate
RDVFS and present its shortcomings. In Section 7.3 we present a dierent ran-
domising countermeasure, random charging. This countermeasure varies N and
C to achieve randomisation. In Section 7.3.1 we propose enchantments to random
charging countermeasure and present DPA results from simulations. Finally we
conclude the chapter.
7.2 Random Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Scal-
ing as DPA Countermeasure
Yang et al. [112] proposed dynamic voltage and frequency scaling as a countermea-
sure to prevent DPA by altering voltage and frequency randomly, thus reducing
the correlation of input data to the power consumed. We call the technique used
in [112] random dynamic voltage scaling (RDVFS) to avoid confusion with normal
dynamic voltage and frequency scaling (DVFS) technique [114]. The dierence be-
tween RDVFS and DVFS is that RDVFS randomly scales voltage and frequency
to randomise the power consumption, whereas DVFS scales voltage and frequencyChapter 7 Randomisation Countermeasures 163
to save power consumption. In both DVFS and RDVFS the voltage and frequency
fVdd;fg pairs are same, i.e, if f is changed Vdd is changed accordingly. The main
strength of RDVFS as a DPA countermeasure is the diculty in predicting key
hypothesis due to variation of frequency, as it is dicult to predict when internal
signals change and thus making it dicult to mount DPA.
The main advantage of RDVFS as a DPA countermeasure is that it does not need
the cryptographic algorithm to be altered nor its implementation design ow. As
RDVFS does not process random data (like masking countermeasure) nor includes
complementary logic styles (like transistor-level countermeasures) to prevent DPA,
its area and power overhead are less. However Yang et al. [112] did not verify the
eectiveness of RDVFS by implementing a DPA attack.
7.2.1 Evaluation of RDVFS
Dynamic voltage and frequency scaling (DVFS) is an eective approach to reduce
energy [114]. DVFS utilises the fact that the power P is directly proportional to
the clock frequency f and to the square of the supply voltage Vdd. P / f  V 2
dd.
In DVFS, scaling of supply voltage and clock frequency takes place dynamically
to adjust to performance demand. Each such power-performance mode has a
fVdd;fg-pair, which are predetermined. It is important to note that frequency
and voltage are both changed together as a pair and both these values are related.
Yang et al. [112] proposed to randomly vary voltage Vdd and frequency f to prevent
DPA (RDVFS). This technique is similar to DVFS in that both vary voltage and
frequency dynamically. Except that the RDVFS aim is to prevent DPA whereas
the DVFS aim is to reduce energy.
DVFS has been generally used with microprocessors to reduce overall power con-
sumption, in the DPA context, RDVFS as a DPA countermeasure is of interest to
both microprocessors and ASICs. In order to check the eect of RDVFS on DPA,164 Chapter 7 Randomisation Countermeasures
we implemented RDVFS on an AES Sbox. Although our circuit is trivial when
compared to a microprocessor, it enables us to check the eectiveness of RDVFS as
a DPA countermeasure. The fVdd;fg-pairs have been arbitrarily chosen to bring
in randomness. We assumed frequency and voltage change values instantly and are
modelled as piecewise linear source in our SPICE simulations. We implemented a
DPA attack as discussed in Chapter 4 and found that we could not nd the key.
Most of the circuits used today are sequential, employing ip-ops and latches,
i.e, circuit operation is synchronised to a single clock pulse. Thus at the rising
(or falling) edge of a clock pulse, there will be a burst of operation (transistors
switching) which will settle down toward the end of the clock period. Current
consumed at the rising edge of clock pulse will thus be higher and goes down along
with switching activity. This can be clearly observed in the Figure 7.1. From this
it is clear that a change in frequency can be easily detected by observing the power
consumption trace. Based on this, we observed the power consumption trace of
Sbox employing RDVFS and recorded the circuit frequency for each input applied.
By knowing the frequency, we found the voltage by looking at the voltage frequency
fVdd;fg-pairs. We changed our hypothetical power consumption to reect the
changes in frequency and voltage. With this new hypothetical power consumption
we performed DPA attack on the same circuit, this time our attack was successful.
Although we could not nd an automated way to determine frequency from power
consumption, this experiment shows that it is possible to implement DPA attack
on systems employing the RDVFS countermeasure, where frequency and voltage
values are related.Chapter 7 Randomisation Countermeasures 165
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Figure 7.1: Power consumption with respect to clock pulse
7.2.2 Random Supply Voltage Variation as DPA counter-
measure
As discussed in the previous section, countermeasures that depend on varying the
frequency are susceptible to DPA. Since frequency is easily detectable, one ap-
proach to overcome this would be to randomly change the supply voltage while
keeping the frequency constant, such that the circuit is operational under all possi-
ble supply voltages as shown in 7.2(a). A simplied block diagram of the proposed
method is shown in Figure 7.2(b). The additional blocks required are a true ran-
dom number generator (RNG) and a voltage controller. RNGs already exists for
secure smart card applications and are not additional overhead. A voltage con-
troller is the only additional block required for this countermeasure. Benet in
this type of countermeasure is that it can be applied to a custom ASIC or a general
micro controller, without modication to the algorithm or its design ow (unlike
masking countermeasures or gate level countermeasures). The main restriction of
our proposed method is that the attacker should not have access to any of these166 Chapter 7 Randomisation Countermeasures
blocks directly, i.e, if the connection between RNG and voltage controller is cut
o, then there would be no randomness in the power consumption.
(a) Voltage and frequency rela-
tionship.
(b) Block diagram of our pro-
posed method.
Figure 7.2: Our proposed method.
As we propose to vary the voltage, the maximum limit of Vdd (Vdd max), the mini-
mum limit of Vdd (Vdd min) and the frequency of change of Vdd (dvs rate) aect the
DPA result. This section discusses these parameters and their eect on DPA. For
our countermeasure to work eectively, the change in power consumed (voltage)
due to a change in voltage (Vdd) should be close to change in power consumed
(switching) due to a change in input (or switching activity). This is explained
below.
Let [In1, In2, In3, In4, In5, In6] be a set of input vectors and [P11, P12, P13,
P14, P15, P16] the power consumed per input at voltage Vdd1 and [P21, P22, P23,
P24, P25, P26] be the power consumed for the same inputs at voltage Vdd2 and
[P31, P32, P33, P34, P35, P36] for Vdd3. For a constant Vdd, the attacker can
easily correlate the hypothetical power model and the actual power consumption
to determine the key. But if the voltage was varied after input In2 and In4,
then the resultant power consumption would be [P11, P12, P23, P24, P35, P36]
(assuming a change in supply voltage would take much less time when compared
to the time to process each input). This would signicantly reduce the correlation
between input data and power consumption, as the dierence in P12   P13 is
not same as P12   P23. This can be seen as introducing randomness in powerChapter 7 Randomisation Countermeasures 167
consumption. For this countermeasure to be eective, the dierence in P12  P23
should be equal to P11   P12 or P13   P14 or P14   P25 or P15   P26, i.e, a
change in Vdd should manifest itself as a change in input. But nding Vdd1, Vdd2
and Vdd3 values to satisfy the above condition would be dicult as the inputs to
the system can be any value (and are usually unknown). Moreover these values
cannot be generalised, as the inputs (switching activity) and the voltage range
vary from system to system.
The rate of change of voltage (dvs rate) should be much less than the time to
process the minimum number of inputs to successfully mount a DPA attack. For
our test circuit AES, the minimum number of encryption rounds required to suc-
cessfully implement a DPA attack was 2500. If the dvs rate is close to the above
number, then the attacker could simply implement a DPA attack, before the ran-
domness is introduced.
The amount of randomness in power consumption can be increased by increasing
the available voltage range, i.e, if Vdd min and Vdd max are close to each other then
the amount of randomness is less and if this range is more, randomness is more.
Zhai et al. [114] [114] discussed the limits of voltage scaling and showed that digital
circuits can work even in the sub-threshold region. Since we propose to keep the
frequency to the lowest possible, selecting the Vdd min will be constrained by the
expected circuit speed. However to overcome such a limitation, one could increase
Vdd max to increase the overall range at the expense of higher power consumption.
To test the eect of voltage variation on DPA we simulated AES Sbox with Vdd max
of 3.3v and Vdd min of 3.0v and found that the correlation strength was lowered
when compared to the Sbox without any countermeasure. When we increased the
range, Vdd max of 3.7v and Vdd min of 1.6v, the correlation strength was lowered
by at least 5 times. We assumed that change in supply voltage is done instantly
without any delay. While this assumption is not realistic, it quickly enables us to168 Chapter 7 Randomisation Countermeasures
check the eectiveness of a countermeasure, without aecting the quality of the
experiment.
Figure 7.3 shows the eect of the available Vdd range for dvs step of 0.1v on
DPA. It can be clearly seen that as this range (the number of available Vdd to
vary) increases, the correlation of the signal decreases. However for the set of
experiments we conducted, the correlation of signal was never below a point where
the secret key was undetectable.
Correlation for different Vdd range
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Figure 7.3: DPA result for dierent Vdd ranges. As the Vdd range widens
correlation value of the highest key and the next highest key reduces
7.2.3 Key Strength of RDVFS
The key strength of RDVFS was in randomising the frequency, f, which in turn
randomised the occurrence of intermediate results. For sequential designs, it is easy
to extract any changes in frequency and thereby overcoming this countermeasure.Chapter 7 Randomisation Countermeasures 169
Randomising the supply voltage alone did not introduce enough randomness in
the power consumption to prevent DPA. From this experiment we can conclude
that, randomising one or more of the variables of the power consumption equation,
Equation 7.1, will increase the noise in the power consumption and thereby reduce
the correlation of the intermediate results and the power consumption. Design-
ers using such countermeasures should ensure that no information regarding the
randomisation itself, leaks. Randomising the occurrence time of calculation of the
intermediate result has a better eect on DPA.
7.3 Random Pre-charging
Bucci et al. [8] have proposed to use random precharge logic to prevent SCA. This
hardware based countermeasure is similar to the software based random interrupts
countermeasure [16]. An overview of this countermeasure can be seen from Fig-
ure 7.4. The idea is to randomly precharge all the combinational gates with a
random value generated from the random number generator(RNG). As register
elements cannot loose their state value, a redundant register is used to load the
random value. To switch between normal operation and random pre-charging a
MUX is used to control the output of the compound register.
The intention of this countermeasure is to randomly precharge all the gates. In
every cycle, all the gates are randomly precharged before the actual data is pro-
cessed. Bucci et al. have reported that they could reduce the DPA correlation but
could not prevent an attack.
7.3.1 Multi Cycle Random Pre-charging
The feature of the RDVFS countermeasure that prevented the DPA attack is in
randomising the occurrence time of the intermediate result of the cryptographic170 Chapter 7 Randomisation Countermeasures
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Figure 7.5: Multi cycle random precharging countermeasure overview
operation. As all the power traces measured by the attacker are not correlated,
calculating the correlation of intermediate results and power consumption willChapter 7 Randomisation Countermeasures 171
lead to an unsuccessful attack. However using frequency to randomise the occur-
rence of the intermediate result is not secure as any change in frequency of the
cryptographic device can be detected.
Although the random precharging countermeasure discussed in [8] only uses one
random precharge before processing the actual data, it can be adapted so that
the number of random precharges per actual data can be increased. The modi-
ed circuit diagram is shown in Figure 7.5. In increasing the number of random
precharges, we increase the noise in the power consumption, there by making DPA
dicult.
In the context of this countermeasure we dene the following terms: every cycle of
operation where the actual data is processed is referred to as an evaluation cycle
and when random data is processed it is referred to as a random precharge cycle.
The total number of clock cycles for processing data is the sum of evaluation
cycles plus random precharge cycles. Note that the analogy of evaluation cycle
and random precharge cycle is similar to the evaluation phase and precharge phase
used in dual rail precharge countermeasures.
Along with the increase in the number of random precharge cycles per evaluation
cycle, we can also move the occurrence of the evaluation cycle. Consider an ex-
ample where the number of random precharge cycles per evaluation cycle is 3, so
the total number of cycles to process data will be 4. Now the evaluation cycle can
occur in any of the available 4 cycles. This behaviour can be achieved by changing
the control logic to control the sel signal in Figure 7.4. This feature of randomis-
ing the occurrence of the evaluation cycle imitates the random behaviour of the
RDVFS countermeasure, discussed in Section 7.2, but without its drawback.172 Chapter 7 Randomisation Countermeasures
7.3.1.1 Test Circuit and DPA Results
We wanted to see how DPA resistance changes when the number of random data
cycles increases for a given cycle of normal data. For this experiment, we have
used the DES sbox circuit shown in Figure 4.3 and used the ST12 design kit. The
secret key used for simulation is 55. In Chapter 6, we have shown that a single
rail DES sbox took 1,000 traces for a successful DPA attack (Page 156). We will
use this as a reference to see the eect of the random precharge countermeasure.
The DES sbox circuit was modied in such a way that, for every clock cycle of
normal operation, we will have N 1 of random operations. We have experimented
with values of 2, 4 and 8 for N. Based on this design, we have two scenarios, one
where the actual operation occurs at the same time and the other where the
occurrence of actual operation is randomised based on an LFSR.
When the normal operation was xed to the same cycle, DPA was successful and
without any signicant increase in the number of required traces. This is expected,
as the additional random precharge cycle only adds noise to the power consump-
tion, and does not actually aect the correlation between power consumption and
intermediate result. results based on the case where the occurance of normal
operation is randomised.
For the cases where the occurrence of normal operation is randomised, DPA was
successful without any signicant increase in the number of required traces as well.
Upon investigating we found that there was a signicant number of glitches before
the MUX is switched from actual data to random data (through SEL signal in
Figure 7.3.1). DPA was successful as these glitches were dependent on the cur-
rent value and the previous value of the actual data, thereby leaking information.
Consider the circuit in Figure 7.5 when N = 2. After the second precharge (3rd
clock), when the SEL signal goes low, the output of the compound register is actual
data. In the next eval phase (4th clock cycle), the output of the compound registerChapter 7 Randomisation Countermeasures 173
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Figure 7.6: DPA result on a DES sbox with multi cycle random pre-charging
countermeasure, where the normal operation occured in the same cycle. No of
traces are 10,000.
changes from the previous value of actual data to the current value of actual data.
As these transitions are dependent on actual data, they leak information that leads
to the successful DPA attack.
7.3.1.2 Improving Multi Cycle Random Pre-charging
Since the multi cycle random precharging countermeasure, introduced above, suf-
fers from glitches, we can prevent glitches by using two phase circuit techniques
used in dual rail precharge circuits (introduced in [94] and shown in Figure 3.12).174 Chapter 7 Randomisation Countermeasures
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reduce glitches
The purpose of this is to eliminate the glitches that occur when the output of
the compound register is changing from the previous value to the current value
of actual data. To prevent these glitches, a latch can be added to the compound
register in Figure 7.5, as shown in Figure 7.7. This latch is active low-enabled and
is connected to the clock. Now, when the MUX is switched from actual data to
random data, the output of the compound register will not change until the falling
edge of the clock. This prevents the glitches from occurring at the output of the
compound register.
After adding the additional latch to the test circuit, the DPA results improved.
DPA results for dierent N are shown in Table 7.1. As N is increased, the numberChapter 7 Randomisation Countermeasures 175
of traces required to nd the correct key also increased.
Table 7.1: Number of traces required for successful DPA attack on DES Sbox
employing multi cycle random precharge countermeasure, based on simulations.
Total number No Of traces
of cycles
1 1,000
2 20,000
4 80,000
8 250,000
7.3.1.3 Changing the DPA peak selection criteria
As discussed in Section 2.8.3, correct key is predicted by the attacker based on
the correlation of the measured power consumption and hypothetical power. The
key with the highest correlation is the secret key. In the multi cycle random pre-
charging countermeasure, the data could be processed in any of the available clock
cycles. Instead of measuring correlation for the entire operation, we used dierent
clock cycles within the same operation. For example, when N = 4, we will have
four dierent correlations with four possible secret keys. Then based on this, we
used the maximum occurrence of a key to predict the secret key.
Table 7.2: Number of traces required for successful DPA attack on DES Sbox
employing multi cycle random precharge countermeasure, using improved DPA
selection.
Total number No Of traces
of cycles
1 1,000
2 20,000
4 80,000
8 150,000
Using the new DPA peak selection criteria, the improvement oered by the multi
cycle random pre-charging countermeasure reduced signicantly. The new results
are tabulated in Table 7.2. Notice that the number of required traces when N = 8
reduced signicantly. DPA trace plot, when N = 8 is shown in Figure 7.8. Notice176 Chapter 7 Randomisation Countermeasures
that although the highest peak trace belongs to key 53, key 55 has more peaks per
clock cycle.
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Figure 7.8: DPA result on a DES sbox with multi cycle random pre-charging
countermeasure, when N = 8. No of traces are 300,000.
7.3.2 Area for Implementing Multi Cycle Random Pre-
charging
Table 7.3: area for for various implementations in ST 0:12 technology
design area in
mm2
times
increase
DES Sbox single rail 3282.2 1.0
DES Sbox Multi Cycle Random
Pre-charging
5476.7 1.66Chapter 7 Randomisation Countermeasures 177
Multi cycle random pre-charging replaces a ip-op with two ip-ops, a MUX
and a latch, overheads for implementing a multi cycle random pre-charging can
be easily estimated. For our DES Sbox design it increased the area by 1.66 times
when compared to an unprotected single rail circuit.
7.3.3 Advantages of Multi cycle random precharging coun-
termeasure
The main advantage of multi cycle random precharging countermeasure is that the
number of random precharge cycles can be decided by the designer. This could
also be done at run time. Since this is a randomisation based countermeasure, it
could be combined with other DPA countermeasures.
7.3.4 Disadvantages of Multi cycle random precharging
countermeasure
The main disadvantage of the multi cycle random precharging countermeasure is
the additional area and performance overhead. Every ip-op in the unmodied
design needs two registers, a MUX and a latch. The decrease in performance is
dependent on the number of random precharge cycles used. Another drawback
of this countermeasure is in implementing it. Although the data path part of the
encryption algorithm is straightforward, the control part of the algorithm needs
special attention and is more dicult to automate.178 Chapter 7 Randomisation Countermeasures
7.3.5 Using Multi cycle random precharging with other
countermeasure
One may think that using multi cycle random precharging with other countermea-
sures may lead to more secure designs. For example, an interesting study would
be to combine the multi cycle random precharge countermeasure with dual rail
precharge logic styles. However, area overheads for combining multi cycle random
precharge and dual rail will be signicantly more; both the register in multi cycle
random precharge need to be converted to dual rail, which will be four times each
register, a total of eight times the total registers plus twice the area for combi-
national logic. This overhead of the combined multi cycle random precharge and
dual rail will be more when compared to other DPA countermeasures, for example
MDPL, WDDL + fat wire, path switching or divided backend duplication.
7.4 Summary
In this chapter we evaluated randomisation based solutions against DPA. From
Chapter 4 we have seen that similar hardware blocks running in parallel will only
increase the number of required traces and not prevent DPA.
We have discussed the limitations of RDVFS as a countermeasure for DPA. The
operating frequency is detectable by monitoring glitches in the power consumption.
Our experiments indicate that this information can be successfully exploited by
a DPA attacker and it severely compromises the eectiveness of the proposed
RDVFS countermeasure. The feature of RDVFS countermeasure that prevented
DPA attack is in randomising the occurrence time of the intermediate result of
the cryptographic operation. As all the power traces measured by the attacker
are not correlated, calculating the correlation of intermediate results and power
consumption will lead to an unsuccessful attack.Chapter 7 Randomisation Countermeasures 179
We proposed a multi cycle random precharge countermeasure which imitates the
behaviour of RDVFS. Using circuit simulations we showed that our proposed coun-
termeasure oers some resistance towards DPA, but at the expense of performance.
This performance and DPA resistance trade o can be decided by the designer.
For a DES Sbox circuit, implementing this countermeasure has an area overhead
of 1.6 times. However this countermeasure has a weakness, in that, if the at-
tacker knows the type of countermeasure used, then he/she can look for peaks per
clock cycle rather than a single correlation peak for the entire trace, bypassing the
countermeasure.Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Work
8.1 Conclusion
In this thesis we have reviewed topics related to side channel analysis in general and
DPA attacks in particular along with DPA countermeasures. DPA is quite eective
at breaking an implementation of the cryptographic algorithm. DPA is successful
at breaking cryptographic algorithm because it relies on the data dependent power
consumption of the implementation of the cryptographic algorithm. We have
demonstrated the ability of DPA on unprotected implementations of DES Sbox,
AES Sbox and AES designs using our simulation based and FPGA based DPA
setup.
Several countermeasures have been proposed to prevent DPA. Of these, dual rail
precharge countermeasures try to eliminate the data dependent power consump-
tion. Algorithmic masking countermeasures aim to randomise power consumption
by using a random mask with the intermediate results. These masking schemes
need to take special care of non-linear functions often found in block ciphers.
However it is shown that algorithmic masking implementations leak data depen-
dent in power side channel via glitches at the output of combinational logic gates
181182 Chapter 8 Conclusion and Future Work
[42]. Randomisation countermeasures such as [8, 112] can only increase the num-
ber of required traces by a margin. Gate-level masking works in a similar way
to algorithmic masking, i.e, each logic gate now has twice as many inputs and
outputs as before, the extra ports are for the mask. Gate-level masking also suf-
fer from glitches [41]. A masking scheme which prevent glitches, called MDPL
has been proposed [69] and is currently the only known secure gate-level masking
scheme against DPA, however it has an area overhead of almost 5 times. Dual rail
precharge logic style countermeasures such as WDDL have been shown to be fully
secure, however special care needs to be taken when routing the dierential nets
[95]. Fat wire [95] and backend duplication [23] have been proposed to solve the
routing problem. While these have been shown to be secure against DPA, they
have 3.1 and 11.8 times area overhead respectively. Moreover, these methods do
not consider the coupling capacitance eect on the dierential nets.
We have studied dual rail precharge logic styles and using our DPA setup con-
rm that without balanced routing dual rail logic styles do not oer signicant
protection against DPA. To work around this balanced routing issue, we proposed
two countermeasure called path switching and divided backend duplication. The
aim of path switching is to randomly swap the path taken by dierential nets.
Using circuit simulations and implementations on FPGA, we showed that dual
rail circuits combined with path switching increase the number of traces required
by DPA by 1664 times, at an area increase of 3 times for ASICs and 11 times for
FPGAs. Because of the way path switching works, it cannot be applied to logic
gates and thus cannot address attacks on combinational logic.
The aim of divided backend duplication is to split the dual rail design into two
logical parts (the true and false parts); place and route one part; and duplicate
the placement and routing for the second part. The benet of this method is that
both the true and false parts of the design see the same environment, including
coupling capacitances. Using an ASIC implementation of DES Sbox we found thatChapter 8 Conclusion and Future Work 183
a dual rail with divided backend duplication did not disclose the correct key for
up to 300,000 traces. On average divided backend duplication method has an area
overhead of 3.2 times.
Randomisation countermeasures were also investigated. Although the RDVFS
randomising countermeasures has low area overheads and seem like a viable op-
tion to prevent DPA, investigation using circuit simulations showed that they are
vulnerable to DPA. This is because of the fact that any change in frequency and
hence voltage can be easily detected by looking at spikes in current consumption
of the device. As part of this investigation we found that randomising the occur-
rence of cryptographic operations are more eective to prevent DPA. We extended
random precharging countermeasure proposed im [8] to include the previous ob-
servation, i.e, randomising the occurrence of cryptographic operation, and called
it multi cycle random precharging. The aim of this countermeasure is to process
N-1 random sets of data for a given set of actual data. We found that special care
needs to be taken to prevent glitches when switching from random data to actual
data. The number of random cycles can be decided to trade o against perfor-
mance. Using circuit simulations we showed that our proposed countermeasure
oers some resistance towards DPA. However this countermeasure has a weakness,
in that, if the attacker knows the type of countermeasure used, then he/she can
look for peaks per clock cycle rather than a single correlation peak for the entire
trace.
8.1.1 Summary of Contributions
Contributions of this research are summarised below:
 Developed a simulation based an FPGA based DPA setups that can be
congured for other designs.184 Chapter 8 Conclusion and Future Work
 Developed a countermeasure, called path switching, to solve the dual rail
dierential routing problem.
 Developed a countermeasure, called divided backend duplication, to solve
the dual rail dierential routing problem, which also considers coupling ca-
pacitance.
 Developed a C++ program to aid in the transformation from a normal cir-
cuit to a dual rail precharge circuit, for path switching or divided backend
duplication implementation. Scripts have also been written that automate
the divided backend duplication process.
 Show that randomising the power consumption itself does not prevent DPA
and that randomising countermeasures should be careful not to leak infor-
mation about the randomisation method employed.
8.2 Future Work
The present thesis could be elaborated in several directions. The following para-
graphs introduce some relevant areas of future research.
The path switching countermeasure described in Chapter 5 is validated using sim-
ulations and experimentally on a FPGA. Divided backend duplication described
in Chapter 6 is validated using simulation. Implementing path switching (Chap-
ter 5) and divided backend duplication (Chapter 6) countermeasures on a test
chip would be helpful in further validating these countermeasures. Due to time
constraints we could not implement divided backend duplication on an FPGA.
However divided backend duplication can be implemented on an FPGA. As an
extension of this research work, implementing divided backend duplication on an
FPGA will help in validating it.Chapter 8 Conclusion and Future Work 185
Generating noise in power consumption is the rst thought that one would get to
prevent DPA. As DPA is based on statistical analysis, small noise introduced does
not have any eect on DPA result. The worst it can do is increase the number of
power traces needed. Moreover there is signicant amount of measurement noise
when capturing the device power consumption, which does not eect the DPA
result. This has been demonstrated in Chapter 7. The only way noise generation
could prevent DPA is if the added noise is signicantly greater in magnitude than
the original power consumption and varies more frequently than the original power
consumption. Clearly doing this will increase the overall power consumption.
However if the devices original power consumption is very small, then adding
noise to satisfy the above constrain would become easy. Lower power design is a
well researched area. Specically, operating a device at sub threshold voltages is
not a new issue [106]. Designing an ultra low power AES circuit and analysing
the eect of noise generation on DPA is an interesting research area.
Self powered smart cards is a concept we propose to prevent DPA on smart cards.
Having a power source on the smart card itself eliminates the possibility of prob-
ing to measure power consumption, there by eliminating the possibility of DPA.
For example, icking a smart card to activate it could be possible. EM attacks
could still be possible. However smart cards can employ a Faraday cage to prevent
invasive attacks such as probing [32, 107]. A Faraday cage also prevents leakage
of any EM signal thus eliminating its possibility. Micro power generators is a new
area of research were power is salvaged from vibrations. Studying the feasibility
of a smart card device, where power is supplied from a micro power generator is
interesting. Mainly looking into details such as maximum power, average power
that current micro power generators can provide and design a low power crypto-
processor to meet these constrains. Ultra low power AES from the above section
can be used here as well.186 Chapter 8 Conclusion and Future Work
Power analysis attacks rely on the fact that the power consumption is data de-
pendent. To be specic dynamic power consumption is data dependent and for
process technologies up to 130 nm, Dynamic power consumption is the dominant
factor in over-all power consumption. However as the transistor sizes are shrunk
(process lower than 90 nm) leakage current begins to dominate. Leakage power
is also data dependent, but in a dierent way to dynamic power. Analyses of
the eect of leakage current on the DPA countermeasures discussed in this thesis
would be relevant extension of work in this thesis.Appendix A
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DPA Results on our FPGA Setup
This chapter contains the DPA results by using dierence of mean correlation
analysis on our FPGA setup.
B.1 DES Sbox
DPA results from various DES Sbox implementation are presented here.
B.1.1 DES SBox with Hamming Weight Hypothesis and
Partition Function of 2
Table B.1: Dierent number of traces and the subkey with highest correlation
value for unprotected DES Sbox using Hamming weight hypothesis and partition
function of 2
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
1 63 0.8292082
2 63 0.7691006
3 63 0.6985500
Continued on next page...
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Table B.1 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
4 63 0.7313769
5 63 0.7490733
6 55 0.7462826
7 48 0.7329142
8 61 0.7508598
9 48 0.7283354
10 61 0.7489878
11 28 0.7305681
12 25 0.7325509
13 61 0.6500452
14 61 0.6204740
15 61 0.6880193
16 24 0.5866135
17 0 0.5772402
18 0 0.5920610
19 0 0.6072298
20 0 0.5861466
21 0 0.5769913
22 24 0.5878594
23 41 0.5269809
24 41 0.5075252
25 58 0.4534925
26 58 0.4787796
27 58 0.4731103
28 24 0.4290293
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Table B.1 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
29 24 0.4449944
30 24 0.4236937
31 24 0.4518262
32 58 0.5266732
33 58 0.5139535
34 58 0.5070974
35 58 0.5179328
36 58 0.5007089
37 58 0.4798657
38 58 0.4905086
39 58 0.4523649
40 58 0.4396411
41 40 0.3395542
42 24 0.3512571
43 58 0.4338010
44 58 0.4603610
45 58 0.4542913
46 58 0.4668437
47 58 0.4407149
48 58 0.4294990
49 58 0.4245436
50 58 0.4286150
51 58 0.4063285
52 58 0.4001933
53 58 0.3857235
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Table B.1 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
54 37 0.3919194
55 37 0.3998409
56 37 0.4243392
57 37 0.4227895
58 37 0.4074173
59 37 0.4186861
60 37 0.4046105
61 37 0.4040150
62 37 0.3870760
63 2 0.3602313
64 2 0.3535247
65 2 0.3590095
66 2 0.3734985
67 2 0.3749662
68 2 0.3683322
69 2 0.3847299
70 2 0.3947381
71 2 0.4121739
72 2 0.4280438
73 2 0.4128306
74 2 0.4062371
75 2 0.3902922
76 2 0.4051390
77 2 0.3882840
78 2 0.3823746
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Table B.1 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
79 2 0.3683599
80 2 0.3733133
81 2 0.3677845
82 2 0.3666974
83 2 0.3608207
84 2 0.3520156
85 2 0.3479559
86 2 0.3610630
87 2 0.3696622
88 2 0.3683901
89 2 0.3169535
90 2 0.3117577
91 2 0.2971890
92 2 0.2959409
93 2 0.2827994
94 42 0.2907343
95 42 0.3090416
96 42 0.3150326
97 42 0.3169208
98 42 0.3208259
99 42 0.3166802
100 42 0.3097727
101 42 0.2948093
102 17 0.2850874
103 17 0.2817122
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Table B.1 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
104 17 0.2691006
105 17 0.2828432
106 17 0.2729809
107 17 0.2684930
108 17 0.2660278
109 42 0.2741175
110 42 0.2648972
111 42 0.2585568
112 42 0.2567575
113 63 0.2558955
114 45 0.2662445
115 63 0.2680096
116 63 0.2659681
117 45 0.2628239
118 17 0.2654250
119 63 0.2724655
120 63 0.2766803
121 55 0.2754703
122 55 0.2688088
123 55 0.2723651
124 55 0.2799802
125 55 0.2912384
126 55 0.2853073
127 55 0.2842662
128 55 0.2817384
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Table B.1 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
129 55 0.2922097
130 55 0.2907432
131 55 0.2971829
132 55 0.3041807
133 55 0.3022913
134 55 0.3117246
135 55 0.3087922
136 55 0.3089722
137 55 0.3096783
138 55 0.3199515
139 55 0.3274661
140 55 0.3318089
141 55 0.3186324
142 55 0.3173617
143 55 0.3162827
144 55 0.3221733
145 55 0.3261251
146 55 0.3186804
147 55 0.3177949
148 55 0.3090269
149 55 0.3064626
150 55 0.3109862
151 55 0.3201605
152 55 0.3228353
153 55 0.3323382
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Table B.1 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
154 55 0.3185710
155 55 0.3196457
156 55 0.3116354
157 55 0.3177347
158 55 0.3118588
159 55 0.3154340
160 55 0.3105639
161 55 0.3049207
162 55 0.3082675
163 55 0.2997649
164 55 0.3038635
165 55 0.3071916
166 55 0.3083748
167 55 0.3049924
168 55 0.3161179
169 55 0.3151687
170 55 0.3244238
171 55 0.3344271
172 55 0.3227794
173 55 0.3293190
174 55 0.3229689
175 55 0.3168854
176 55 0.3155612
177 55 0.3082075
178 55 0.3019426
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Table B.1 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
179 55 0.2994902
180 55 0.3059745
181 55 0.3075860
182 55 0.3182279
183 55 0.3199289
184 55 0.3142439
185 55 0.3047627
186 55 0.3053366
187 55 0.3078247
188 55 0.3002016
189 55 0.2991713
190 55 0.2923999
191 55 0.2868119
192 55 0.2875825
193 55 0.2824718
194 55 0.2768689
195 55 0.2714655
196 55 0.2772256
197 55 0.2711063
198 55 0.2789289
199 55 0.2779502
200 55 0.2824231
300 55 0.2278576
400 33 0.2049206
500 55 0.1875466
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Table B.1 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
600 55 0.2201948
700 55 0.2115890
800 55 0.2022365
900 55 0.1968179
1000 55 0.2027333
B.1.2 Dual Rail DES SBox with Hamming Weight Hy-
pothesis and Partition Function of 2
Table B.2: Dierent number of traces and the subkey with highest correlation
value for dual rail DES Sbox using Hamming weight hypothesis and partition
function of 2
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
1 63 1.0996550
2 62 1.1134000
3 62 1.1808575
4 62 1.2269280
5 62 1.2331317
6 61 1.2370471
7 61 1.2690600
8 61 1.2816600
9 61 1.3024010
10 61 1.3234555
11 61 1.3044658
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Table B.2 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
12 58 1.2971662
13 58 1.3174314
14 58 1.3200613
15 61 0.8273571
16 21 0.7738066
17 21 0.7446711
18 58 0.6550473
19 58 0.6334789
20 58 0.6351333
21 6 0.5773066
22 58 0.5636440
23 58 0.5478825
24 58 0.5259296
25 33 0.4471030
26 10 0.4462181
27 10 0.4413380
28 21 0.4424980
29 58 0.4426489
30 58 0.4468327
31 10 0.4455617
32 10 0.4390971
33 10 0.4325060
34 10 0.4398874
35 10 0.4315207
36 10 0.4288170
Continued on next page...200 Appendix B DPA Results on our FPGA Setup
Table B.2 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
37 10 0.4272609
38 10 0.4404577
39 10 0.4439545
40 10 0.4391842
41 58 0.3658384
42 58 0.3836109
43 10 0.3590090
44 10 0.3573073
45 58 0.3492804
46 2 0.3493464
47 2 0.3531632
48 58 0.3330213
49 58 0.3353233
50 58 0.3400278
51 58 0.3371864
52 58 0.3418779
53 58 0.3362966
54 58 0.3380066
55 58 0.3403017
56 58 0.3364773
57 58 0.3380782
58 2 0.3354842
59 2 0.3302099
60 2 0.3384920
61 58 0.3249585
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Table B.2 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
62 2 0.3231711
63 2 0.3207500
64 2 0.3240276
65 58 0.3227433
66 58 0.3340148
67 58 0.3227603
68 58 0.3260910
69 58 0.3269573
70 58 0.3382455
71 58 0.3480255
72 58 0.3461678
73 58 0.3537665
74 58 0.3462475
75 58 0.3499349
76 58 0.3509914
77 58 0.3211006
78 58 0.3222614
79 58 0.3238817
80 58 0.3191816
81 58 0.3103211
82 10 0.3048258
83 10 0.3058306
84 10 0.3002149
85 10 0.3033637
86 10 0.3009436
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Table B.2 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
87 58 0.2959439
88 10 0.2871476
89 10 0.2838136
90 58 0.2720290
91 58 0.2712510
92 58 0.2783271
93 58 0.2794020
94 58 0.2744490
95 58 0.2817708
96 58 0.2860841
97 58 0.2739285
98 58 0.2742464
99 58 0.2515998
100 58 0.2471742
101 58 0.2484123
102 58 0.2402844
103 58 0.2421044
104 58 0.2398702
105 58 0.2368598
106 57 0.2315591
107 58 0.2296323
108 58 0.2297843
109 58 0.2328989
110 58 0.2351773
111 58 0.2366447
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Table B.2 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
112 58 0.2370878
113 58 0.2215936
114 58 0.2158777
115 58 0.2185005
116 58 0.2212781
117 58 0.2223946
118 58 0.2157784
119 58 0.2067332
120 58 0.2079482
121 58 0.2059622
122 58 0.2082384
123 58 0.2072124
124 27 0.2040852
125 58 0.2077976
126 58 0.2035863
127 58 0.2028607
128 58 0.2035780
129 58 0.2046966
130 10 0.2102354
131 10 0.2034356
132 10 0.2041123
133 10 0.2076704
134 10 0.2061765
135 10 0.2084115
136 10 0.2075114
Continued on next page...204 Appendix B DPA Results on our FPGA Setup
Table B.2 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
137 10 0.2095076
138 10 0.1983820
139 52 0.2006485
140 52 0.2007623
141 52 0.1995115
142 52 0.1983431
143 52 0.1991589
144 52 0.1938385
145 52 0.1949769
146 52 0.1905804
147 52 0.1878787
148 52 0.1814923
149 52 0.1770016
150 38 0.1776262
151 44 0.1786649
152 38 0.1806049
153 52 0.1808559
154 38 0.1791485
155 38 0.1803924
156 38 0.1803165
157 38 0.1787059
158 38 0.1787600
159 38 0.1751800
160 38 0.1772391
161 44 0.1776960
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Table B.2 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
162 38 0.1745706
163 38 0.1734031
164 61 0.1694919
165 61 0.1751295
166 61 0.1762530
167 61 0.1753698
168 61 0.1733539
169 61 0.1721847
170 61 0.1745377
171 61 0.1721983
172 61 0.1684038
173 38 0.1740647
174 38 0.1722004
175 38 0.1741360
176 61 0.1745140
177 61 0.1737525
178 61 0.1728716
179 61 0.1755634
180 61 0.1758721
181 61 0.1730145
182 61 0.1704748
183 38 0.1767282
184 38 0.1770154
185 38 0.1757883
186 38 0.1705510
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Table B.2 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
187 61 0.1731293
188 61 0.1747503
189 61 0.1711764
190 61 0.1737293
191 61 0.1719528
192 61 0.1692074
193 61 0.1668613
194 61 0.1663988
195 61 0.1634031
196 61 0.1577890
197 61 0.1562021
198 61 0.1587199
199 61 0.1577525
200 61 0.1561727
201 61 0.1546501
202 61 0.1517943
203 61 0.1508899
204 37 0.1512772
205 37 0.1488454
206 38 0.1510153
207 38 0.1510507
208 38 0.1492602
209 38 0.1491916
210 38 0.1488466
211 38 0.1529564
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Table B.2 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
212 38 0.1526853
213 38 0.1498246
214 38 0.1484952
215 38 0.1494744
216 38 0.1476185
217 38 0.1457808
218 61 0.1444195
219 38 0.1452075
220 38 0.1446139
221 38 0.1453367
222 38 0.1453655
223 55 0.1460800
224 55 0.1465194
225 38 0.1474651
226 38 0.1476652
227 38 0.1507334
228 38 0.1460743
229 15 0.1428934
230 15 0.1431820
231 15 0.1436468
232 15 0.1434539
233 0 0.1430526
234 0 0.1433206
235 38 0.1441868
236 0 0.1431007
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Table B.2 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
237 55 0.1439243
238 55 0.1437912
239 15 0.1415835
240 15 0.1433444
241 38 0.1398519
242 38 0.1419969
243 38 0.1417880
244 38 0.1421146
245 38 0.1409726
246 38 0.1424090
247 38 0.1424010
248 38 0.1416582
249 38 0.1436905
250 38 0.1417497
251 38 0.1398612
252 38 0.1389282
253 38 0.1381458
254 15 0.1367075
255 15 0.1346717
256 15 0.1349070
257 37 0.1351089
258 37 0.1349176
259 37 0.1353920
260 37 0.1363465
261 37 0.1368203
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Table B.2 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
262 55 0.1419772
263 55 0.1481859
264 55 0.1500990
265 55 0.1481533
266 55 0.1479101
267 55 0.1460811
268 55 0.1506325
269 55 0.1504068
270 55 0.1538203
271 55 0.1518938
272 55 0.1516083
273 55 0.1521128
274 55 0.1526189
275 55 0.1498188
276 55 0.1508800
277 55 0.1521995
278 55 0.1518457
279 55 0.1540432
280 55 0.1544860
281 55 0.1568385
282 55 0.1548118
283 55 0.1562953
284 55 0.1559741
285 55 0.1563889
286 55 0.1534449
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Table B.2 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
287 55 0.1504891
288 55 0.1505402
289 55 0.1503928
290 55 0.1512638
291 55 0.1509939
292 55 0.1492252
293 55 0.1498384
294 55 0.1499670
295 55 0.1494702
296 55 0.1503224
297 55 0.1516498
298 55 0.1528798
299 55 0.1571700
300 55 0.1555019
301 55 0.1555249
302 55 0.1549690
303 55 0.1544300
304 55 0.1557553
305 55 0.1566801
306 55 0.1573852
307 55 0.1537053
308 55 0.1515119
309 55 0.1501329
310 55 0.1497264
311 55 0.1495497
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Table B.2 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
312 55 0.1456342
313 55 0.1457615
314 55 0.1444890
315 55 0.1457997
316 55 0.1470931
317 55 0.1474820
318 55 0.1485807
319 55 0.1485524
320 55 0.1481110
321 55 0.1483184
322 55 0.1491054
323 55 0.1486985
324 55 0.1467230
325 55 0.1496658
326 55 0.1489510
327 55 0.1479699
328 55 0.1470072
329 55 0.1471628
330 55 0.1453987
331 55 0.1423396
332 55 0.1463835
333 55 0.1472212
334 55 0.1462750
335 55 0.1453037
336 55 0.1449787
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Table B.2 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
337 55 0.1450995
338 55 0.1452927
339 55 0.1459005
340 55 0.1452947
341 55 0.1451657
342 55 0.1477512
343 55 0.1477506
344 55 0.1455993
345 55 0.1420560
346 55 0.1449242
347 55 0.1445476
348 55 0.1457562
349 55 0.1457904
350 55 0.1471237
351 55 0.1464495
352 55 0.1451547
353 55 0.1448445
354 55 0.1416047
355 55 0.1421123
356 55 0.1430852
357 55 0.1425840
358 55 0.1406678
359 55 0.1375957
360 55 0.1373789
361 55 0.1349199
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Table B.2 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
362 55 0.1369257
363 55 0.1354486
364 55 0.1349177
365 55 0.1329634
366 55 0.1339634
367 55 0.1339730
368 55 0.1331395
369 55 0.1341446
370 55 0.1324318
371 55 0.1310219
372 55 0.1299621
373 55 0.1328486
374 55 0.1321852
375 55 0.1308678
376 55 0.1304502
377 55 0.1322605
378 55 0.1308172
379 55 0.1266916
380 55 0.1252851
381 55 0.1252147
382 55 0.1236888
383 55 0.1230609
384 55 0.1229974
385 55 0.1270965
386 55 0.1267258
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Table B.2 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
387 55 0.1274721
388 55 0.1257382
389 55 0.1283159
390 55 0.1303993
391 55 0.1307480
392 55 0.1305898
393 55 0.1300707
394 55 0.1295993
395 55 0.1303035
396 55 0.1295035
397 55 0.1288091
398 55 0.1275641
399 55 0.1282679
400 55 0.1300116
401 55 0.1297331
402 55 0.1300844
403 55 0.1290046
404 55 0.1293118
405 55 0.1289551
406 55 0.1289634
407 55 0.1291461
408 55 0.1305205
409 55 0.1288290
410 55 0.1277860
411 55 0.1286714
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Table B.2 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
412 55 0.1284225
413 55 0.1261054
414 55 0.1262038
415 55 0.1267023
416 55 0.1282393
417 55 0.1298280
418 55 0.1305640
419 55 0.1309953
420 55 0.1301646
421 55 0.1286253
422 55 0.1283781
423 55 0.1283186
424 55 0.1279716
425 55 0.1276392
426 55 0.1280225
427 55 0.1268301
428 55 0.1281303
429 55 0.1271449
430 55 0.1280950
431 55 0.1293371
432 55 0.1284008
433 55 0.1282904
434 55 0.1299416
435 55 0.1332432
436 55 0.1339561
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Table B.2 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
437 55 0.1327022
438 55 0.1317440
439 55 0.1311138
440 55 0.1300043
441 55 0.1276054
442 55 0.1280232
443 55 0.1274192
444 55 0.1269631
445 55 0.1275720
446 55 0.1273531
447 55 0.1271970
448 55 0.1274729
449 55 0.1261572
450 55 0.1253971
451 55 0.1256688
452 55 0.1249336
453 55 0.1253212
454 55 0.1268202
455 55 0.1277675
456 55 0.1277369
457 55 0.1282542
458 55 0.1281003
459 55 0.1252742
460 55 0.1255331
461 55 0.1238343
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Table B.2 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
462 55 0.1212329
463 55 0.1218324
464 55 0.1220213
465 55 0.1210990
466 55 0.1205266
467 55 0.1200449
468 55 0.1203562
469 55 0.1201673
470 55 0.1217500
471 55 0.1224826
472 55 0.1263315
473 55 0.1272585
474 55 0.1257991
475 55 0.1260778
476 55 0.1260937
477 55 0.1281346
478 55 0.1271719
479 55 0.1263909
480 55 0.1262450
481 55 0.1255806
482 55 0.1252319
483 55 0.1258398
484 55 0.1250345
485 55 0.1220276
486 55 0.1217035
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Table B.2 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
487 55 0.1222320
488 55 0.1210998
489 55 0.1224492
490 55 0.1219056
491 55 0.1213827
492 55 0.1207231
493 55 0.1202557
494 55 0.1206149
495 55 0.1205005
496 55 0.1205463
497 55 0.1197712
498 55 0.1203851
499 55 0.1188802
500 55 0.1197846
600 55 0.1202966
700 55 0.1098941
800 55 0.1171481
900 55 0.1215631
1000 55 0.1228230
1100 55 0.1159752
1200 55 0.1252646
1300 55 0.1256369
1400 55 0.1237615
1500 55 0.1186465
1600 55 0.1166875
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Table B.2 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
1700 55 0.1151947
1800 55 0.1119309
1900 55 0.1118905
2000 55 0.1114829
2100 55 0.1065890
2200 55 0.1098200
2300 55 0.1122863
2400 55 0.1157294
2500 55 0.1182918
2600 55 0.1186988
2700 55 0.1220862
2800 55 0.1235627
2900 55 0.1226064
3000 55 0.1256955
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Figure B.1: DPA result for all encryption rounds on FPGA Implementation
of DES Sbox without any countermeasure for Hamming weight hypothesis and
partition function of 2
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Figure B.2: DPA result for all encryption rounds on FPGA Implementation
of dual rail DES Sbox for Hamming weight hypothesis and partition function
of 2
Table B.3: Dierent number of traces and the subkey with highest correla-
tion value for dual rail alternating spacer DES Sbox using Hamming weight
hypothesis and partition function of 2
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
1 63 0.9628500
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Table B.3 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
2 62 1.0604700
3 62 1.2041225
4 62 1.1392632
5 62 1.0889002
6 61 1.0362080
7 61 1.0685308
8 61 1.0547751
9 61 1.0320346
10 61 1.0457079
11 61 1.0449193
12 58 1.0765135
13 58 1.0789076
14 58 1.1061031
15 58 0.8928546
16 58 0.9024238
17 58 0.8726353
18 58 0.8795834
19 58 0.9017522
20 58 0.9143887
21 30 0.7447051
22 30 0.7075082
23 30 0.7237754
24 30 0.7295673
25 30 0.7062031
26 30 0.7228330
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Table B.3 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
27 30 0.7464529
28 30 0.7299688
29 30 0.6969801
30 30 0.6504684
31 30 0.6124712
32 30 0.6204839
33 30 0.5940668
34 30 0.5839104
35 30 0.5812711
36 30 0.5966761
37 30 0.5731604
38 30 0.5690841
39 30 0.5853552
40 30 0.5596671
41 30 0.5347302
42 30 0.5193378
43 30 0.5356045
44 10 0.4885304
45 10 0.4358543
46 30 0.4521296
47 30 0.4658780
48 30 0.4658764
49 30 0.4529360
50 10 0.4308862
51 10 0.4336871
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Table B.3 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
52 10 0.4377022
53 30 0.4243955
54 30 0.4383238
55 30 0.4307328
56 30 0.4246198
57 30 0.4211958
58 61 0.3873221
59 61 0.3889485
60 39 0.3816157
61 39 0.3907143
62 39 0.3918521
63 39 0.3630283
64 39 0.3559780
65 39 0.3624772
66 39 0.3747092
67 39 0.3477996
68 39 0.3550044
69 39 0.3429248
70 39 0.3351730
71 39 0.3389471
72 39 0.3428742
73 39 0.3477659
74 39 0.3442647
75 39 0.3508983
76 39 0.3534594
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Table B.3 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
77 39 0.3468936
78 39 0.3389924
79 39 0.3175666
80 39 0.3159308
81 39 0.3125393
82 39 0.2930952
83 39 0.2876867
84 39 0.2948221
85 39 0.2994224
86 39 0.3058096
87 39 0.3008829
88 39 0.2787941
89 39 0.2802942
90 40 0.2672891
91 40 0.2686134
92 40 0.2603080
93 24 0.2526315
94 40 0.2553958
95 24 0.2521536
96 40 0.2519468
97 40 0.2512948
98 40 0.2510953
99 40 0.2537110
100 48 0.2552815
101 48 0.2676500
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Table B.3 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
102 30 0.2740271
103 48 0.2831607
104 30 0.2783922
105 30 0.2867722
106 30 0.3028152
107 30 0.2949587
108 30 0.2913263
109 30 0.2869844
110 30 0.2845517
111 48 0.2649731
112 48 0.2760452
113 30 0.2637161
114 48 0.2622053
115 48 0.2623100
116 30 0.2457067
117 48 0.2333978
118 30 0.2352631
119 30 0.2398095
120 30 0.2295933
121 30 0.2347109
122 13 0.2309045
123 30 0.2284542
124 30 0.2224012
125 30 0.2265641
126 30 0.2290568
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Table B.3 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
127 30 0.2288860
128 30 0.2228145
129 30 0.2258477
130 61 0.2129662
131 61 0.2130950
132 61 0.2252345
133 30 0.2136993
134 30 0.2150404
135 30 0.2163874
136 13 0.2217126
137 18 0.2228124
138 18 0.2263788
139 30 0.2177582
140 18 0.2215502
141 18 0.2300317
142 18 0.2356066
143 18 0.2397542
144 18 0.2398031
145 18 0.2359133
146 18 0.2361064
147 18 0.2415185
148 18 0.2493793
149 18 0.2552745
150 18 0.2598056
151 18 0.2639828
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Table B.3 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
152 18 0.2632952
153 18 0.2482980
154 18 0.2408453
155 18 0.2423312
156 18 0.2412254
157 18 0.2409376
158 18 0.2299884
159 18 0.2337411
160 18 0.2302731
161 18 0.2272401
162 30 0.2088903
163 30 0.2115380
164 37 0.2101203
165 37 0.2060345
166 37 0.2003638
167 49 0.2021025
168 49 0.2032330
169 49 0.2029327
170 49 0.2005343
171 49 0.2051795
172 49 0.2096263
173 61 0.2078165
174 61 0.2102609
175 61 0.2073217
176 61 0.2036933
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Table B.3 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
177 49 0.2052163
178 49 0.1983597
179 37 0.1996499
180 37 0.1972875
181 37 0.2016233
182 37 0.1901831
183 49 0.1882833
184 48 0.1872959
185 18 0.1883315
186 18 0.1906364
187 18 0.1886688
188 18 0.1906016
189 18 0.1931537
190 18 0.1904929
191 18 0.1864216
192 18 0.1822161
193 48 0.1839115
194 18 0.1795913
195 49 0.1790812
196 49 0.1804996
197 49 0.1753848
198 49 0.1816944
199 49 0.1832250
200 49 0.1849448
201 49 0.1889619
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Table B.3 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
202 49 0.1914305
203 49 0.1911783
204 49 0.2000731
205 49 0.2023150
206 49 0.2051221
207 49 0.2078982
208 49 0.2097734
209 49 0.2056108
210 49 0.1996608
211 49 0.1953877
212 49 0.1980386
213 49 0.2001207
214 49 0.1952921
215 49 0.2028607
216 49 0.2058597
217 49 0.2109348
218 49 0.2037267
219 49 0.2009103
220 49 0.1958382
221 49 0.1963090
222 49 0.1922682
223 49 0.1957802
224 49 0.1955788
225 49 0.1965796
226 49 0.1892982
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Table B.3 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
227 49 0.1870862
228 18 0.1850452
229 18 0.1874118
230 18 0.1895888
231 18 0.1899791
232 18 0.1938205
233 18 0.1925661
234 18 0.1940584
235 18 0.1944974
236 18 0.1858882
237 18 0.1818452
238 18 0.1781285
239 49 0.1781282
240 48 0.1783495
241 48 0.1818247
242 48 0.1780757
243 18 0.1766021
244 48 0.1784520
245 18 0.1788530
246 48 0.1784892
247 48 0.1805757
248 48 0.1816234
249 48 0.1842358
250 48 0.1810228
251 48 0.1809208
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Table B.3 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
252 18 0.1806700
253 48 0.1805794
254 48 0.1801528
255 48 0.1777200
256 18 0.1767658
257 48 0.1782816
258 48 0.1818351
259 48 0.1804692
260 48 0.1816956
261 48 0.1752966
262 48 0.1790766
263 48 0.1759571
264 28 0.1761344
265 28 0.1762389
266 28 0.1736759
267 28 0.1721950
268 28 0.1743188
269 28 0.1718262
270 28 0.1743581
271 28 0.1747565
272 28 0.1796540
273 28 0.1762312
274 28 0.1748061
275 28 0.1721287
276 28 0.1701546
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Table B.3 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
277 28 0.1727514
278 28 0.1720477
279 28 0.1732448
280 28 0.1758428
281 28 0.1682401
282 28 0.1683186
283 28 0.1659199
284 28 0.1675814
285 28 0.1660710
286 18 0.1631370
287 18 0.1697149
288 18 0.1731569
289 18 0.1771124
290 18 0.1698254
291 18 0.1715394
292 18 0.1729372
293 18 0.1697916
294 39 0.1686159
295 39 0.1684477
296 39 0.1714649
297 39 0.1670796
298 39 0.1726334
299 39 0.1739006
300 39 0.1758110
301 39 0.1734214
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Table B.3 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
302 39 0.1763947
303 39 0.1729072
304 39 0.1687088
305 39 0.1659225
306 39 0.1656563
307 39 0.1677531
308 39 0.1619477
309 39 0.1637070
310 39 0.1656315
311 39 0.1663646
312 39 0.1665841
313 39 0.1695825
314 39 0.1644295
315 39 0.1657524
316 39 0.1643746
317 39 0.1640507
318 18 0.1619539
319 18 0.1668759
320 18 0.1654850
321 18 0.1665512
322 18 0.1691000
323 18 0.1677949
324 18 0.1627473
325 37 0.1660061
326 37 0.1669059
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Table B.3 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
327 18 0.1667373
328 18 0.1684358
329 18 0.1724843
330 18 0.1763466
331 18 0.1745491
332 18 0.1732219
333 18 0.1698799
334 18 0.1682814
335 18 0.1702150
336 18 0.1678593
337 18 0.1664225
338 18 0.1643217
339 18 0.1636082
340 18 0.1607493
341 18 0.1583373
342 18 0.1628203
343 18 0.1607597
344 18 0.1591150
345 18 0.1610664
346 18 0.1591004
347 18 0.1611168
348 18 0.1636455
349 18 0.1622055
350 18 0.1642243
351 18 0.1652817
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number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
352 18 0.1652387
353 18 0.1641312
354 18 0.1646098
355 18 0.1631209
356 18 0.1615546
357 18 0.1590540
358 18 0.1575298
359 18 0.1558147
360 18 0.1581650
361 18 0.1593369
362 18 0.1594416
363 18 0.1640000
364 18 0.1624099
365 18 0.1603306
366 18 0.1591406
367 18 0.1600065
368 18 0.1609791
369 18 0.1556436
370 18 0.1558724
371 18 0.1543505
372 18 0.1523219
373 18 0.1518324
374 18 0.1530937
375 18 0.1536322
376 18 0.1516273
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Table B.3 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
377 18 0.1535635
378 18 0.1556598
379 18 0.1574052
380 18 0.1552525
381 18 0.1503801
382 18 0.1522202
383 18 0.1555785
384 18 0.1544578
385 18 0.1564090
386 18 0.1576005
387 18 0.1547482
388 18 0.1556558
389 18 0.1540293
390 18 0.1521604
391 18 0.1531869
392 18 0.1532714
393 18 0.1531761
394 18 0.1517153
395 18 0.1492051
396 18 0.1483224
397 18 0.1505389
398 18 0.1506538
399 18 0.1519879
400 18 0.1538488
401 18 0.1562288
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number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
402 18 0.1587763
403 18 0.1555915
404 18 0.1538778
405 18 0.1524153
406 18 0.1498376
407 18 0.1505064
408 18 0.1501850
409 18 0.1510380
410 18 0.1495875
411 18 0.1478649
412 18 0.1464674
413 18 0.1478491
414 18 0.1483548
415 18 0.1489668
416 18 0.1471737
417 18 0.1458150
418 18 0.1468477
419 18 0.1461521
420 18 0.1466923
421 18 0.1486364
422 18 0.1435017
423 18 0.1406183
424 18 0.1410003
425 18 0.1394430
426 18 0.1380898
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Table B.3 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
427 18 0.1394885
428 18 0.1425241
429 18 0.1444001
430 18 0.1439961
431 18 0.1479813
432 18 0.1466357
433 18 0.1448503
434 18 0.1456851
435 18 0.1427061
436 18 0.1445740
437 18 0.1466048
438 18 0.1475823
439 18 0.1481150
440 18 0.1477143
441 18 0.1432429
442 18 0.1451692
443 18 0.1421864
444 18 0.1423977
445 18 0.1451276
446 18 0.1441335
447 18 0.1427758
448 18 0.1420583
449 18 0.1422582
450 37 0.1414181
451 37 0.1425920
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number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
452 18 0.1411395
453 39 0.1394379
454 39 0.1420514
455 39 0.1402389
456 39 0.1413976
457 39 0.1436064
458 39 0.1445891
459 39 0.1425817
460 39 0.1404693
461 39 0.1367813
462 39 0.1352374
463 18 0.1335108
464 18 0.1337180
465 18 0.1318395
466 18 0.1309887
467 18 0.1326791
468 18 0.1288184
469 18 0.1293254
470 49 0.1260147
471 49 0.1290260
472 18 0.1282197
473 18 0.1297751
474 18 0.1344412
475 18 0.1334255
476 18 0.1311705
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Table B.3 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
477 49 0.1304229
478 49 0.1285789
479 18 0.1280867
480 18 0.1296682
481 18 0.1304155
482 18 0.1307206
483 18 0.1317029
484 18 0.1329752
485 18 0.1326202
486 18 0.1342505
487 18 0.1357879
488 18 0.1357984
489 18 0.1366893
490 18 0.1370095
491 18 0.1341777
492 18 0.1363420
493 18 0.1369103
494 18 0.1375913
495 18 0.1354819
496 18 0.1363129
497 18 0.1338921
498 18 0.1341287
499 18 0.1348891
500 18 0.1292840
501 18 0.1295645
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number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
502 18 0.1312788
503 18 0.1314806
504 18 0.1293374
505 18 0.1283792
506 18 0.1271955
507 18 0.1255588
508 18 0.1239390
509 18 0.1239968
510 18 0.1243274
511 18 0.1254098
512 18 0.1261656
513 18 0.1257740
514 39 0.1256766
515 39 0.1243338
516 39 0.1229026
517 18 0.1236459
518 49 0.1250817
519 49 0.1260376
520 49 0.1238059
521 49 0.1232605
522 49 0.1218932
523 49 0.1234715
524 49 0.1239852
525 49 0.1248634
526 49 0.1235143
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number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
527 49 0.1213004
528 49 0.1221156
529 49 0.1207974
530 49 0.1209080
531 49 0.1211851
532 49 0.1234721
533 49 0.1221218
534 49 0.1233733
535 49 0.1237086
536 49 0.1218787
537 49 0.1215031
538 49 0.1240225
539 49 0.1199410
540 39 0.1195988
541 39 0.1194021
542 49 0.1197649
543 49 0.1191516
544 45 0.1194277
545 49 0.1203139
546 49 0.1173420
547 49 0.1187374
548 49 0.1193399
549 49 0.1209557
550 49 0.1218194
551 49 0.1224721
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number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
552 49 0.1204453
553 49 0.1190238
554 49 0.1192047
555 49 0.1177390
556 49 0.1166905
557 39 0.1177233
558 39 0.1170948
559 39 0.1187485
560 39 0.1186708
561 39 0.1204108
562 39 0.1180676
563 39 0.1178552
564 39 0.1169827
565 39 0.1171240
566 39 0.1184590
567 39 0.1180581
568 39 0.1167063
569 39 0.1198615
570 39 0.1207194
571 39 0.1223095
572 39 0.1231237
573 39 0.1197775
574 39 0.1178294
575 39 0.1179339
576 39 0.1173940
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number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
577 39 0.1169757
578 39 0.1197161
579 39 0.1201913
580 39 0.1180706
581 49 0.1162395
582 49 0.1157247
583 55 0.1154037
584 55 0.1163758
585 49 0.1149995
586 49 0.1128041
587 55 0.1140458
588 55 0.1136099
589 55 0.1137199
590 55 0.1141768
591 55 0.1133121
592 55 0.1131199
593 55 0.1094684
594 39 0.1083393
595 14 0.1074586
596 49 0.1076488
597 49 0.1061224
598 49 0.1076224
599 49 0.1077360
600 49 0.1084938
601 49 0.1095750
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number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
602 55 0.1064229
603 55 0.1067695
604 55 0.1067525
605 55 0.1084464
606 55 0.1097182
607 55 0.1097392
608 55 0.1050589
609 49 0.1067534
610 49 0.1060889
611 49 0.1083980
612 49 0.1083555
613 49 0.1069420
614 49 0.1059582
615 49 0.1063252
616 49 0.1052257
617 49 0.1062611
618 49 0.1064111
619 49 0.1071214
620 49 0.1057828
621 49 0.1066986
622 49 0.1082211
623 49 0.1075969
624 49 0.1045545
625 49 0.1032140
626 49 0.1018017
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number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
627 49 0.1010281
628 49 0.1020342
629 49 0.0996894
630 49 0.0995977
631 49 0.0990331
632 49 0.0982770
633 14 0.0978618
634 49 0.0968251
635 55 0.0981613
636 55 0.0985784
637 14 0.0988998
638 55 0.0991768
639 55 0.0988777
640 55 0.0989425
641 55 0.0996000
642 14 0.0992395
643 14 0.0999982
644 55 0.0990678
645 55 0.1002666
646 55 0.0993017
647 55 0.1000512
648 55 0.1002881
649 55 0.0996570
650 55 0.0997963
651 55 0.1030620
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number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
652 55 0.1031921
653 55 0.1029411
654 55 0.1015666
655 55 0.1017696
656 55 0.1039830
657 55 0.1045796
658 55 0.1042838
659 55 0.1051968
660 55 0.1048713
661 55 0.1066924
662 55 0.1063299
663 55 0.1057296
664 55 0.1066080
665 55 0.1058089
666 55 0.1070742
667 55 0.1068519
668 55 0.1064489
669 55 0.1080524
670 55 0.1069648
671 55 0.1065559
672 55 0.1071839
673 55 0.1046295
674 55 0.1044543
675 55 0.1040199
676 55 0.1009969
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number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
677 55 0.1021250
678 55 0.1027856
679 55 0.1022817
680 55 0.1029390
681 55 0.1022654
682 55 0.1020496
683 55 0.1023012
684 55 0.1009532
685 55 0.1018987
686 55 0.1005915
687 55 0.0992748
688 55 0.1016186
689 55 0.1013163
690 55 0.0996928
691 55 0.0995013
692 49 0.1007736
693 49 0.0996137
694 49 0.1002489
695 49 0.1004881
696 49 0.1020854
697 49 0.1026888
698 49 0.1019159
699 49 0.1033104
700 49 0.1041163
701 49 0.1031803
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number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
702 49 0.1037608
703 49 0.1041044
704 49 0.1030363
705 49 0.1013827
706 49 0.1006497
707 49 0.0981518
708 49 0.0955409
709 55 0.0933841
710 49 0.0921843
711 55 0.0916460
712 55 0.0908314
713 55 0.0909533
714 55 0.0906236
715 55 0.0905431
716 55 0.0903893
717 55 0.0909031
718 55 0.0918530
719 55 0.0915886
720 55 0.0928344
721 55 0.0929415
722 55 0.0923451
723 55 0.0961234
724 55 0.0950473
725 55 0.0946160
726 55 0.0949606
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number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
727 55 0.0962001
728 55 0.0955587
729 55 0.0961317
730 55 0.0968861
731 55 0.0978185
732 55 0.0943292
733 55 0.0948866
734 55 0.0953457
735 55 0.0946788
736 55 0.0933441
737 55 0.0926212
738 55 0.0930544
739 55 0.0918708
740 55 0.0926779
741 55 0.0919959
742 55 0.0927638
743 55 0.0920838
744 55 0.0905848
745 55 0.0915521
746 55 0.0919022
747 55 0.0911126
748 55 0.0907697
749 55 0.0909209
750 55 0.0903230
751 4 0.0890581
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Table B.3 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
752 4 0.0888933
753 49 0.0875617
754 4 0.0878989
755 4 0.0900351
756 4 0.0896846
757 4 0.0901866
758 4 0.0909353
759 4 0.0911943
760 4 0.0909901
761 4 0.0916005
762 4 0.0911186
763 4 0.0903651
764 4 0.0895175
765 4 0.0882749
766 55 0.0870990
767 55 0.0878423
768 55 0.0871923
769 55 0.0871487
770 55 0.0860260
771 13 0.0860864
772 13 0.0862226
773 13 0.0856429
774 13 0.0867188
775 13 0.0869435
776 13 0.0867114
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Table B.3 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
777 13 0.0867184
778 13 0.0878863
779 13 0.0888550
780 13 0.0895537
781 13 0.0905561
782 13 0.0900785
783 13 0.0899887
784 13 0.0899358
785 13 0.0890704
786 49 0.0895328
787 49 0.0910152
788 49 0.0891937
789 49 0.0897551
790 49 0.0907220
791 49 0.0910111
792 49 0.0921488
793 49 0.0930149
794 49 0.0903739
795 49 0.0899434
796 49 0.0888389
797 49 0.0860980
798 49 0.0874996
799 49 0.0882701
800 49 0.0870577
801 49 0.0871849
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Table B.3 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
802 49 0.0881486
803 49 0.0873684
804 49 0.0879287
805 49 0.0869492
806 49 0.0866824
807 49 0.0867352
808 49 0.0863614
809 49 0.0858475
810 49 0.0870789
811 49 0.0888005
812 49 0.0884198
813 49 0.0876120
814 49 0.0883852
815 49 0.0875165
816 49 0.0861759
817 55 0.0865913
818 49 0.0881848
819 49 0.0873942
820 55 0.0875900
821 55 0.0897614
822 55 0.0899131
823 55 0.0895936
824 55 0.0882686
825 49 0.0896300
826 49 0.0886353
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Table B.3 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
827 49 0.0882864
828 49 0.0883791
829 49 0.0869607
830 49 0.0877766
831 49 0.0882844
832 55 0.0880652
833 55 0.0894067
834 55 0.0871492
835 55 0.0875038
836 55 0.0884654
837 55 0.0880998
838 55 0.0874045
839 55 0.0884925
840 55 0.0888081
841 55 0.0888056
842 55 0.0887486
843 55 0.0889774
844 55 0.0892100
845 55 0.0906139
846 55 0.0930832
847 55 0.0940336
848 55 0.0946389
849 55 0.0954573
850 55 0.0953053
851 55 0.0943355
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Table B.3 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
852 55 0.0954708
853 55 0.0927160
854 55 0.0929324
855 55 0.0944501
856 55 0.0962862
857 55 0.0971369
858 55 0.0967049
859 55 0.0963681
860 55 0.0965303
861 55 0.0967337
862 55 0.0968336
863 55 0.0990499
864 55 0.0972141
865 55 0.0986663
866 55 0.0974706
867 55 0.0958905
868 55 0.0937199
869 55 0.0938506
870 55 0.0955982
871 55 0.0948846
872 55 0.0954380
873 55 0.0945044
874 55 0.0954321
875 55 0.0955732
876 55 0.0943632
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Table B.3 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
877 55 0.0940160
878 55 0.0944340
879 55 0.0926690
880 55 0.0928925
881 55 0.0919919
882 55 0.0940479
883 55 0.0938717
884 55 0.0929550
885 55 0.0938559
886 55 0.0937409
887 55 0.0949950
888 55 0.0923506
889 55 0.0932639
890 55 0.0938137
891 55 0.0939190
892 55 0.0947786
893 55 0.0954386
894 55 0.0949424
895 55 0.0945879
896 55 0.0948134
897 55 0.0954230
898 55 0.0959859
899 55 0.0953008
900 55 0.0951610
1000 55 0.0910483
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Table B.3 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
1100 55 0.0866581
1200 55 0.0744983
1300 18 0.0804488
1400 55 0.0724334
1500 55 0.0784814
1600 55 0.0756255
1700 55 0.0779620
1800 55 0.0804208
1900 55 0.0843767
2000 55 0.0824246
2100 55 0.0775019
2200 55 0.0787086
2300 55 0.0774521
2400 55 0.0787248
2500 55 0.0787341
2600 55 0.0786563
2700 55 0.0799934
2800 55 0.0816448
2900 55 0.0778432
3000 55 0.0766251
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Figure B.3: DPA result for all encryption rounds on FPGA Implementation
of dual rail alternating spacer DES Sbox for Hamming weight hypothesis and
partition function of 2
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Figure B.4: DPA result for all encryption rounds on FPGA Implementation of
dual rail path switching DES Sbox for Hamming weight hypothesis and partition
function of 3
Table B.4: Dierent number of traces and the subkey with highest correlation
value for dual rail path switching DES Sbox using Hamming weight hypothesis
and partition function of 3
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
100 2 0.1864230
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Table B.4 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
1000 13 0.0571700
2000 38 0.0395304
3000 30 0.0369098
4000 30 0.0322767
5000 39 0.0253517
6000 39 0.0228228
7000 39 0.0186005
8000 30 0.0167514
9000 30 0.0153658
10000 19 0.0140555
11000 11 0.0146432
12000 11 0.0145491
13000 11 0.0142485
14000 11 0.0139054
15000 11 0.0155173
16000 11 0.0143426
17000 11 0.0145552
18000 11 0.0127238
19000 11 0.0119311
20000 11 0.0121111
21000 11 0.0111994
22000 11 0.0113200
23000 11 0.0102036
24000 30 0.0104529
25000 30 0.0108667
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Table B.4 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
26000 21 0.0108181
27000 11 0.0107061
28000 11 0.0111509
29000 11 0.0106669
30000 35 0.0100548
31000 35 0.0095394
32000 35 0.0094404
33000 35 0.0086670
34000 35 0.0090721
35000 35 0.0095915
36000 35 0.0096214
37000 35 0.0094423
38000 35 0.0083414
39000 35 0.0086830
40000 35 0.0087643
41000 35 0.0085365
42000 35 0.0085661
43000 35 0.0082714
44000 35 0.0087147
45000 35 0.0084287
46000 35 0.0089015
47000 11 0.0082525
48000 11 0.0084689
49000 11 0.0085251
50000 35 0.0082216
Continued on next page...Appendix B DPA Results on our FPGA Setup 261
Table B.4 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
51000 35 0.0080078
52000 35 0.0076579
53000 11 0.0076615
54000 35 0.0075904
55000 35 0.0072969
56000 49 0.0072853
57000 11 0.0071251
58000 11 0.0073078
59000 11 0.0072875
60000 11 0.0074691
61000 11 0.0067014
62000 11 0.0063585
63000 35 0.0063174
64000 35 0.0059372
65000 4 0.0059724
66000 52 0.0057689
67000 19 0.0061662
68000 35 0.0057848
69000 30 0.0059224
70000 4 0.0056294
71000 4 0.0058068
72000 4 0.0058432
73000 4 0.0058744
74000 4 0.0059235
75000 4 0.0055344
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Table B.4 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
76000 4 0.0057432
77000 4 0.0055065
78000 27 0.0056586
79000 0 0.0057694
80000 9 0.0055703
81000 8 0.0056989
82000 8 0.0055870
83000 8 0.0057978
84000 8 0.0058555
85000 8 0.0058818
86000 8 0.0057786
87000 8 0.0054693
88000 9 0.0055625
89000 9 0.0055769
90000 9 0.0057077
91000 4 0.0054866
92000 9 0.0056443
93000 9 0.0057376
94000 9 0.0056233
95000 9 0.0056760
96000 30 0.0055087
97000 8 0.0054830
98000 30 0.0053676
99000 30 0.0052376
100000 8 0.0052288
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Table B.4 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
101000 30 0.0054092
102000 30 0.0053012
103000 30 0.0053579
104000 55 0.0053197
105000 30 0.0053938
106000 30 0.0054175
107000 30 0.0052218
108000 55 0.0051043
109000 55 0.0050359
110000 55 0.0049911
111000 8 0.0050790
112000 55 0.0050549
113000 8 0.0051048
114000 8 0.0051858
115000 8 0.0053583
116000 8 0.0055252
117000 8 0.0053803
118000 8 0.0051494
119000 8 0.0050019
120000 8 0.0049568
121000 8 0.0049257
122000 8 0.0047920
123000 55 0.0047446
124000 8 0.0046972
125000 8 0.0048873
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Table B.4 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
126000 8 0.0050926
127000 8 0.0051280
128000 8 0.0050630
129000 8 0.0050891
130000 8 0.0049499
131000 27 0.0050037
132000 27 0.0047330
133000 27 0.0048803
134000 27 0.0049152
135000 27 0.0047058
136000 27 0.0046844
137000 27 0.0045961
138000 27 0.0046757
139000 9 0.0045648
140000 9 0.0046518
141000 9 0.0046424
142000 9 0.0044978
143000 9 0.0045772
144000 9 0.0045676
145000 9 0.0045794
146000 9 0.0043532
147000 9 0.0043971
148000 9 0.0044097
149000 9 0.0043729
150000 9 0.0043418
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Table B.4 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
151000 9 0.0043250
152000 9 0.0042529
153000 55 0.0040829
154000 9 0.0040796
155000 55 0.0040543
156000 55 0.0041429
157000 55 0.0042096
158000 55 0.0041349
159000 55 0.0041784
160000 55 0.0041035
161000 55 0.0040417
162000 55 0.0040020
163000 55 0.0039734
164000 55 0.0040880
165000 55 0.0042057
166000 55 0.0043470
167000 55 0.0042089
168000 55 0.0041050
169000 55 0.0042293
170000 55 0.0042147
171000 55 0.0040342
172000 55 0.0038762
173000 55 0.0040316
174000 55 0.0039696
175000 55 0.0037897
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Table B.4 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
176000 55 0.0036552
177000 29 0.0037744
178000 29 0.0037713
179000 29 0.0038361
180000 29 0.0039491
181000 29 0.0040198
182000 29 0.0039052
183000 29 0.0038448
184000 29 0.0037289
185000 29 0.0037061
186000 29 0.0037826
187000 29 0.0039236
188000 29 0.0038037
189000 29 0.0038420
190000 29 0.0039137
191000 55 0.0039176
192000 55 0.0039366
193000 55 0.0040412
194000 55 0.0040350
195000 55 0.0038481
196000 55 0.0037853
197000 55 0.0038053
198000 55 0.0037659
199000 55 0.0039166
200000 55 0.0039746
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Table B.4 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
201000 55 0.0040610
202000 55 0.0039310
203000 55 0.0040197
204000 55 0.0041089
205000 55 0.0041645
206000 55 0.0043203
207000 55 0.0043185
208000 55 0.0043026
209000 55 0.0042295
210000 55 0.0041645
211000 55 0.0041330
212000 55 0.0042378
213000 55 0.0042294
214000 55 0.0042991
215000 55 0.0042335
216000 55 0.0043252
217000 55 0.0044414
218000 55 0.0045097
219000 55 0.0044128
220000 55 0.0043861
221000 55 0.0044492
222000 55 0.0043496
223000 55 0.0041958
224000 55 0.0041501
225000 55 0.0040774
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Table B.4 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
226000 55 0.0039557
227000 55 0.0039465
228000 55 0.0039548
229000 55 0.0039128
230000 55 0.0038581
231000 55 0.0038739
232000 55 0.0037486
233000 55 0.0037329
234000 55 0.0038066
235000 55 0.0037969
236000 55 0.0038390
237000 55 0.0039049
238000 55 0.0038894
239000 55 0.0037870
240000 55 0.0038600
241000 55 0.0037560
242000 55 0.0038716
243000 55 0.0038441
244000 55 0.0037063
245000 55 0.0036830
246000 55 0.0037319
247000 55 0.0037048
248000 55 0.0036445
249000 55 0.0036656
250000 40 0.0038047
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Table B.4 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
251000 40 0.0037881
252000 40 0.0038942
253000 40 0.0038852
254000 40 0.0039223
255000 40 0.0038078
256000 40 0.0038195
257000 40 0.0037277
258000 40 0.0037581
259000 40 0.0037664
260000 40 0.0037538
261000 40 0.0036617
262000 40 0.0037087
263000 40 0.0037063
264000 40 0.0036396
265000 40 0.0035687
266000 40 0.0036479
267000 40 0.0035209
268000 40 0.0035795
269000 40 0.0036515
270000 40 0.0035722
271000 40 0.0036029
272000 40 0.0036422
273000 40 0.0035021
274000 40 0.0034101
275000 40 0.0033921
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Table B.4 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
276000 40 0.0034313
277000 40 0.0033595
278000 40 0.0033533
279000 40 0.0033677
280000 40 0.0033121
281000 40 0.0032578
282000 40 0.0031910
283000 40 0.0032872
284000 40 0.0031690
285000 40 0.0032337
286000 40 0.0032292
287000 40 0.0033336
288000 40 0.0034192
289000 40 0.0033518
290000 40 0.0033895
291000 40 0.0034493
292000 40 0.0034332
293000 40 0.0034439
294000 40 0.0034178
295000 40 0.0033915
296000 40 0.0034610
297000 40 0.0034470
298000 40 0.0034446
299000 40 0.0034420
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B.1.5 Dual Rail Path Switching and Alternating Spacer
DES SBox with Hamming Weight Hypothesis and
Partition Function of 1
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Figure B.5: DPA result for all encryption rounds on FPGA Implementation of
dual rail path switching and alternating spacer DES Sbox for Hamming weight
hypothesis and partition function of 1
Table B.5: Dierent number of traces and the subkey with highest correlation
value for dual rail path switching and alternating spacer using Hamming weight
hypothesis and partition function of 1
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
100 6 5.3739707
3000 4 0.2100494
6000 4 0.1350354
9000 56 0.1093362
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Table B.5 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
12000 63 0.0844690
15000 36 0.0624367
18000 36 0.0613229
21000 11 0.0552916
24000 19 0.0518406
27000 19 0.0522575
30000 8 0.0495707
33000 27 0.0530693
36000 27 0.0462193
39000 27 0.0409506
42000 8 0.0421104
45000 8 0.0426450
48000 8 0.0414585
51000 27 0.0373147
54000 27 0.0345453
57000 31 0.0321307
60000 31 0.0314572
63000 27 0.0265172
66000 46 0.0277116
69000 46 0.0279779
72000 46 0.0249346
75000 31 0.0261547
78000 58 0.0254682
81000 58 0.0246726
84000 26 0.0252818
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Table B.5 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
87000 27 0.0262779
90000 26 0.0259857
93000 26 0.0254840
96000 26 0.0243916
99000 26 0.0246518
102000 26 0.0250454
105000 26 0.0244660
108000 26 0.0228652
111000 31 0.0229301
114000 31 0.0221332
117000 29 0.0208623
120000 8 0.0196844
123000 8 0.0199263
126000 8 0.0210342
129000 8 0.0207446
132000 8 0.0221198
135000 8 0.0209493
138000 8 0.0206186
141000 8 0.0198728
144000 26 0.0195697
147000 26 0.0197015
150000 26 0.0195837
153000 26 0.0194169
156000 26 0.0186968
159000 27 0.0195825
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Table B.5 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
162000 27 0.0208858
165000 27 0.0201589
168000 27 0.0183216
171000 27 0.0165416
174000 27 0.0169392
177000 27 0.0176339
180000 27 0.0164896
183000 26 0.0164601
186000 19 0.0165769
189000 27 0.0168050
192000 26 0.0166662
195000 26 0.0167873
198000 26 0.0167928
201000 26 0.0161910
204000 46 0.0158292
207000 46 0.0172919
210000 46 0.0177745
213000 46 0.0174733
216000 46 0.0174399
219000 46 0.0167660
222000 26 0.0165160
225000 26 0.0162490
228000 26 0.0161804
231000 26 0.0161690
234000 26 0.0158373
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Table B.5 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
237000 26 0.0157588
240000 26 0.0152679
243000 26 0.0154761
246000 32 0.0153332
249000 32 0.0152866
252000 26 0.0150850
255000 26 0.0150248
258000 32 0.0151464
261000 32 0.0152050
264000 32 0.0152117
267000 32 0.0154610
270000 32 0.0159063
273000 32 0.0156025
276000 32 0.0148691
279000 32 0.0140731
282000 32 0.0136029
285000 32 0.0143472
288000 32 0.0138630
291000 32 0.0136291
294000 32 0.0137277
297000 32 0.0134650
300000 32 0.0134665
303000 32 0.0139631
306000 32 0.0129805
309000 32 0.0132760
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Table B.5 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
312000 32 0.0128513
315000 32 0.0135526
318000 32 0.0126694
321000 32 0.0122913
324000 32 0.0118667
327000 32 0.0126394
330000 32 0.0128460
333000 32 0.0130144
336000 32 0.0131921
339000 32 0.0125825
342000 32 0.0120754
345000 32 0.0121127
348000 32 0.0117571
351000 32 0.0113184
354000 32 0.0110913
357000 46 0.0109471
360000 32 0.0114608
363000 32 0.0112190
366000 46 0.0115805
369000 46 0.0113435
372000 46 0.0112666
375000 32 0.0108436
378000 32 0.0113357
381000 43 0.0108254
384000 46 0.0103036
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Table B.5 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
387000 32 0.0104243
390000 32 0.0108768
393000 32 0.0114462
396000 32 0.0118735
399000 32 0.0119687
402000 32 0.0115217
405000 32 0.0116417
408000 32 0.0116889
411000 32 0.0119021
414000 32 0.0120916
417000 32 0.0121092
420000 32 0.0117748
423000 32 0.0114698
426000 32 0.0105435
429000 32 0.0109783
432000 32 0.0103924
435000 32 0.0103363
438000 32 0.0109192
441000 32 0.0104560
444000 32 0.0106811
447000 32 0.0104026
450000 32 0.0104922
453000 32 0.0102907
456000 32 0.0102824
459000 32 0.0103129
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Table B.5 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
462000 32 0.0096562
465000 32 0.0095937
468000 36 0.0097050
471000 32 0.0096270
474000 32 0.0094090
477000 32 0.0093824
480000 32 0.0098964
483000 32 0.0096303
486000 26 0.0094629
489000 26 0.0095103
492000 26 0.0094072
495000 26 0.0094045
498000 43 0.0093136
501000 34 0.0094973
504000 34 0.0096856
507000 34 0.0096067
510000 34 0.0094838
513000 29 0.0092175
516000 43 0.0090579
519000 30 0.0091453
522000 30 0.0094254
525000 30 0.0093472
528000 34 0.0089803
531000 30 0.0089736
534000 34 0.0093532
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Table B.5 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
537000 30 0.0093654
540000 46 0.0093746
543000 46 0.0097470
546000 46 0.0097896
549000 46 0.0100516
552000 46 0.0097007
555000 46 0.0097260
558000 46 0.0095389
561000 46 0.0098776
564000 46 0.0103790
567000 46 0.0105724
570000 46 0.0104257
573000 46 0.0105334
576000 46 0.0101494
579000 46 0.0095663
582000 46 0.0094398
585000 46 0.0091849
588000 30 0.0088067
591000 42 0.0088557
594000 42 0.0089596
597000 42 0.0089601
600000 46 0.0089620
603000 46 0.0090544
606000 42 0.0090809
609000 42 0.0096147
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Table B.5 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
612000 42 0.0094984
615000 42 0.0098073
618000 42 0.0099008
621000 42 0.0101128
624000 42 0.0101779
627000 42 0.0100255
630000 42 0.0103537
633000 42 0.0102597
636000 42 0.0102035
639000 42 0.0101802
642000 42 0.0101697
645000 42 0.0099863
648000 42 0.0100775
651000 42 0.0100642
654000 42 0.0097487
657000 42 0.0098822
660000 24 0.0096640
663000 24 0.0098802
666000 24 0.0098189
669000 24 0.0097702
672000 24 0.0099454
675000 24 0.0097271
678000 24 0.0097118
681000 24 0.0095264
684000 24 0.0098145
Continued on next page...Appendix B DPA Results on our FPGA Setup 281
Table B.5 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
687000 24 0.0099466
690000 24 0.0097517
693000 24 0.0095786
696000 24 0.0092863
699000 24 0.0092896
702000 24 0.0091363
705000 24 0.0091020
708000 24 0.0091345
711000 24 0.0087885
714000 30 0.0086176
717000 24 0.0088787
720000 30 0.0085914
723000 24 0.0085690
726000 24 0.0087205
729000 46 0.0085209
732000 46 0.0085135
735000 46 0.0084449
738000 46 0.0084377
741000 46 0.0084766
744000 46 0.0083779
747000 24 0.0083246
750000 24 0.0082457
753000 24 0.0083991
756000 24 0.0087487
759000 24 0.0089386
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Table B.5 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
762000 24 0.0090976
765000 24 0.0090966
768000 24 0.0089219
771000 24 0.0089208
774000 24 0.0090094
777000 24 0.0089521
780000 24 0.0090104
783000 24 0.0091998
786000 24 0.0092621
789000 24 0.0093209
792000 24 0.0093855
795000 24 0.0094170
798000 24 0.0093175
801000 24 0.0089980
804000 24 0.0089144
807000 24 0.0087205
810000 24 0.0086377
813000 24 0.0086460
816000 24 0.0089100
819000 24 0.0088302
822000 24 0.0087974
825000 24 0.0087704
828000 24 0.0088905
831000 24 0.0090200
834000 24 0.0090356
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number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
837000 24 0.0090039
840000 24 0.0087975
843000 24 0.0089089
846000 42 0.0089031
849000 42 0.0086979
852000 42 0.0085105
855000 42 0.0086222
858000 42 0.0084939
861000 24 0.0084462
864000 42 0.0084298
867000 42 0.0082688
870000 42 0.0085504
873000 42 0.0086918
876000 42 0.0088277
879000 42 0.0084793
882000 42 0.0085471
885000 42 0.0086087
888000 42 0.0085781
891000 42 0.0083225
894000 42 0.0086783
897000 42 0.0086582
900000 42 0.0086524
903000 42 0.0085046
906000 42 0.0085974
909000 42 0.0085506
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912000 42 0.0084726
915000 42 0.0085897
918000 42 0.0084701
921000 42 0.0083585
924000 42 0.0079758
927000 42 0.0081404
930000 42 0.0079439
933000 42 0.0080602
936000 42 0.0079516
939000 42 0.0081909
942000 42 0.0082215
945000 42 0.0082754
948000 42 0.0083094
951000 42 0.0080805
954000 42 0.0080784
957000 42 0.0078767
960000 42 0.0079119
963000 42 0.0078990
966000 42 0.0078798
969000 42 0.0079191
972000 42 0.0078203
975000 42 0.0077489
978000 42 0.0078601
981000 42 0.0080549
984000 42 0.0079371
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987000 42 0.0079539
990000 42 0.0079580
993000 42 0.0079425
996000 42 0.0078473
999000 42 0.0078922
1002000 42 0.0077435
1005000 42 0.0077763
1008000 42 0.0079061
1011000 42 0.0077792
1014000 42 0.0077761
1017000 42 0.0077692
1020000 42 0.0076013
1023000 42 0.0077813
1026000 42 0.0078925
1029000 42 0.0078967
1032000 42 0.0079520
1035000 42 0.0078437
1038000 42 0.0077193
1041000 42 0.0076571
1044000 42 0.0076677
1047000 42 0.0077746
1050000 42 0.0079288
1053000 42 0.0078583
1056000 42 0.0080997
1059000 42 0.0080249
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1062000 42 0.0082066
1065000 42 0.0082083
1068000 42 0.0081917
1071000 42 0.0082355
1074000 42 0.0080954
1077000 42 0.0079169
1080000 42 0.0077165
1083000 42 0.0076093
1086000 42 0.0076472
1089000 42 0.0074675
1092000 42 0.0073341
1095000 42 0.0073591
1098000 30 0.0074981
1101000 42 0.0073324
1104000 42 0.0073928
1107000 42 0.0075132
1110000 42 0.0074058
1113000 42 0.0075387
1116000 42 0.0075772
1119000 42 0.0073070
1122000 42 0.0071948
1125000 55 0.0071384
1128000 55 0.0072318
1131000 55 0.0072480
1134000 55 0.0071333
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number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
1137000 55 0.0071245
1140000 30 0.0073030
1143000 30 0.0073777
1146000 30 0.0073828
1149000 42 0.0074158
1152000 42 0.0074470
1155000 42 0.0073998
1158000 42 0.0072859
1161000 42 0.0072334
1164000 42 0.0073224
1167000 30 0.0071799
1170000 30 0.0072428
1173000 30 0.0072828
1176000 30 0.0073105
1179000 30 0.0072648
1182000 30 0.0072367
1185000 42 0.0070653
1188000 42 0.0069950
1191000 42 0.0069715
1194000 42 0.0070185
1197000 42 0.0069411
1200000 42 0.0069179
1203000 42 0.0069512
1206000 25 0.0070618
1209000 25 0.0070588
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1212000 25 0.0069158
1215000 25 0.0069763
1218000 25 0.0070091
1221000 25 0.0069915
1224000 25 0.0068595
1227000 25 0.0067928
1230000 25 0.0068715
1233000 25 0.0068995
1236000 25 0.0069465
1239000 55 0.0067475
1242000 25 0.0070003
1245000 25 0.0070302
1248000 25 0.0069183
1251000 25 0.0070566
1254000 25 0.0071042
1257000 25 0.0070704
1260000 25 0.0071172
1263000 25 0.0071345
1266000 25 0.0070995
1269000 25 0.0070036
1272000 25 0.0070387
1275000 25 0.0071129
1278000 25 0.0070959
1281000 25 0.0070463
1284000 25 0.0069021
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number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
1287000 25 0.0069887
1290000 25 0.0071178
1293000 25 0.0070253
1296000 25 0.0069401
1299000 25 0.0071972
1302000 25 0.0074150
1305000 25 0.0072691
1308000 25 0.0072573
1311000 25 0.0072861
1314000 25 0.0072987
1317000 25 0.0072689
1320000 25 0.0071290
1323000 25 0.0070973
1326000 25 0.0070790
1329000 25 0.0069734
1332000 55 0.0068854
1335000 55 0.0068001
1338000 55 0.0068746
1341000 55 0.0069675
1344000 55 0.0069952
1347000 55 0.0069820
1350000 55 0.0069931
1353000 55 0.0070146
1356000 55 0.0068316
1359000 55 0.0067698
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number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
1362000 55 0.0067524
1365000 55 0.0067995
1368000 55 0.0067683
1371000 55 0.0067521
1374000 55 0.0067472
1377000 55 0.0067550
1380000 55 0.0068868
1383000 55 0.0068435
1386000 55 0.0067894
1389000 55 0.0067658
1392000 55 0.0067847
2997000 55 0.0063799
3000000 55 0.0064045
B.2 AES Sbox
DPA results from various AES Sbox implementation are presented here.
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Figure B.6: DPA result for all encryption rounds on FPGA Implementation
of AES Sbox without any countermeasure for Hamming weight hypothesis and
partition function of 5
Table B.6: Dierent number of traces and the subkey with highest correlation
value for unprotected AES Sbox using Hamming weight hypothesis and partition
function of 5
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
1 255 1.2630413
2 253 1.7985434
3 253 1.6788640
4 253 1.7901968
5 253 1.8804406
6 253 1.9701186
7 246 2.0406005
8 246 2.0738040
9 246 2.1159032
10 246 2.1550969
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number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
11 242 2.1664025
12 242 2.1886611
13 242 2.1979131
14 242 2.2248992
15 198 2.2437524
16 15 1.4320802
17 15 1.5637997
18 66 1.5130662
19 55 1.5154489
20 55 1.4499997
21 56 1.5000871
22 102 1.3386762
23 243 1.4167817
24 243 1.3734384
25 243 1.3717232
26 102 1.3575847
27 102 1.3919015
28 102 1.3543731
29 243 1.3679693
30 102 1.3441177
31 55 1.3709769
32 55 1.3948820
33 55 1.3748670
34 55 1.4119024
35 55 1.4243068
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number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
36 55 1.4637633
37 55 1.4125204
38 55 1.4799811
39 55 1.4093935
40 55 1.3567415
41 55 1.3885749
42 55 1.3768263
43 55 1.4226672
44 55 1.4054749
45 55 1.3848384
46 55 1.2263570
47 55 1.3010535
48 55 1.2802982
49 55 1.2591252
50 55 1.3112822
51 55 1.2773553
52 55 1.3350066
53 55 1.3761053
54 55 1.3841436
55 55 1.3467669
56 55 1.4138026
57 55 1.5514006
58 55 1.4509537
59 55 1.4892469
60 55 1.4121466
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number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
61 55 1.4381564
62 55 1.4353020
63 55 1.3863895
64 55 1.3731556
65 55 1.4164625
66 55 1.3257131
67 55 1.2583099
68 55 1.2862437
69 55 1.3769566
70 55 1.4342134
71 55 1.4501447
72 55 1.4638102
73 55 1.4972211
74 55 1.4657037
75 55 1.4742830
76 55 1.5279856
77 55 1.5134902
78 55 1.4959699
79 55 1.4941519
80 55 1.4861487
81 55 1.5053766
82 55 1.5781465
83 55 1.5112580
84 55 1.4375484
85 55 1.5058158
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number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
86 55 1.6055982
87 55 1.6448240
88 55 1.6036326
89 55 1.6272550
90 55 1.6380619
91 55 1.6289738
92 55 1.6527666
93 55 1.6944706
94 55 1.6730881
95 55 1.6499684
96 55 1.6478046
97 55 1.7019706
98 55 1.6898489
99 55 1.7150950
100 55 1.6888085
101 55 1.7187922
102 55 1.6850029
103 55 1.6748693
104 55 1.7042422
105 55 1.7038727
106 55 1.6965097
107 55 1.7017183
108 55 1.7024576
109 55 1.7043235
110 55 1.6940711
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number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
111 55 1.6693175
112 55 1.6806518
113 55 1.6767794
114 55 1.6585076
115 55 1.6322155
116 55 1.6573778
117 55 1.6475488
118 55 1.6549817
119 55 1.6544064
120 55 1.6418997
121 55 1.6657254
122 55 1.6986194
123 55 1.6537970
124 55 1.6635044
125 55 1.6642765
126 55 1.6663192
127 55 1.6973641
128 55 1.6871108
129 55 1.6720154
130 55 1.6798688
131 55 1.6384639
132 55 1.6214708
133 55 1.6620521
134 55 1.6424062
135 55 1.6641516
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number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
136 55 1.7023159
137 55 1.6990461
138 55 1.6997472
139 55 1.7369018
140 55 1.7420421
141 55 1.7510590
142 55 1.7777076
143 55 1.8181909
144 55 1.8348008
145 55 1.8423445
146 55 1.8388566
147 55 1.8354966
148 55 1.8296975
149 55 1.8368166
150 55 1.7943260
4900 55 1.4009086
5000 55 1.3908096
B.2.2 Dual Rail AES SBox with Hamming Distance Hy-
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Figure B.7: DPA result for all encryption rounds on FPGA Implementation
of dual rail AES Sbox for Hamming distance hypothesis and partition function
of 2
Table B.7: Dierent number of traces and the subkey with highest correlation
value for dual rail AES Sbox using Hamming distance hypothesis and partition
function of 2
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
100 214 0.4573025
200 55 0.4463399
300 55 0.4088132
400 55 0.4068426
500 55 0.4149826
600 55 0.4072080
700 55 0.3899829
800 55 0.3554054
900 55 0.3762647
1000 55 0.3639463
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Table B.7 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
2000 55 0.3390435
3000 55 0.3125784
4000 55 0.3199967
5000 55 0.3219624
6000 55 0.3274026
7000 55 0.3278641
8000 55 0.3255407
9000 55 0.3204393
10000 55 0.3179254
B.2.3 Dual Rail Path Switching and Alternating Spacer
AES SBox with Hamming Weight Hypothesis and
Partition Function of 6
Table B.8: Dierent number of traces and the subkey with highest correla-
tion value for dual rail path switching and alternating spacer AES Sbox using
Hamming weight hypothesis and partition function of 6
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
100 184 3.7244470
200 120 1.6268552
300 7 0.9280507
400 7 0.8022216
500 7 0.6770780
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Table B.8 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
600 115 0.5919207
700 231 0.5377365
800 192 0.5271584
900 231 0.5150363
1000 231 0.4396287
2000 14 0.2930141
3000 136 0.1995848
4000 242 0.1760428
5000 231 0.1435665
6000 242 0.1431486
7000 242 0.1285860
8000 190 0.1305335
9000 229 0.1246925
10000 229 0.1156641
11000 47 0.1020992
12000 205 0.1077231
13000 4 0.1019187
14000 205 0.1042027
15000 122 0.1004655
16000 122 0.1091084
17000 223 0.1010120
18000 201 0.0977701
19000 201 0.0959144
20000 201 0.0820969
21000 201 0.0802810
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number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
22000 201 0.0757032
23000 122 0.0740441
24000 7 0.0741756
25000 201 0.0700609
26000 201 0.0692413
27000 201 0.0684092
28000 201 0.0661208
29000 7 0.0633062
30000 201 0.0607386
31000 201 0.0624711
32000 201 0.0661944
33000 201 0.0641500
34000 201 0.0598044
35000 201 0.0605517
36000 201 0.0538536
37000 122 0.0507238
38000 7 0.0510412
39000 7 0.0511577
40000 7 0.0493656
41000 225 0.0500583
42000 68 0.0519712
43000 68 0.0517961
44000 68 0.0526788
45000 68 0.0527977
46000 68 0.0489943
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number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
47000 68 0.0468788
48000 251 0.0494824
49000 251 0.0495595
50000 7 0.0470209
51000 7 0.0477863
52000 7 0.0468247
53000 7 0.0431205
54000 7 0.0461674
55000 7 0.0472631
56000 7 0.0465017
57000 137 0.0460838
58000 7 0.0454875
59000 7 0.0458326
60000 7 0.0450992
61000 7 0.0431937
62000 137 0.0427780
63000 137 0.0446129
64000 137 0.0437369
65000 137 0.0426653
66000 137 0.0415927
67000 137 0.0430407
68000 137 0.0404119
69000 249 0.0395140
70000 249 0.0406183
71000 249 0.0385215
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number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
72000 232 0.0392126
73000 249 0.0385371
74000 232 0.0381966
75000 232 0.0397256
76000 232 0.0405868
77000 232 0.0390645
78000 243 0.0390102
79000 243 0.0386934
80000 243 0.0399839
81000 243 0.0403155
82000 249 0.0410672
83000 249 0.0425562
84000 249 0.0439586
85000 249 0.0428372
86000 249 0.0424620
87000 249 0.0426041
88000 249 0.0413076
89000 249 0.0419462
90000 249 0.0399539
91000 249 0.0375386
92000 24 0.0382264
93000 24 0.0383415
94000 24 0.0374184
95000 243 0.0374418
96000 243 0.0376459
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97000 243 0.0370115
98000 125 0.0374536
99000 125 0.0364398
100000 125 0.0371804
101000 125 0.0373255
102000 125 0.0368776
103000 125 0.0364705
104000 125 0.0355352
105000 24 0.0354862
106000 24 0.0353939
107000 125 0.0355266
108000 125 0.0367945
109000 24 0.0359103
110000 125 0.0369796
111000 24 0.0363374
112000 24 0.0369675
113000 24 0.0372868
114000 24 0.0364387
115000 24 0.0350208
116000 24 0.0350044
117000 24 0.0353315
118000 24 0.0346486
119000 24 0.0336473
120000 24 0.0331480
121000 243 0.0346872
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number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
122000 243 0.0338257
123000 243 0.0343575
124000 125 0.0334394
125000 243 0.0331163
126000 243 0.0334237
127000 243 0.0328164
128000 243 0.0322323
129000 243 0.0315885
130000 7 0.0312468
131000 7 0.0305260
132000 243 0.0306095
133000 7 0.0306353
134000 125 0.0313761
135000 125 0.0311161
136000 125 0.0323157
137000 125 0.0320256
138000 7 0.0317896
139000 7 0.0315214
140000 7 0.0311156
141000 7 0.0305633
142000 7 0.0309297
143000 7 0.0319914
144000 7 0.0323856
145000 7 0.0330045
146000 7 0.0332507
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147000 7 0.0328859
148000 7 0.0324081
149000 7 0.0321522
150000 125 0.0320092
151000 125 0.0333342
152000 125 0.0334710
153000 125 0.0326095
154000 125 0.0329126
155000 125 0.0328310
156000 125 0.0322136
157000 125 0.0311235
158000 125 0.0311713
159000 125 0.0298715
160000 7 0.0304348
161000 125 0.0312657
162000 125 0.0316613
163000 125 0.0307573
164000 125 0.0303555
165000 125 0.0307447
166000 125 0.0302331
167000 125 0.0292737
168000 125 0.0283970
169000 7 0.0287190
170000 125 0.0281221
171000 125 0.0277521
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number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
172000 125 0.0275677
173000 125 0.0276677
174000 125 0.0291437
175000 125 0.0292298
176000 125 0.0295571
177000 125 0.0297752
178000 125 0.0291237
179000 125 0.0287089
180000 125 0.0288552
181000 125 0.0281346
182000 125 0.0278074
183000 125 0.0274920
184000 125 0.0272845
185000 125 0.0276268
186000 125 0.0278489
187000 125 0.0283912
188000 125 0.0286614
189000 125 0.0283097
190000 125 0.0280221
191000 125 0.0271545
192000 125 0.0270877
193000 125 0.0269277
194000 125 0.0263055
195000 125 0.0258951
196000 125 0.0263374
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number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
197000 125 0.0254375
198000 125 0.0257136
199000 125 0.0260499
200000 125 0.0266048
201000 125 0.0260801
202000 125 0.0262457
203000 125 0.0263546
204000 125 0.0258974
205000 125 0.0251279
206000 24 0.0245835
207000 24 0.0247764
208000 125 0.0247668
209000 125 0.0252387
210000 125 0.0254998
211000 125 0.0252915
212000 125 0.0246360
213000 125 0.0244368
214000 24 0.0242236
215000 24 0.0237116
216000 24 0.0237973
217000 24 0.0237411
218000 24 0.0243256
219000 24 0.0240737
220000 24 0.0239775
221000 24 0.0239636
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number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
222000 24 0.0247847
223000 24 0.0251253
224000 24 0.0249496
225000 24 0.0241849
226000 24 0.0237708
227000 24 0.0241817
228000 24 0.0248917
229000 24 0.0255664
230000 24 0.0250131
231000 24 0.0254449
232000 24 0.0256372
233000 24 0.0250285
234000 24 0.0250901
235000 24 0.0251891
236000 24 0.0254255
237000 24 0.0251076
238000 24 0.0256274
239000 24 0.0256094
240000 24 0.0250828
241000 24 0.0246391
242000 24 0.0244572
243000 24 0.0231556
244000 24 0.0228956
245000 24 0.0221309
246000 24 0.0218709
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247000 125 0.0216468
248000 198 0.0218616
249000 24 0.0215871
250000 125 0.0216885
251000 24 0.0223530
252000 24 0.0225171
253000 24 0.0228232
254000 24 0.0223507
255000 24 0.0221046
256000 24 0.0222071
257000 24 0.0219795
258000 24 0.0220725
259000 24 0.0222751
260000 24 0.0224321
261000 24 0.0231369
262000 24 0.0229846
263000 24 0.0230508
264000 24 0.0217960
265000 24 0.0214536
266000 24 0.0213509
267000 24 0.0213913
268000 113 0.0213593
269000 113 0.0218494
270000 24 0.0215720
271000 24 0.0212413
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number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
272000 24 0.0214930
273000 24 0.0217560
274000 113 0.0216302
275000 113 0.0213705
276000 24 0.0209745
277000 24 0.0209677
278000 24 0.0208001
279000 24 0.0204962
280000 24 0.0200265
281000 24 0.0203590
282000 24 0.0208510
283000 24 0.0208611
284000 24 0.0210604
285000 24 0.0206407
286000 24 0.0198153
287000 24 0.0197201
288000 24 0.0197090
289000 24 0.0199253
290000 24 0.0199620
291000 24 0.0197397
292000 229 0.0196939
293000 24 0.0196472
294000 229 0.0194854
295000 229 0.0196892
296000 229 0.0200776
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297000 229 0.0199288
298000 229 0.0198157
299000 24 0.0199736
300000 24 0.0202403
301000 24 0.0199633
302000 229 0.0196468
303000 229 0.0198210
304000 229 0.0197098
305000 229 0.0198487
306000 229 0.0200089
307000 229 0.0199732
308000 229 0.0204115
309000 229 0.0208150
310000 229 0.0206295
311000 229 0.0202104
312000 229 0.0206910
313000 229 0.0205220
314000 229 0.0208565
315000 229 0.0208949
316000 229 0.0211505
317000 229 0.0210075
318000 229 0.0208002
319000 229 0.0206268
320000 229 0.0209402
321000 229 0.0205891
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322000 55 0.0207690
323000 55 0.0208771
324000 55 0.0206159
325000 55 0.0208833
326000 55 0.0207281
327000 55 0.0207306
328000 229 0.0206982
329000 229 0.0212321
330000 229 0.0214438
331000 229 0.0218306
332000 55 0.0218117
333000 55 0.0217869
334000 55 0.0216798
335000 55 0.0217749
336000 55 0.0218825
337000 55 0.0223706
338000 55 0.0220895
339000 55 0.0222558
340000 55 0.0220959
341000 55 0.0222145
342000 55 0.0221357
343000 55 0.0220782
344000 55 0.0220295
345000 55 0.0217248
346000 55 0.0215112
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347000 55 0.0214448
348000 55 0.0216312
349000 55 0.0216876
350000 55 0.0218882
351000 55 0.0223945
352000 55 0.0221346
353000 55 0.0220795
354000 55 0.0220083
355000 55 0.0221257
356000 55 0.0222797
357000 55 0.0220011
358000 55 0.0218257
359000 55 0.0220595
360000 55 0.0218837
361000 55 0.0221139
362000 55 0.0221623
363000 55 0.0221749
364000 55 0.0224645
365000 55 0.0223872
366000 55 0.0222405
367000 55 0.0221726
368000 55 0.0221020
369000 55 0.0223520
370000 55 0.0224420
371000 55 0.0220249
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372000 55 0.0216910
373000 55 0.0215215
374000 55 0.0216578
375000 55 0.0216308
376000 55 0.0218414
377000 55 0.0219150
378000 55 0.0219368
379000 55 0.0219999
380000 55 0.0218310
381000 55 0.0221663
382000 55 0.0223279
383000 55 0.0226135
384000 55 0.0223150
385000 55 0.0224520
386000 55 0.0224363
387000 55 0.0228021
388000 55 0.0229445
389000 55 0.0232717
390000 55 0.0233513
391000 55 0.0239379
392000 55 0.0241630
393000 55 0.0241718
394000 55 0.0242756
395000 55 0.0243793
396000 55 0.0240023
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397000 55 0.0239537
398000 55 0.0236963
399000 55 0.0233214
400000 55 0.0234706
401000 55 0.0233352
402000 55 0.0230254
403000 55 0.0230326
404000 55 0.0231034
405000 55 0.0232212
406000 55 0.0230188
407000 55 0.0230195
408000 55 0.0231459
409000 55 0.0231887
410000 55 0.0230927
411000 55 0.0231073
412000 55 0.0233436
413000 55 0.0233997
414000 55 0.0237388
415000 55 0.0237687
416000 55 0.0239607
417000 55 0.0238959
418000 55 0.0234179
419000 55 0.0237562
420000 55 0.0238315
421000 55 0.0237402
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422000 55 0.0235916
423000 55 0.0236014
424000 55 0.0233059
425000 55 0.0230491
426000 55 0.0230564
427000 55 0.0230940
428000 55 0.0230110
429000 55 0.0230557
430000 55 0.0229402
431000 55 0.0229618
432000 55 0.0230116
433000 55 0.0230239
434000 55 0.0230180
435000 55 0.0231708
436000 55 0.0230037
437000 55 0.0229208
438000 55 0.0228704
439000 55 0.0231334
440000 55 0.0232334
441000 55 0.0232192
442000 55 0.0234457
443000 55 0.0234220
444000 55 0.0234055
445000 55 0.0235141
446000 55 0.0234993
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447000 55 0.0233849
448000 55 0.0233191
449000 55 0.0233027
450000 55 0.0232371
451000 55 0.0229592
452000 55 0.0226528
453000 55 0.0231291
454000 55 0.0229982
455000 55 0.0226765
456000 55 0.0227310
457000 55 0.0226068
458000 55 0.0224857
459000 55 0.0226412
460000 55 0.0225684
461000 55 0.0222587
462000 55 0.0223807
463000 55 0.0230071
464000 55 0.0228478
465000 55 0.0226159
466000 55 0.0227177
467000 55 0.0228161
468000 55 0.0223049
469000 55 0.0223177
470000 55 0.0225707
471000 55 0.0223031
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472000 55 0.0223659
473000 55 0.0220573
474000 55 0.0219455
475000 55 0.0215685
476000 55 0.0218031
477000 55 0.0218389
478000 55 0.0218350
479000 55 0.0218537
480000 55 0.0215342
481000 55 0.0216015
482000 55 0.0216218
483000 55 0.0216055
484000 55 0.0220969
485000 55 0.0223460
486000 55 0.0224792
487000 55 0.0226021
488000 55 0.0225726
489000 55 0.0224884
490000 55 0.0227462
491000 55 0.0228085
492000 55 0.0227225
493000 55 0.0228811
494000 55 0.0228604
495000 55 0.0229069
496000 55 0.0228947
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497000 55 0.0228236
498000 55 0.0228959
499000 55 0.0228987
500000 55 0.0227826
501000 55 0.0230496
502000 55 0.0227087
503000 55 0.0226896
504000 55 0.0226136
505000 55 0.0226715
506000 55 0.0224303
507000 55 0.0224457
508000 55 0.0224758
509000 55 0.0225994
510000 55 0.0225171
511000 55 0.0225612
512000 55 0.0226682
513000 55 0.0227632
514000 55 0.0228389
515000 55 0.0228103
516000 55 0.0229536
517000 55 0.0226491
518000 55 0.0225654
519000 55 0.0226624
520000 55 0.0225522
521000 55 0.0223820
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522000 55 0.0223008
523000 55 0.0222721
524000 55 0.0221730
525000 55 0.0221412
526000 55 0.0217941
527000 55 0.0220037
528000 55 0.0221141
529000 55 0.0219386
530000 55 0.0220872
531000 55 0.0221661
532000 55 0.0220153
533000 55 0.0219078
534000 55 0.0218308
535000 55 0.0219328
536000 55 0.0217187
537000 55 0.0215033
538000 55 0.0211548
539000 55 0.0211142
540000 55 0.0210562
541000 55 0.0212899
542000 55 0.0214787
543000 55 0.0215879
544000 55 0.0213474
545000 55 0.0211755
546000 55 0.0211922
Continued on next page...322 Appendix B DPA Results on our FPGA Setup
Table B.8 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
547000 55 0.0213414
548000 55 0.0215083
549000 55 0.0217715
550000 55 0.0217808
551000 55 0.0219963
552000 55 0.0219093
553000 55 0.0219472
554000 55 0.0220414
555000 55 0.0219047
556000 55 0.0218647
557000 55 0.0217703
558000 55 0.0216374
559000 55 0.0214333
560000 55 0.0215560
561000 55 0.0214722
562000 55 0.0216013
563000 55 0.0219330
564000 55 0.0223188
565000 55 0.0223341
566000 55 0.0226094
567000 55 0.0226072
568000 55 0.0226010
569000 55 0.0227757
570000 55 0.0228269
571000 55 0.0227803
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572000 55 0.0226850
573000 55 0.0224587
574000 55 0.0225482
575000 55 0.0221905
576000 55 0.0222250
577000 55 0.0218607
578000 55 0.0218837
579000 55 0.0217405
580000 55 0.0218165
581000 55 0.0219392
582000 55 0.0219871
583000 55 0.0219425
584000 55 0.0219708
585000 55 0.0220695
586000 55 0.0218843
587000 55 0.0220913
588000 55 0.0222594
589000 55 0.0223136
590000 55 0.0225650
591000 55 0.0227302
592000 55 0.0225318
593000 55 0.0227376
594000 55 0.0228337
595000 55 0.0229801
596000 55 0.0228682
Continued on next page...324 Appendix B DPA Results on our FPGA Setup
Table B.8 { continued from previous page
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
597000 55 0.0227811
598000 55 0.0227969
599000 55 0.0228563
600000 55 0.0230683
601000 55 0.0231087
602000 55 0.0231731
603000 55 0.0233245
604000 55 0.0234199
605000 55 0.0232844
606000 55 0.0231278
607000 55 0.0231720
608000 55 0.0229948
609000 55 0.0228187
610000 55 0.0229781
611000 55 0.0231629
612000 55 0.0231795
613000 55 0.0232121
614000 55 0.0230083
615000 55 0.0230498
616000 55 0.0230516
617000 55 0.0226402
618000 55 0.0226550
619000 55 0.0228322
620000 55 0.0227171
621000 55 0.0227997
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622000 55 0.0228952
623000 55 0.0229424
624000 55 0.0231936
625000 55 0.0231594
626000 55 0.0232569
627000 55 0.0231145
628000 55 0.0231023
629000 55 0.0229381
630000 55 0.0227285
631000 55 0.0228452
632000 55 0.0229047
633000 55 0.0229856
634000 55 0.0233396
635000 55 0.0234676
636000 55 0.0235362
637000 55 0.0235755
638000 55 0.0234514
639000 55 0.0234729
640000 55 0.0235233
641000 55 0.0234755
642000 55 0.0236967
643000 55 0.0238389
644000 55 0.0238730
645000 55 0.0241038
646000 55 0.0241206
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647000 55 0.0239100
648000 55 0.0237463
649000 55 0.0239280
650000 55 0.0239636
651000 55 0.0239914
652000 55 0.0240062
653000 55 0.0240729
654000 55 0.0241318
655000 55 0.0240166
656000 55 0.0239436
657000 55 0.0238965
658000 55 0.0240353
659000 55 0.0240496
660000 55 0.0240956
661000 55 0.0243200
662000 55 0.0244447
663000 55 0.0243435
664000 55 0.0244033
665000 55 0.0241688
666000 55 0.0240757
667000 55 0.0239031
668000 55 0.0237516
669000 55 0.0238108
670000 55 0.0238812
671000 55 0.0239931
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672000 55 0.0240523
673000 55 0.0240444
674000 55 0.0239572
675000 55 0.0239704
676000 55 0.0238484
677000 55 0.0235509
678000 55 0.0234045
679000 55 0.0234024
680000 55 0.0234343
681000 55 0.0232026
682000 55 0.0234332
683000 55 0.0233939
684000 55 0.0234660
685000 55 0.0234866
686000 55 0.0231471
687000 55 0.0231934
688000 55 0.0232617
689000 55 0.0232258
690000 55 0.0231364
691000 55 0.0232283
692000 55 0.0231072
693000 55 0.0232464
694000 55 0.0232144
695000 55 0.0232073
696000 55 0.0233805
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697000 55 0.0233881
698000 55 0.0232461
699000 55 0.0230926
700000 55 0.0232006
701000 55 0.0231249
702000 55 0.0232489
703000 55 0.0233417
704000 55 0.0234226
705000 55 0.0235472
706000 55 0.0235346
707000 55 0.0233754
708000 55 0.0231544
709000 55 0.0233531
710000 55 0.0234396
711000 55 0.0232269
712000 55 0.0234352
713000 55 0.0234541
714000 55 0.0235668
715000 55 0.0235591
716000 55 0.0235458
717000 55 0.0236515
718000 55 0.0237732
719000 55 0.0238728
720000 55 0.0237836
721000 55 0.0239790
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722000 55 0.0240992
723000 55 0.0238232
724000 55 0.0237860
725000 55 0.0240105
726000 55 0.0240203
727000 55 0.0240424
728000 55 0.0240608
729000 55 0.0240656
730000 55 0.0243310
731000 55 0.0244402
732000 55 0.0245026
733000 55 0.0244404
734000 55 0.0245753
735000 55 0.0244084
736000 55 0.0245404
737000 55 0.0243670
738000 55 0.0244719
739000 55 0.0244948
740000 55 0.0244064
741000 55 0.0242937
742000 55 0.0242620
743000 55 0.0242333
744000 55 0.0242874
745000 55 0.0242240
746000 55 0.0240976
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747000 55 0.0240453
748000 55 0.0243117
749000 55 0.0242743
750000 55 0.0241840
751000 55 0.0241468
752000 55 0.0241667
753000 55 0.0240898
754000 55 0.0239337
755000 55 0.0238944
756000 55 0.0239291
757000 55 0.0237617
758000 55 0.0236625
759000 55 0.0236655
760000 55 0.0239088
761000 55 0.0239018
762000 55 0.0237480
763000 55 0.0238418
764000 55 0.0239636
765000 55 0.0239694
766000 55 0.0240804
767000 55 0.0238987
768000 55 0.0237583
769000 55 0.0237099
770000 55 0.0236951
771000 55 0.0237075
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772000 55 0.0236823
773000 55 0.0235986
774000 55 0.0235174
775000 55 0.0235360
776000 55 0.0236109
777000 55 0.0234234
778000 55 0.0235185
779000 55 0.0233714
780000 55 0.0234807
781000 55 0.0234866
782000 55 0.0234880
783000 55 0.0234812
784000 55 0.0235509
785000 55 0.0236515
786000 55 0.0236503
787000 55 0.0237584
788000 55 0.0236717
789000 55 0.0237603
790000 55 0.0236194
791000 55 0.0238536
792000 55 0.0238561
793000 55 0.0238031
794000 55 0.0239408
795000 55 0.0238575
796000 55 0.0238053
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797000 55 0.0239255
798000 55 0.0238762
799000 55 0.0237332
800000 55 0.0237255
801000 55 0.0236927
802000 55 0.0236133
803000 55 0.0236426
804000 55 0.0236700
805000 55 0.0235764
806000 55 0.0237045
807000 55 0.0236769
808000 55 0.0234635
809000 55 0.0235421
810000 55 0.0234485
811000 55 0.0233473
812000 55 0.0234858
813000 55 0.0233426
814000 55 0.0231738
815000 55 0.0231832
816000 55 0.0232449
817000 55 0.0232205
818000 55 0.0232821
819000 55 0.0231954
820000 55 0.0231902
821000 55 0.0232414
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822000 55 0.0233720
823000 55 0.0235225
824000 55 0.0236230
825000 55 0.0235111
826000 55 0.0234112
827000 55 0.0233830
828000 55 0.0232918
829000 55 0.0231659
830000 55 0.0232540
831000 55 0.0232876
832000 55 0.0232665
833000 55 0.0233810
834000 55 0.0233733
835000 55 0.0235672
836000 55 0.0235497
837000 55 0.0236442
838000 55 0.0236199
839000 55 0.0235480
840000 55 0.0236317
841000 55 0.0234359
842000 55 0.0235311
843000 55 0.0235977
844000 55 0.0235520
845000 55 0.0236138
846000 55 0.0235512
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847000 55 0.0235428
848000 55 0.0235835
849000 55 0.0234947
850000 55 0.0235558
851000 55 0.0234952
852000 55 0.0236776
853000 55 0.0236028
854000 55 0.0235475
855000 55 0.0234832
856000 55 0.0233600
857000 55 0.0233232
858000 55 0.0232326
859000 55 0.0232118
860000 55 0.0234756
861000 55 0.0235324
862000 55 0.0236168
863000 55 0.0236407
864000 55 0.0236369
865000 55 0.0236786
866000 55 0.0235739
867000 55 0.0233832
868000 55 0.0231632
869000 55 0.0232710
870000 55 0.0233687
871000 55 0.0233418
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872000 55 0.0233605
873000 55 0.0235022
874000 55 0.0235241
875000 55 0.0233553
876000 55 0.0233502
877000 55 0.0233903
878000 55 0.0234680
879000 55 0.0235384
880000 55 0.0236377
881000 55 0.0235877
882000 55 0.0236188
883000 55 0.0235467
884000 55 0.0235441
885000 55 0.0234065
886000 55 0.0233904
887000 55 0.0235787
888000 55 0.0235087
889000 55 0.0235353
890000 55 0.0235128
891000 55 0.0235904
892000 55 0.0235699
893000 55 0.0234802
894000 55 0.0235128
895000 55 0.0235203
896000 55 0.0233965
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897000 55 0.0231740
898000 55 0.0231272
899000 55 0.0231249
900000 55 0.0231913
901000 55 0.0230778
902000 55 0.0230895
903000 55 0.0231124
904000 55 0.0230406
905000 55 0.0229261
906000 55 0.0230405
907000 55 0.0229102
908000 55 0.0227871
909000 55 0.0228716
910000 55 0.0229370
911000 55 0.0230202
912000 55 0.0230052
913000 55 0.0229561
914000 55 0.0228839
915000 55 0.0229717
916000 55 0.0229945
917000 55 0.0228082
918000 55 0.0227637
919000 55 0.0227433
920000 55 0.0227323
921000 55 0.0226642
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922000 55 0.0227366
923000 55 0.0226116
924000 55 0.0226218
925000 55 0.0225490
926000 55 0.0227553
927000 55 0.0225934
928000 55 0.0225345
929000 55 0.0226190
930000 55 0.0226316
931000 55 0.0225449
932000 55 0.0225108
933000 55 0.0224592
934000 55 0.0224098
935000 55 0.0224335
936000 55 0.0224549
937000 55 0.0224357
938000 55 0.0223296
939000 55 0.0222871
940000 55 0.0223180
941000 55 0.0222505
942000 55 0.0223439
943000 55 0.0222692
944000 55 0.0222578
945000 55 0.0221808
946000 55 0.0221179
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947000 55 0.0222285
948000 55 0.0222113
949000 55 0.0222151
950000 55 0.0221704
951000 55 0.0221381
952000 55 0.0220697
953000 55 0.0220132
954000 55 0.0219369
955000 55 0.0219256
956000 55 0.0218211
957000 55 0.0218643
958000 55 0.0218604
959000 55 0.0220530
960000 55 0.0219090
961000 55 0.0218173
962000 55 0.0217987
963000 55 0.0219435
964000 55 0.0219593
965000 55 0.0218910
966000 55 0.0219860
967000 55 0.0219453
968000 55 0.0219114
969000 55 0.0219574
970000 55 0.0219392
971000 55 0.0219915
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972000 55 0.0219212
973000 55 0.0217792
974000 55 0.0219482
975000 55 0.0221158
976000 55 0.0221622
977000 55 0.0220344
978000 55 0.0219768
979000 55 0.0219030
980000 55 0.0219602
981000 55 0.0219804
982000 55 0.0220225
983000 55 0.0219750
984000 55 0.0220859
985000 55 0.0221643
986000 55 0.0222136
987000 55 0.0223513
988000 55 0.0223944
989000 55 0.0223372
990000 55 0.0224221
991000 55 0.0225230
992000 55 0.0225839
993000 55 0.0224223
994000 55 0.0225553
995000 55 0.0225747
996000 55 0.0226124
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997000 55 0.0227537
998000 55 0.0227757
999000 55 0.0227587
1000000 55 0.0227692
B.3 AES
DPA results from an unprotected AES implementation are presented here.
B.3.1 AES with Hamming Weight Hypothesis and Parti-
tion Function of 4
Table B.9: Dierent number of traces and the subkey with highest correlation
value for unprotected AES using Hamming weight hypothesis and partition
function of 4
number of traces subkey with highest correlation correlation value
1 255 0.6758750
2 253 1.0351033
3 253 1.1191625
4 253 1.1593580
5 253 1.2122250
6 251 1.2562100
7 251 1.2538525
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8 251 1.2536889
9 251 1.2665570
10 251 1.3114655
11 251 1.3304925
12 235 1.3579862
13 235 1.3539579
14 235 1.3481587
15 203 1.3637250
16 63 1.3654182
17 63 1.3936950
18 12 1.3969879
19 12 1.3950910
20 12 1.3943971
21 12 1.4160432
22 12 1.4184161
23 12 1.4309512
24 12 1.4292568
25 12 1.4254550
26 12 1.4234270
27 12 1.4176029
28 12 1.4264476
29 12 1.4360847
30 12 1.4451339
31 12 0.7429189
32 12 0.7431372
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33 7 0.4394990
34 7 0.4336728
35 7 0.4372876
36 7 0.4321726
37 7 0.4326957
38 7 0.4307614
39 7 0.4400395
40 12 0.3637262
41 12 0.3631307
42 12 0.3235807
43 12 0.3261257
44 12 0.2503319
45 202 0.2487427
46 143 0.2459191
47 7 0.2423425
48 118 0.2386479
49 143 0.2420172
50 143 0.2377949
51 143 0.2357187
52 143 0.2457941
53 143 0.2503964
54 118 0.2452437
55 187 0.2311450
56 187 0.2509266
57 187 0.2346607
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58 187 0.2358395
59 187 0.2386027
60 143 0.2275443
61 143 0.2331801
62 143 0.2322681
63 187 0.2425794
64 187 0.2405627
65 187 0.2415246
66 187 0.2358835
67 187 0.2141718
68 143 0.2007716
69 143 0.2101496
70 143 0.2031910
71 143 0.1947658
72 143 0.1908288
73 143 0.1915637
74 71 0.1898652
75 219 0.1767728
76 219 0.1771314
77 219 0.1815394
78 219 0.1755060
79 127 0.1768228
80 127 0.1762851
81 127 0.1728932
82 127 0.1768010
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83 219 0.1690609
84 127 0.1722271
85 127 0.1739762
86 127 0.1840075
87 219 0.1773703
88 127 0.1775180
89 127 0.1749925
90 127 0.1799524
91 127 0.1807868
92 127 0.1801107
93 127 0.1725874
94 127 0.1732246
95 127 0.1815166
96 127 0.1778331
97 127 0.1664960
98 127 0.1724545
99 127 0.1666192
100 74 0.1802946
101 74 0.1841296
102 74 0.1778614
103 74 0.1758622
104 74 0.1790654
105 74 0.1927517
106 74 0.1933392
107 74 0.1929603
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108 74 0.1936024
109 74 0.2016625
110 74 0.2048862
111 74 0.2023200
112 74 0.2013189
113 74 0.1985370
114 74 0.1999572
115 74 0.1999185
116 74 0.2005384
117 74 0.2064412
118 74 0.1999775
119 74 0.1995589
120 74 0.2039623
121 74 0.2044964
122 74 0.1965770
123 74 0.1965466
124 74 0.1962712
125 74 0.1974360
126 74 0.1903870
127 74 0.1904489
128 74 0.1850362
129 74 0.1849990
130 74 0.1736224
131 74 0.1728044
132 74 0.1757530
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133 74 0.1773746
134 74 0.1727366
135 74 0.1731759
136 74 0.1752731
137 74 0.1764341
138 74 0.1833671
139 74 0.1831146
140 74 0.1829893
141 74 0.1841158
142 74 0.1840747
143 74 0.1794033
144 74 0.1753723
145 74 0.1746202
146 74 0.1653067
147 74 0.1655105
148 74 0.1674302
149 74 0.1626814
150 74 0.1628953
151 74 0.1608651
152 74 0.1608929
153 74 0.1593175
154 130 0.1575456
155 74 0.1550866
156 130 0.1546735
157 130 0.1570533
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158 130 0.1549847
159 130 0.1502595
160 207 0.1502523
161 207 0.1501145
162 207 0.1506643
163 207 0.1507927
164 207 0.1506798
165 207 0.1501027
166 207 0.1537547
167 207 0.1506503
168 207 0.1519700
169 207 0.1526288
170 207 0.1542613
171 207 0.1548295
172 207 0.1527021
173 207 0.1541045
174 207 0.1540347
175 207 0.1520896
176 207 0.1504668
177 207 0.1503730
178 130 0.1510642
179 130 0.1533268
180 130 0.1541372
181 130 0.1552816
182 130 0.1547044
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183 130 0.1528105
184 130 0.1480359
185 55 0.1482863
186 207 0.1488339
187 207 0.1477876
188 207 0.1484644
189 55 0.1502245
190 55 0.1483035
191 55 0.1474328
192 130 0.1461076
193 130 0.1435286
194 130 0.1412316
195 55 0.1398395
196 130 0.1415853
197 130 0.1420224
198 130 0.1461644
199 130 0.1457538
200 130 0.1509892
201 130 0.1503682
202 130 0.1556449
203 130 0.1529034
204 130 0.1510262
205 130 0.1486238
206 130 0.1498581
207 130 0.1482608
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208 130 0.1461196
209 130 0.1454608
210 130 0.1472858
211 130 0.1485989
212 130 0.1498534
213 130 0.1486492
214 130 0.1475874
215 130 0.1450107
216 130 0.1435337
217 130 0.1428901
218 130 0.1405639
219 130 0.1411633
220 130 0.1380882
221 55 0.1364736
222 55 0.1366161
223 55 0.1438833
224 55 0.1425170
225 130 0.1422681
226 130 0.1417496
227 130 0.1414196
228 130 0.1411823
229 130 0.1421313
230 130 0.1423911
231 130 0.1390693
232 55 0.1356278
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233 55 0.1360938
234 55 0.1383433
235 55 0.1375430
236 55 0.1376478
237 55 0.1386513
238 55 0.1400772
239 55 0.1390974
240 55 0.1391016
241 55 0.1369315
242 55 0.1397030
243 55 0.1371697
244 55 0.1356038
245 55 0.1379631
246 55 0.1363991
247 55 0.1383068
248 55 0.1376121
249 55 0.1369554
250 55 0.1402948
251 55 0.1420217
252 55 0.1398381
253 55 0.1385114
254 55 0.1384862
255 55 0.1405477
256 55 0.1385977
257 55 0.1405170
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258 55 0.1405461
259 55 0.1413527
260 55 0.1408701
261 55 0.1440162
262 55 0.1439708
263 55 0.1463417
264 55 0.1461975
265 55 0.1483996
266 55 0.1462930
19800 55 0.1140298
19900 55 0.1143453
20000 55 0.1144660352 Appendix B DPA Results on our FPGA Setup
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Figure B.8: DPA result for all encryption rounds on FPGA Implementation of
dual rail path switching and alternating spacer AES Sbox for Hamming weight
hypothesis and partition function of 6
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Figure B.9: DPA result for all encryption rounds on FPGA Implementation of
AES without any countermeasure for Hamming weight hypothesis and partition
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